Incentive regulation and the change in productive efficiency of local exchange carriers

Applied Mathematical Modelling

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 335-345

  Uri, Noel D ^a  

^a FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DATA REDUCTION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS (LEC);

TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY;

DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; REGULATORY APPROACH; TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0035310995     PISSN: 0307904X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0307-904X(00)00056-1     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. The mathematical programming approach to efficiency analysis
2. Some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis
3. Decomposing TFP growth in the presence of cost inefficiency, non-constant returns to scale, and technological progress
4. Regulating by capping prices
5. A measure of technical change and returns to scale
6. Incentives for cost reduction under price cap regulation
7. Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
8. Biased efficiency growth and capital-labor substitution in US 1899-1969
9. The coefficient of resource utilization
10. The measurement of productive efficiency
11. An analysis of production as an efficient combination of activities
12. The effects of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey
13. Empirical estimation and partitioning of X-inefficiency: A data-envelopment approach
14. Production frontiers and productive efficiency
15. Total factor productivity growth technological progress and technical efficiency change: Dimensions of productivity change in Yugoslavia, 1965-1978
16. A note on the duality between production and cost functions: Rate of return to scale and rate of technological progress
17. Strategic firm behavior under a dynamic regulatory adjustment process
18. Recent developments in DEA: The mathematical programming approach to frontier analysis
19. The averch and johnson analysis of public utility regulation twenty years later
20. Capital waste in the rate-of-return regulated firm
21. Costly gains to breaking up: LECs and the baby bells
22. Technical change and the aggregate production function
23. Price-cap regulation of telecommunications services: A long-run approach
24. A non-Bayesian incentive mechanism using two-part tariffs