The value of endangered species

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 43-58

  Bradley, Ben ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035286067     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010383322591     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Judith Thomson, "The Right and the Good," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), p. 294n.
2. See Robert Elliot, "Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness," Monist 75 (1992).
3. See Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Alastair Gunn, "Why Should We Care About Rare Species?" Environmental Ethics 2 (1980); and Nicholas Rescher, Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).
4. See Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Alastair Gunn, "Why Should We Care About Rare Species?" Environmental Ethics 2 (1980); and Nicholas Rescher, Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).
5. See Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Alastair Gunn, "Why Should We Care About Rare Species?" Environmental Ethics 2 (1980); and Nicholas Rescher, Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).
6. Robin Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Athens, Ga.: The University of Georgia Press, 1991).
7. Robin Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Athens, Ga.: The University of Georgia Press, 1991).
8. Gunn, "Preserving Rare Species," in Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), p. 330.
9. Ibid., p. 330.
10. See Rescher, op. cit. p. 87.
11. G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (New York: The Humanities Press, 1951), p. 260.
12. Elliot, op. cit., p. 139.
13. Ibid., pp. 138-139.
14. Ibid., p. 139.
15. Ibid., p. 138.
16. Ibid., p. 139.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Rolston, op. cit., p. 131.
20. Ibid., p. 144.
21. Ibid., p. 150.
22. Gunn, "Why Should We Care About Rare Species?" op. cit., p. 36.
23. Rescher, op. cit., p. 80.
24. Rick O'Neil, "Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species," Environmental Ethics 19 (1997), p. 49.
25. Rolston, op. cit., p. 135.
26. Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981), p. 104.
27. J. Baird Callicott, "The Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity, ed. Bryan Norton (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 160.
28. Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation, op. cit., pp. 19-20. Also see Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, op. cit., p. 151.
29. Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation, op. cit., pp. 19-20. Also see Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, op. cit., p. 151.
30. See Callicott, op. cit., p. 139.
31. G.W. Leibniz, The Monadology and Other Writings (London: Oxford University Press, 1898), p. 347.
32. Roderick Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 71-72.
33. See G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 107; W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 72; William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 66; and C.D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 258.
34. See G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 107; W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 72; William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 66; and C.D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 258.
35. See G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 107; W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 72; William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 66; and C.D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 258.
36. See G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 107; W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 72; William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 66; and C.D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 258.
37. C.I. Lewis, The Ground and Nature of the Right (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 68.
38. See A.C. Ewing, Value and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 221, and Peter Miller, "Value as Richness: Toward a Value Theory for an Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982), p. 108n.
39. See A.C. Ewing, Value and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 221, and Peter Miller, "Value as Richness: Toward a Value Theory for an Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982), p. 108n.
40. Leibniz, op. cit., p. 249.
41. Leibniz, Theodicy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 198.
42. Chisholm, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
43. Ibid., p. 71.
44. See David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
45. See John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), and Monroe Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965).
46. See John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), and Monroe Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965).
47. Bryan Norton, "Epistemology and Environmental Values," Monist 75 (1992).
48. Ibid., p. 213.
49. Ibid., p. 215.
50. See John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992).
51. See Margarita Rosa Levin, "A Defense of Objectivity," in The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1999).
52. Russow, op. cit., p. 109.
53. Ibid., p. 112.
54. Callicott, op. cit., p. 151.
55. E.O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 346.
56. Ibid., p. 31.
57. Geerat Vermeij, "The Biology of Human-Caused Extinction," in Norton, The Preservation of Species, op. cit., p. 44.
58. This paper was presented at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Brown University; I thank those who were present on those occasions, especially my commentators, Erik Wielenberg and Jason Kawall, for their excellent comments. I also thank Ed Abrams for helpful discussion. I am especially indebted to Fred Feldman and two anonymous referees for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.