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1
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84971847886
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Moral beliefs and blameworthiness
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Lloyd Fields, "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness," Philosophy 69 (1994), p. 412. See also, Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
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Fields, L.1
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2
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84971847886
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Philadelphia: Temple University Press
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Lloyd Fields, "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness," Philosophy 69 (1994), p. 412. See also, Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
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(1992)
Moral Responsibility and Persons
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Schlossberger, E.1
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3
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0040864164
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Beliefs and responsibility
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Carl Elliot, "Beliefs and Responsibility, the Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1991), p. 244.
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(1991)
Journal of Value Inquiry
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, pp. 244
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Elliot, C.1
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4
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0000135084
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Moral responsibility and ignorance
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See Michael Zimmerman, "Moral Responsibility and Ignorance," Ethics 107 (1997).
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(1997)
Ethics
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Zimmerman, M.1
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6
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0007257831
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Ibid.
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(1997)
Ethics
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7
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0007182964
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Ibid., p. 409.
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Ethics
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8
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0007257832
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-
Ibid.
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(1997)
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, vol.107
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-
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9
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0007305283
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Ibid., p. 414. See also, Elliot, op. cit., pp. 235 ff.
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Ethics
, pp. 414
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10
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4243331960
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Ibid., p. 414. See also, Elliot, op. cit., pp. 235 ff.
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Ethics
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Elliot1
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11
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0004260399
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New York: Oxford University Press
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Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 152.
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(1986)
Harm to Self
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Feinberg, J.1
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19
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84960595364
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Is justified true belief knowledge?
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Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963).
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(1963)
Analysis
, vol.23
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Gettier, E.1
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20
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0007189086
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Boulder, Colo.: Westview
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Keith Lehrer, Theoiy of Knowledge (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 16.
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(1990)
Theoiy of Knowledge
, pp. 16
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Lehrer, K.1
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21
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0007190261
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-
note
-
I thank Joanne Ciulla, Joel Feinberg, Douglas Hicks, Keith Lehrer, and Holly Smith, as well as an anonymous referee and the Editor-in-Chief at the Journal of Value Inquiry, for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. A version of Section 3 of this paper was presented at the 2000 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and I am grateful to Michael Zimmerman for his insightful remarks at that session.
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