Learning game theory from John Harsanyi

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 20-25

  Myerson, Roger ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035402244     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0868     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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