Opening the black box: An analysis of the Russian economy

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 401-422

  Goorha, P ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Barter; Gazprom; Nomenklatura; Political control; Property rights; Virtual economy

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; NATIONAL ECONOMY; PROPERTY RIGHTS;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0035194635     PISSN: 0967067X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0967-067X(01)00020-4     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Barter in Russia: Liquidity shortage versus lack of restructuring
2. The problem of social cost
3. The institutional nature of production
4. Understanding barter in Russia
5. Barriers to collective action: Steelworkers and mutual dependence in the former Soviet Union
6. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
7. A transactions theory of trade credit use
8. Russia's virtual economy
9. A simple four-sector model of the virtual economy
10. Corruption: Theory and evidence through economies in transition
11. Barter in Russia
12. How Russian enterprises cope with payments problems
13. Tunneling
14. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
15. The post-socialist transition and the state: Reflections in the light of the Hungarian fiscal problems
16. The allocation of property rights in Russia: The first round
17. Complexity in long-term contracts: An analysis of natural gas contractual provisions
18. The roles of the state in establishing property rights
19. Politicians and firms
20. Recombinant property in East European capitalism
21. Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system - A property rights-based approach