Sharing Nonconvex Costs

Journal of Global Optimization

Volumn 20, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 257-271

  Evstigneev, I V ^a   Flam, S D ^b  

^a CENTRAL ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICS INSTITUTE   (Russian Federation)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Core allocations; Duality gap; Lack of convexity; Production games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035416251     PISSN: 09255001     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017599310112     Document Type: Article

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