The theory of socially embedded games: Applications and extensions to open and closed games

Quality and Quantity

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-32

  Burns, Tom R ^a   Gomolińska, Anna ^b   Meeker, L David ^c  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIALYSTOK   (Poland)

^c Univ of New Hampshire   (United States)

Author keywords

Action repertoire; Model; Normative equilibria; Open and closed games; Role; Value complex

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035242104     PISSN: 00335177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004825116540     Document Type: Article

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