Germany and Europe after Kohl: Between social democracy and normalization?

German Studies Review

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 55-82

  Handl, Vladmir ^a   Jeffery, Charlie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0035242134     PISSN: 01497952     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1433156     Document Type: Review

References (144)

1. We are grateful that research for this paper was supported by an ESRC project entitled "Germany and the Reshaping of Europe" and awarded under the One Europe or Several? Research Programme, Reference number L213252002. We also thank Adrian Hyde-Price and James Sloam for the material they put at our disposal in writing the paper.
2. Klaus Goetz, "National Governance and European Integration: Intergovernmental Relations in Germany," Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (1995).
3. See sections two and three.
4. Entirely justifying Gunther Hellmann's comment that "the most outstanding characteristic of German foreign policy after 1990 has been continuity in the rhetoric of continuity." Quoted in Gunther Hellmann, "Nationale Normalität als Zukunft? Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik, in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik" 24 (1999), 837.
5. Aufbruch und Erneuerung-Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen., Bonn 20.10.1998. (Hereafter Koalitionsvereinbarung), 41.
6. "Weil wir Deutschlands Kraft vertrauen." Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. 10.11.1998 (hereafter Regierungserklärung), Bulletin. Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Nr.74, 11.11.1998, 912.
7. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 41.
8. Regierungserklärung, 914.
9. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 42.
10. Regierungserklärung, 913.
11. Regierungserklärung, 914.
12. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.11.1998, 1-2.
13. E.g., Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy. Berlin's Difficulties," in F. Boterman et al. eds., Van Bonn naar Berlijn, Deel 3 (Amsterdam, Duitsland Instituut, 1997).
14. P. Placak, "Vlak sjednocovani Evropy nabira novy smer," Lidove noviny, 5.12.1998, p. 10.
15. Hans Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik," Europa-Archiv, 10 (1992).
16. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 41.
17. Albert Statz, Christian Sterzing, "Grüne Perspektiven auf die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft," Integration, 22 (1999), 31, 35.
18. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 41.
19. Koalitionsvereinbarung, pp. 44-45. This was an issue Foreign Minister Fischer pursued a little too vigorously, considering the brusquely negative reactions it raised in the USA, NATO, and Poland, and the conspicuous lack of support from the SPD and its Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping. The SPD regarded the issue primarily as a means of succouring pacifist elements in the party rank and file and therefore at best as a long-term goal rather than a priority for current policy. See Der Spiegel, 23.11.1998,87; Badische Zeitung, 27.11.1998. Also interview with a prominent member of the SPD expert commission for foreign and foreign and security policy, Bonn, December 1998.
20. Regierungserklärung, 912.
21. Quoted in Die Zeit, 12.5.1999, 18.
22. The Guardian, 23.10.1998.
23. The Times, 22.10.1998.
24. The Independent, 23,10.1998.
25. Niall Ferguson, "The Best Thing about Europe is that They'll Wreck the Euro," The Independent, 26.11.1998.
26. Cf. Bodo Hombach, Aufbruch. Die Politik der neuen Mitte, Econ (1998). Hombach was Schröder's chief of staff in the chancellor's office through to his unexpected transfer to run the EU aid effort in Kosovo in June 1999.
27. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 1. See also Regierungserklärung, 902.
28. Oskar Lafontaine, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, "Europa - sozial und stark. Märkte brauchen die ordnende Hand des Staates," Die Zeit, No. 3, 1999.
29. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 41.
30. Cf. Oskar Lafontaine, "Notwendig ist Steuergerechtigkeit," Das Parlament, 27.11.1998, 8.
31. Quoted in The Independent, 3.11.1998.
32. Regierungserklärung, 913.
33. Kohl and his Finance Minister Theo Waigel had largely created the EMU framework of ECB independence and Stability Pact.
34. E.g. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 4-5.
35. Günther Verbeugen, "Deutschland und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft: Erwartungen und Realitäten," Integration 22 (1999), 2; Günther Verheugen, "The Future of Germany's European Policy," speech at the Centre for European Reform, 3 February 1999, 5; Objectives and Priorities of the German Presidency in the Council of the European Union, http://www.eu-praesidentschaft.de/ausland/englisch/01/frameset .html. (1999), 3.
36. Günther Verbeugen, "Deutschland und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft: Erwartungen und Realitäten," Integration 22 (1999), 2; Günther Verheugen, "The Future of Germany's European Policy," speech at the Centre for European Reform, 3 February 1999, 5; Objectives and Priorities of the German Presidency in the Council of the European Union, http://www.eu-praesidentschaft.de/ausland/englisch/01/frameset .html. (1999), 3.
37. Our emphases. Dietrich von Kyaw, "Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien," ZEI Discussion Papers, No. C33 (1999), 6.
38. "... structural reforms, responsible behaviour by the social partners, tax and other performance incentives, and also the financial support of innovative projects." Ibid.
39. Günther Verbeugen in discussion with Reinhold Bocklet (Bavarian European Minister) on the theme "Europa wohin? - Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union," Bayerische Landesvertretung, Bonn, 4.5.1999.
40. Der Spiegel, 9.11.1998, front cover caption.
41. See respectively The Sun, 25.11.1998, 2.12.1998; The Independent 24.11.1998.
42. See respectively The Sun, 25.11.1998, 2.12.1998; The Independent 24.11.1998.
43. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 41.
44. Objectives and Priorities of the German Presidency (1999).
45. Quoted in Financial Times, 3.12.1998.
46. "Coordination," apparently, was the preferred term. See, e.g., The Independent, 2.12.1998.
47. "Coordination," apparently, was the preferred term. See, e.g., The Independent, 2.12.1998.
48. Verbeugen, "The Future of Germany's European Policy," 5.
49. The Independent, 9.12.1998.
50. "Chaos mit dem Kanzler," Der Spiegel, 5 (1999), 22-34. A more charitable view, represented in some quarters, was that Schröder's (ultimately successful) strategy was to disable a powerful rival by "giving him enough rope to hang himself".
51. The Guardian, 12.3.1999.
52. Financial Times, 10.4.1999.
53. Cf. Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes. Europäischer Rat in Köln 3. und 4. Juni 1999, 1-4 and 15-20.
54. The English version had the clumsier and more anodyne title: "Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte".
55. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, "Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte," http://www.labour.org.uk/views/items/0000005 3.html (1999).
56. Cf. Charlie Jeffery and Vladimir Handl, "Blair, Schröder and the Third Way," in Lothar Funk, ed., "The Economics and Politics of the Third Way" (Hamburg, 1999).
57. Blair and, Schröder (1999), 16.
58. Lafontaine and, Strauss-Kahn (1999).
59. E.g., The Independent, 14.10.1999, The Times, 22.10.1999, The Guardian 23.10.1999, The Observer, 1.11.99, Financial Times, 10.11.1999.
60. E.g., The Independent, 14.10.1999, The Times, 22.10.1999, The Guardian 23.10.1999, The Observer, 1.11.99, Financial Times, 10.11.1999.
61. E.g., The Independent, 14.10.1999, The Times, 22.10.1999, The Guardian 23.10.1999, The Observer, 1.11.99, Financial Times, 10.11.1999.
62. E.g., The Independent, 14.10.1999, The Times, 22.10.1999, The Guardian 23.10.1999, The Observer, 1.11.99, Financial Times, 10.11.1999.
63. E.g., The Independent, 14.10.1999, The Times, 22.10.1999, The Guardian 23.10.1999, The Observer, 1.11.99, Financial Times, 10.11.1999.
64. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Kontinuität oder Erneuerung? Paris und Bonn/Berlin nach den Machtwechseln," International Politik, 4 (1999).
65. Jeff Anderson and John Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," in Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (London:, Harvard University Press, 1993).
66. E.g., Christian Hacke, "Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert," Außenpolitik. German Foreign Affairs Review, 49 (1998).
67. Timothy Garton-Ash, "Germany's Choice," Foreign Affairs, 73 (1994), 74.
68. Quoted in "Germany - Annual Country Review," Financial Times, 10.11.1998, 6.
69. We are grateful to James Sloam on this point.
70. Enlargement/Agenda 2000 - Watch. Pilot issue. October 1998. Institut für Europäische Politik/TEPSA, 58-59.
71. Quoted in "Germany - Annual Country Review," Financial Times, 10.11.1998, p. 6. See also EU-Magazin, 12/1998, 19.
72. Quoted in "Germany - Annual Country Review," Financial Times, 10.11.1998, p. 6. See also EU-Magazin, 12/1998, 19.
73. "Schröder will die deutschen Zahlungen an die Europäische Union verringern," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.11.1998, 1-2.
74. Regierungserklärung, 914.
75. Bettina Marx, "Zur EU-Osterweiterung gibt es keine Alternative." Außenminister Fischer im Gespräch mit der Deutschen Welle. 8.1.1999; Von Kyaw, (1999), 10.
76. Bettina Marx, "Zur EU-Osterweiterung gibt es keine Alternative." Außenminister Fischer im Gespräch mit der Deutschen Welle. 8.1.1999; Von Kyaw, (1999), 10.
77. Europe's Path into the 21st Century, http://www.eu-praesidentschaft.de/ausland/englisch/ 01/frameset.htm.(1999).
78. Ibid.
79. Objectives and Priorities of the German Presidency (1999).
80. Ibid.
81. "A careful and complete adoption and implementation of the acquis by the accession states has priority over a quick accession." Verheugen, "Deutschland und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft" (1999), 6.
82. Ibid.
83. Friedbert Pflüger, "Europa muß Weltmacht werden. Weichenstellungen der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft," Internationale Politik, 1 (1999),° 53.
84. W. Schäuble and, K. Lamers, Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik II-zum Fortgang des europäischen Einigungsprozesses, Bonn, 3. May 1999.
85. P. Zavadil, "Nemecky kancler: Vstup do EU vam platit nebudeme," Lidove noviny, 27.11.1998, 1.
86. L. Palata, "Rozsireni Evropske unie je v rukou Nemecka," Mlada Fronta Dnes, 6.1.1999, 10.
87. As revealed in a series of interviews with German policy analysts in Bonn, December 1998.
88. "Poland Stands Firm in Face of Changing EU Attitudes," Central European Online, 19.11.1998.
89. See for example the results of the first visit of Foreign Minister Fischer to Prague in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8.1.1999.
90. Interviews of the authors with officials of Bundesländer bordering with the Czech Republic and Poland.
91. K. Pries, "Das Porzellan bleibt heil. Die rot-grünen Novizen auf europäischem Terrain mildern manchen früheren Eindruck von deutscher Arroganz," Frankfurter Rundschau, 24.11.1998.
92. Ibid.
93. This has since been reflected in Germany's ongoing and active background role in the detailed negotiations on the conditions of enlargement, which has been vital in maintaining steady progress. Interview of the authors with a high-ranking Czech diplomat, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1999.
94. Programmrede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen Union. Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg am 12.1.1999, 18-23.
95. Cf. 'Gestikulace kolem Agendy 2000 nabyva na intenzite,' Ceske noviny, CTK, 2.6.1999; 'Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Cardiff. Kohl will deutschen EU-Beitrag senken,' Süddetusche Zeitung 16.06.1998.
96. Cf. 'Gestikulace kolem Agendy 2000 nabyva na intenzite,' Ceske noviny, CTK, 2.6.1999; 'Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Cardiff. Kohl will deutschen EU-Beitrag senken,' Süddetusche Zeitung 16.06.1998.
97. Our italics. "Verbraten" in the original. Quoted in Gerd Langguth, "Ein sozialistisches Europa? Ist die These 'vom Ende des sozialdemokratischen Jahrhunderts' widerlegt?" Politische Studien, 50 (1999), 55.
98. Financial Times, 27.11.1998.
99. Schröder, quoted in The Guardian, 2. 1.1999.
100. Verheugen, "The Future of Germany's European Policy" (1999), p. 4.
101. E.g., Pflüger (1999), 58; The Independent, 13.12.1998.
102. E.g., Pflüger (1999), 58; The Independent, 13.12.1998.
103. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.2.1999, 1.
104. Von Kyaw (1999), 11-12.
105. E.g., in the CSU and in France. Cf. "Edmund Stoiber übt Kritik an EU-Zeitplan der Bundesregierung und EU-Kommission: 'Bei Agenda 2000 nichts überstürzen,' Passauer Neue Presse, 3.12.1998; H. Korfmacher, "Tritt Europa bei der Agenda 2000 auf der Stelle? Zur Situation nach dem informellen Sondergipfel auf dem Petersberg," Deutsche Welle Online, Analysen, 2.3.1999.
106. E.g., in the CSU and in France. Cf. "Edmund Stoiber übt Kritik an EU-Zeitplan der Bundesregierung und EU-Kommission: 'Bei Agenda 2000 nichts überstürzen,' Passauer Neue Presse, 3.12.1998; H. Korfmacher, "Tritt Europa bei der Agenda 2000 auf der Stelle? Zur Situation nach dem informellen Sondergipfel auf dem Petersberg," Deutsche Welle Online, Analysen, 2.3.1999.
107. Die Welt, 27.2.1999, 1.
108. Handelsblatt, 29.3.1999, 10.
109. Der Spiegel, 13 (1999), 30.
110. So Verheugen, "Europa wohin" (1999).
111. Gordon (1997), 39.
112. Ibid.
113. By which point the credibility of relying on the framework of the UN to restrain Serbian ethnic cleansing had diminished significantly given that Russia was likely to veto any effective UN-sanctioned action against its traditional ally.
114. Die Zeit, 12.5.99, 18.
115. Ibid., 19.
116. Ibid.
117. M. Soric, "Viel Strittiges. Der politische Themenkatalog bei der Reise von Bundeskanzler Schröder nach Moskau," Deutsche Welle, Analysen, 17.02.1999.
118. H. Simonian, "Past and future spur Schröder's role," Financial Times, 16.4.1999. The impression was enhanced by the complaints of both the CDU and CSU that the government was not doing enough to secure a constructive involvement of Russia in resolving the conflict, and in particular by Bavaria's CSU Minister-President, Edmund Stoiber's surprise visit to Moscow in April 1999.
119. "The participation of German forces in measures to preserve world peace and international security is bound by observance of international law and of German constitutional law. The new Federal Government will commit itself actively to preserving the monopoly of force of the United Nations and the role of the General Secretary of the United Nations." Koalitionsvereinbarung, 45.
120. We are grateful on the following points to Adrian Hyde-Price. Cf. Adrian Hyde-Price, "Berlin Republic Takes to Arms," The World Today, 55 (1999).
121. C.f. Die Zeit, 12.5.99, 18.
122. Quoted in Hellmann (1999), 841.
123. E.g. Rudolf Scharping, "Der Stein auf unserer Seele. Deutschland und der gerechte Krieg," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3.5.99.
124. Quoted in Der Spiegel, 29 March 1999, 218.
125. Vorläufige Bilanz der deutschen Präsidentschaft vom 22.06.1999, http://www.bundesregierung.de/03/0302/99072/index.html. (1999).
126. Maull (1992), p. 274. Maull does, though, regard military intervention as 'the most dramatic' and exceptional form of collective sanction. Ibid.
127. Koalitionsvereinbarung, 43.
128. Frankfurter Rundschau, 17.11.1998. Cf. B.Marx, "Lücken zur Halbzeit. Das informelle EU-Außenministertreffen offenbarte die Defizite der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft," Deutsche Welle, Analysen 15.03.1999.
129. Defence Minister Scharping, quoted in Die Zeit, 8 (1999).
130. EU Minister Verbeugen, speaking to the European Parliament on 3 May 1999, quoted in Financial Times, 31.5.1999.
131. Europäischer Rat in Köln-Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes (1999), 33.
132. Cf. Gordon (1997), pp. 49-51; Hellmann (1999), 839-40.
133. Cf. Gordon (1997), pp. 49-51; Hellmann (1999), 839-40.
134. 57 percent of the supporters of the Green party were in favour and 40 percent against the airstrikes. The position of the supporters of the other parties was as follows: SPD: 66 percent and 35 percent respectively; CDU/CSU 65 percent and 31 percent; FDP 59 percent and 35 percent. Only the PDS supporters clearly rejected the airstrikes (24 percent in favour, 70 percent against). Politbarometer, 4/99.
135. Politbarometer, 4/99. An important nuance was that intervention was much more strongly favoured by west Germans than by easterners. See Renate Köcher, "Das Kosovo spaltet in Deutschland Ost und West," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.6.1999, 5.
136. Cf. Focus, 20 (1999), 20-24.
137. U.Beck, "Der militärische Pazifismus," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19.4.1999, 15.
138. According to Michael Vesper, Green Deputy Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia: "If there is a question which might have justified our leaving the coalition, then this was it. There is nothing more important than war and peace." Quoted in Focus, 20 (1999), 23.
139. E.g., Die Woche, 11.6.99.
140. See Heather Grabbe and, Kirsty Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards (London: Cassell, 1998), 10.
141. This accounted for much of the sourness of French complaints prior to the Franco-German summit at the end of May 1999 that "Bonn has opened up initiatives, only then to follow evidently different aims," and that "since Lafontaine's resignation no German proposals on the European Employment Pact have been put forward." Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.5.1999.
142. Europe's Path into the 21st Century (1999).
143. Interview of the authors with an official of the finance ministry, Bonn, June 1999.
144. It was striking that immediately after the brokering of the deal on the EU budget at the Berlin Summit, the SPD pasted up posters for the European Election stating, next to a picture of Schröder: "We don't expect any presents from our European partners. Nor should they from us".