Securing the accountability of international organizations

Global Governance

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 131-149

  Reinisch, August ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035315477     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00702004     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Christoph H. Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?" European Journal of International Law 4 (1993): 447-471.
2. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Christoph H. Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?" European Journal of International Law 4 (1993): 447-471.
3. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 138.
4. See Philip Alston and James Crawford, eds., The Future of UN Human Rights Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5. Decimus Junius Juvenal, Satires VI, 347. See also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, "Claims Against International Organizations - Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" Yale Journal of World Public Order 7 (1980/81): 131-176, specifically addressing problems of the responsibility of international organizations both under public international and national law. See also David P. Forsythe, "Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed Conflict," American Journal of International Law 70 (1976): 41-61, on the system of protective powers under the Geneva Conventions.
6. Decimus Junius Juvenal, Satires VI, 347. See also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, "Claims Against International Organizations - Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" Yale Journal of World Public Order 7 (1980/81): 131-176, specifically addressing problems of the responsibility of international organizations both under public international and national law. See also David P. Forsythe, "Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed Conflict," American Journal of International Law 70 (1976): 41-61, on the system of protective powers under the Geneva Conventions.
7. Decimus Junius Juvenal, Satires VI, 347. See also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, "Claims Against International Organizations - Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" Yale Journal of World Public Order 7 (1980/81): 131-176, specifically addressing problems of the responsibility of international organizations both under public international and national law. See also David P. Forsythe, "Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed Conflict," American Journal of International Law 70 (1976): 41-61, on the system of protective powers under the Geneva Conventions.
8. The best-known claims of this type concerned damage as a result of activities carried out by UN forces in the Congo in the early 1960s. After having been unsuccessfully sued before Belgian courts, Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies and État Belge (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères), Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, 11 May 1966, UNJYB (1966), 283, 45 ILR (1972), 446-455, Cour d'appel de Bruxelles, 15 September 1969, UNJYB (1969), 236, the organization assumed responsibility and agreed to make compensation to the aggrieved individuals. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and Belgium Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian Nationals, New York, 20 February 1965, UNJYB (1965), p. 39ff.
9. In the more recent American case of Abdi Hosh Askir v. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Joseph E. Connor, et al., 933 F.Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), it was ultimately the immunity from suit of the defendants that precluded the individual plaintiff from recovering damages for unauthorized and unlawful possession of his property in Somalia during the UN's peacekeeping activities in 1992. While one might indeed doubt whether national courts are the appropriate forums for such claims, the lawsuit demonstrates the problem of holding the UN accountable for property rights infringements.
10. See Special Issue on Peace-Maintenance Operations, Global Governance 4, no. 1 (1998): 1-122.
11. See August Reinisch, "Das Jugoslawien-Tribunal der Vereinten Nationen und die Verfahrensgarantien des II. UN-Menschenrechtspaktes," Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 47 (1995): 173-213.
12. See R. Provost, "Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 30 (1992): 577-639; W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, "The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes," European Journal of International Law 9 (1998): 86-141.
13. See R. Provost, "Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 30 (1992): 577-639; W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, "The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes," European Journal of International Law 9 (1998): 86-141.
14. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
15. See note 24.
16. See T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 187ff.
17. See Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, eds., The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 43.
18. See Andreas Fisahn, "Europol - Probleme der Kontrolle," Kritische Justiz 31 (1998): 358-371; Kay Hailbronner, "Die Immunität von Europol-Bediensteten," Juristenzeitung (1998): 283-289.
19. See Andreas Fisahn, "Europol - Probleme der Kontrolle," Kritische Justiz 31 (1998): 358-371; Kay Hailbronner, "Die Immunität von Europol-Bediensteten," Juristenzeitung (1998): 283-289.
20. Cf. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1962).
21. Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 1007.
22. For instance, whether the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is bound by general international law and whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide on a transgression of the Security Council's powers. See note 48.
23. See Ngaire Woods, "Good Governance in International Organizations," Global Governance 5 (1999): 39-61.
24. The 1998 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), devoted to the topic "The Challenge of Nonstate Actors," included a panel on the accountability of international organizations to nonstate actors. Similarly, the 2000 annual meeting presented a panel on an ASIL/Ford Foundation project on accountability of international institutions as well as a working panel on accountability of intergovernmental organizations.
25. See the newly formed International Law Association's Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, which first met at the 1998 ILA Conference in Taipei, ROC. ILA, ed., Report of the 68th Conference (1998), p. 584ff.
26. Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 96ff., 34.
27. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, "The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles," Australian Yearbook of International Law 12 (1992): 103.
28. Felice Morgenstern, Legal Problems of International Organizations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1986), p. 4.
29. Albert Bleckmann, "Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für Internationale Organisationen," Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 37 (1977): 107, 110ff.
30. Cf. Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, ECJ, 28 March 1996, ECR [1996 I] 1759-1790, where the ECJ considered that despite the current practice of guaranteeing the core of the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR, a formal accession of the Community would imply a change of Community law of a "constitutional dimension" that could be achieved only by treaty revision.
31. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, ECJ, 14 May 1974, ECR [1974] 491.
32. See also the succinct formulation of this jurisprudence in Article 6 (former Article F, para. 2) of the Treaty on European Union. For the wording of this article, see note 39.
33. See C. F. Amerasinghe, The Law of the International Civil Service (as Applied by International Administrative Tribunals), vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
34. See Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 824.
35. See Moshe Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 31ff.
36. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (London: London Institute of World Affairs, 1950), p. 294ff.
37. Cf. Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971), pp. 16, 294, speaking of territorial sovereignty: "This is a principle of international law that is as well established as any there can be - and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the United Nations is itself a subject of international law) as any of its individual member States are."
38. Cf. Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971), pp. 16, 294, speaking of territorial sovereignty: "This is a principle of international law that is as well established as any there can be - and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the United Nations is itself a subject of international law) as any of its individual member States are."
39. See also the statement of the World Court in Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1980), p. 90, that "international organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law."
40. See the ILC commentary on the jus cogens provision of Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations and Between International Organizations 1986, stating that "peremptory norms of international law apply to international organizations as well as to States. . . . International organizations are created by treaties concluded between States . . . despite a personality which is in some aspects different from that of States parties to such treaties, they are none the less the creation of those States. And it can hardly be maintained that States can avoid compliance with peremptory norms by creating organizations." YBILC (1982), vol. 2, part 2, p. 56.
41. Michel Virally, "Unilateral Acts of International Organizations," in M. Bedjaoui, ed., International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Paris: UNESCO and Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 241.
42. Reprinted in International Review of the Red Cross (January 1962): 29.
43. Derek W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 511ff.; Yves Sandoz, "The Application of Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the United Nations Organization," International Review of the Red Cross (1978): 274-284.
44. Derek W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 511ff.; Yves Sandoz, "The Application of Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the United Nations Organization," International Review of the Red Cross (1978): 274-284.
45. Christoph H. Schreuer, "Die Bindung Internationaler Organisationen an völkerrechtliche Verträge ihrer Mitgliedstaaten," in Konrad Ginther et al., eds., Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität: Festschrift Zemanek (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), p. 243. See also the cautious view expressed in Legal Opinion of the Secretariat of the UN, Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, in UNJYB (1972), p. 153.
46. Christoph H. Schreuer, "Die Bindung Internationaler Organisationen an völkerrechtliche Verträge ihrer Mitgliedstaaten," in Konrad Ginther et al., eds., Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität: Festschrift Zemanek (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), p. 243. See also the cautious view expressed in Legal Opinion of the Secretariat of the UN, Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, in UNJYB (1972), p. 153.
47. Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker; see note 15, p. 987.
48. O.J. C 103/1 (27 April 1977).
49. L. B. Krogsgaard, "Fundamental Rights in the European Community After Maastricht," Legal Issues of European Integration (1993/1): 108.
50. T. C. Hartley, "Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (1993): 214.
51. Cf. Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker; see note 15, p. 983, stating that - analogous to state succession principles - one might argue that international organizations should be bound by the obligations of its members states when they transferred powers to the organization.
52. Since the Dillon Round (1960-1961), the EC has participated in all GATT bodies except the Budget Committee; since the mid-1970s it has been a direct party to GATT dispute settlement proceedings. Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "The EC as a GATT Member - Legal Conflicts Between GATT Law and European Community Law," in Meinhard Hilf et al., eds, The European Community and GATT (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1986), p. 23, at 73.
53. In International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Gruenten en Fruit, the ECJ held that "in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the effect of binding the Community." Joined Cases 2124/72, [1972] ECR 1219, 1227.
54. In Watson and Belmann, it submitted that "following ratification by the Member States, the Convention is now legally binding upon the Community." Case 118/75, [1976] ECR 1185, at 1194.
55. Accession of the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, 28 March 1996, ECR I-1753.
56. José E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council," American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 1; Thomas M. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 519; W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 83; Karl Zemanek, "Is the Security Council the Sole Judge of Its Own Legality?" in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra, eds., Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 629.
57. José E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council," American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 1; Thomas M. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 519; W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 83; Karl Zemanek, "Is the Security Council the Sole Judge of Its Own Legality?" in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra, eds., Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 629.
58. José E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council," American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 1; Thomas M. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 519; W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 83; Karl Zemanek, "Is the Security Council the Sole Judge of Its Own Legality?" in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra, eds., Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 629.
59. José E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council," American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 1; Thomas M. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 519; W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 83; Karl Zemanek, "Is the Security Council the Sole Judge of Its Own Legality?" in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra, eds., Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 629.
60. ICJ, 14 April 1992, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports (1992), pp. 3, 114, ICJ, 27 February 1998, Preliminary Objections, Order.
61. ICJ, 8 April 1993, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports (1993), p. 3.
62. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Yugoslavia v. Canada) (Yugoslavia v. Germany) (Yugoslavia v. Italy) (Yugoslavia v. The Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v. Portugal) (Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom) (Yugoslavia v. United States), ICJ, Orders 2 June 1999, online at http://www.icj-cij.org.
63. Article 230 (former 173), EC Treaty.
64. Cf. August Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 35ff.
65. See Panayotis Glavinis, Les litiges relatifs aux contrats passés entre organisations internationales et personnes privées (Paris: Travaux et Recherches Pantheon-Assas Paris II, 1990).
66. According to the common law jurisdictional doctrine of forum non-conveniens, a national court should abstain from exercising its adjudicative jurisdiction if it finds that another (state's) court would be a more convenient forum for determining the questions at issue. While this usually relates to practical issues (such as the ability to conduct evidence gathering) or to procedural issues (such as the reach of a national court's [long-arm] jurisdiction over foreign parties and things), one might also speak of a convenience offered by a forum specialized and thus competent in the legal subject matter of a dispute.
67. Cf. the European Human Rights Court's judgment in Tyrer, ECtHR, 25 February 1978, Series A, No. 26, para. 31, stating that "the [European Human Rights] Convention is a living instrument which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions."
68. See art. 25 ECHR; arts. 45 and 62 American Convention on Human Rights; art. 41 and Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
69. See Confedération Française Démocratique du Travail v. European Communities, Alternatively Their Member States (a) Jointly and (b) Severally, European Commission on Human Rights, Application No. 8030/77, 10 July 1978, p. 13; Decisions and Reports, p. 231.
70. See Confedération Française Démocratique du Travail v. European Communities, Alternatively Their Member States (a) Jointly and (b) Severally, European Commission on Human Rights, Application No. 8030/77, 10 July 1978, p. 13; Decisions and Reports, p. 231.
71. Concerning the European Communities, see M(elchers) & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, p. 64; Decisions and Reports (1990), p. 138;
72. Concerning the European Communities, see M(elchers) & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, p. 64; Decisions and Reports (1990), p. 138; concerning the European Patent Organization, see Heinz v. Contracting Parties Who Are Also Parties to the European Patent Convention, ECommHR, Application No. 12090/92, 10 January 1994, 76-A Decisions and Reports (1994), p. 125. See note 70 for potential exceptions.
73. Concerning the European Communities, see M(elchers) & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, p. 64; Decisions and Reports (1990), p. 138; concerning the European Patent Organization, see Heinz v. Contracting Parties Who Are Also Parties to the European Patent Convention, ECommHR, Application No. 12090/92, 10 January 1994, 76-A Decisions and Reports (1994), p. 125. See note 70 for potential exceptions.
74. Concerning the European Communities, see M(elchers) & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, p. 64; Decisions and Reports (1990), p. 138; concerning the European Patent Organization, see Heinz v. Contracting Parties Who Are Also Parties to the European Patent Convention, ECommHR, Application No. 12090/92, 10 January 1994, 76-A Decisions and Reports (1994), p. 125. See note 70 for potential exceptions.
75. See H.v.d.P. v. The Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 217/1986, 8 April 1987, 9 HRLJ (1988), p. 254.
76. Established by UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993).
77. Established by UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994).
78. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, reprinted in International Legal Materials 72 (1998): 999.
79. Cf. Symposium: "State Responsibility," European Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 339-460.
80. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, available online at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm (21 June 2000).
81. Art. 8 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia provides that "the territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and territorial waters. The temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to a period beginning on 1 January 1991."
82. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Typology of Transjudicial Communication," in Thomas M. Franck and Gregory H. Fox, eds., International Law Decisions in National Courts (Irvington, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1995), p. 37.
83. Cf. Internationale HandelsgesellschaftmbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I), German Federal Constitutional Court, 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. After the ECJ had assumed its role as protector of fundamental rights, the German court reversed and held that it would abstain from exercising its human rights scrutiny over acts of EC organs "as long as" an equal human rights protection is guaranteed by the ECJ. In re application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), Federal Constitutional Court, 22 October 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339 [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225.
84. See only Hartley, note 11, p. 130ff.
85. M(elchers). & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, Decisions and Reports (1990), pp. 64, 138, at 145.
86. M(elchers). & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 13258/77, 9 February 1990, Decisions and Reports (1990), pp. 64, 138, at 145.
87. Karlheinz Beer and Philip Regan v. Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 28934/95, 2 December 1997; ECtHR, available online at http://ww.dhcour. coe.fr/hudoc (18 February 1999).
88. Richard Waite and Terry Kennedy v. Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 26083/94, 2 December 1997; ECtHR, available online at http://www. dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc (18 February 1999).
89. Karlheinz Beer and Philip Regan v. Germany, ECtHR, 18 February 1999, Judgment, par. 67.
90. Denise Matthews v. United Kingdom, Application No. 24833/94, ECtHR, available online at http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc (18 February 1999).
91. In the particular case, the court held that an EC Council decision, exempting residents of Gibraltar from the right to vote for the European Parliament, violated the right to free and regular legislative elections as guaranteed by art. 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR.