What is deontology? Part two: Reasons to act

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 179-193

  Gaus, Gerald F ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035374071     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010351814780     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. Philip Pettit, "Consequentialism" in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 233.
2. Philip Pettit, The Common Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 303.
3. For a similar understanding of deontology, see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 499.
4. Stanley I. Benn, "Personal Freedom and Environmental Ethics" in Gray Dorsey, ed., Equality and Freedom: International and Comparative Jurisprudence (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publication, 1977), vol. II, p. 414. See also Gerald F. Gaus, Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 138.
5. Stanley I. Benn, "Personal Freedom and Environmental Ethics" in Gray Dorsey, ed., Equality and Freedom: International and Comparative Jurisprudence (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publication, 1977), vol. II, p. 414. See also Gerald F. Gaus, Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 138.
6. See Stephen L. Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics, vol. 88 (October 1977).
7. S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 7-8.
8. Ibid.
9. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
10. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
11. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
12. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
13. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
14. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
15. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Back, trans. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1959), p. 47; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195ff. Cf. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 240; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 65-66; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 29; Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123-124; Eric Mack "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15 (Summer 1998).
16. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 26.
17. See Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
18. Kant, op. cit., p. 52.
19. Ibid., p. 39. See Onora Nell [O'Neill], Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
20. Ibid., p. 39. See Onora Nell [O'Neill], Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
21. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis for Ethics (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 97.
22. R.B. Brandt, Value and Obligation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), pp. 131-132.
23. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 278; W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 51ff.
24. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 278; W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 51ff.
25. See Jonathan Dancy, "An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties" in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 219-229.
26. See John H. Muirhead, Rule and End in Morals (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), p. 3.
27. See Bernard Gert, Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 9-10; Donagan, op. cit., p. 7.
28. See Bernard Gert, Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 9-10; Donagan, op. cit., p. 7.
29. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291; Eric Mack, "Negative Causation and the Duty of Rescue" in Edward Regis, Jr., ed., Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 149; Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., p. 50; Reiman, op. cit., p. 192.
30. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291; Eric Mack, "Negative Causation and the Duty of Rescue" in Edward Regis, Jr., ed., Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 149; Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., p. 50; Reiman, op. cit., p. 192.
31. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291; Eric Mack, "Negative Causation and the Duty of Rescue" in Edward Regis, Jr., ed., Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 149; Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., p. 50; Reiman, op. cit., p. 192.
32. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291; Eric Mack, "Negative Causation and the Duty of Rescue" in Edward Regis, Jr., ed., Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 149; Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., p. 50; Reiman, op. cit., p. 192.
33. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 46-47.
34. H.A. Prichard, "Moral Obligation" in Moral Obligation: Essays and Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949). p. 142.
35. Ibid., p. 156.
36. Kant, op. cit., p. 9. See Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., 97ff; Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 5ff.
37. Kant, op. cit., p. 9. See Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., 97ff; Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 5ff.
38. Kant, op. cit., p. 9. See Nell [O'Neill], op. cit., 97ff; Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 5ff.
39. Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 107.
40. See Gerald F. Gaus "Why All Welfare States (Including Laissez-Faire Ones) Are Unreasonable," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 15, no. 2 (June, 1998).
41. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 24. See also Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 54ff, 72, 77 and 113.
42. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 24. See also Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 54ff, 72, 77 and 113.
43. H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 121.
44. F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 8-10; Mack, "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," pp. 62-63; cf. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 216.
45. F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 8-10; Mack, "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," pp. 62-63; cf. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 216.
46. F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 8-10; Mack, "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," pp. 62-63; cf. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 216.
47. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 28ff; Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 494; Korsgaard, op. cit., p. 275.
48. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 28ff; Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 494; Korsgaard, op. cit., p. 275.
49. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 28ff; Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 494; Korsgaard, op. cit., p. 275.
50. Korsgaard, op. cit., pp. 294-295.
51. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 178.
52. Samuel Sheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Elizabeth Anderson, Values in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 73-79.
53. Samuel Sheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Elizabeth Anderson, Values in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 73-79.
54. Nagel, op. cit., p. 176.
55. Ibid., p. 177.
56. Ibid., pp. 175 and 178, quoted in Mack, "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," p. 72.
57. Ibid., pp. 175 and 178, quoted in Mack, "Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions," p. 72.
58. See Mack, op. cit.
59. Robert Olson, "Deontological Ethics" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1967).
60. Fried, op. cit., p. 9n.
61. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
62. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 105-106; Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (London: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 1-10.
63. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 105-106; Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (London: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 1-10.
64. Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20.
65. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 2.
66. Cf. Prichard's "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" in his Moral Obligation: Essays and Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 13.
67. See Gerald F. Gaus, Social Philosophy (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), ch. 1. See also Joel J. Kupperman, The Foundations of Morality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), ch. 1.
68. See Gerald F. Gaus, Social Philosophy (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), ch. 1. See also Joel J. Kupperman, The Foundations of Morality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), ch. 1.
69. See Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907), vol. I, pp. 102ff.
70. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism in John Gray, ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 184.
71. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 3.
72. See P.F. Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal," Philosophy, vol. 36 (January 1961).
73. Ibid.