Premature deaths: Russia's radical economic transition in Soviet perspective

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 53, Issue 8, 2001, Pages 1159-1176

  Rosefielde, Steven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAUSE OF DEATH; ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; MORTALITY; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0035193792     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668130120093174     Document Type: Article

References (113)

1. The Washington Consensus refers to a set of free market, globalising policies including 'shock therapy' that American elite institutions like the IMF and World Bank believe are appropriate for developing nations and countries in transition.
2. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447. For an explanation of the Washington Consensus's change of heart see Joseph Stiglitz, 'Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition', Keynote Address, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 1999.
3. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447. For an explanation of the Washington Consensus's change of heart see Joseph Stiglitz, 'Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition', Keynote Address, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 1999.
4. Sergei Glaz'ev, a well known Russian parliamentarian, arrived at a similar conclusion. He has been criticised by Michael Ellman for using the 'alarmist' term 'genocide' for Russia's post-Soviet demographic disaster, mis-implying that Russia's fertility experience is off the charts and that the El'tsin administration deliberately tried to exterminate the Russian people. See Michael Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', paper presented at the VI ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, citing, S. Ya. Glaz'ev, Genotsid (Oktyabr' 1993 - Avgust 1998), Rossiya i novyi mirovoi poryadok. Strategiya ekonomicheskogo rosta na poroge XXI veka, 2nd ed. (Moscow, TERRA, 1998). David Powell appears sympathetic with Glaz'ev's assessment but condemns contemporary Russian culture broadly by describing the post-Soviet demographic situation as 'national self-genocide'. Roundtable on 'Health Conditions in the Former Soviet Union', American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 32nd National Convention, Denver, 11 November 2000.
5. Sergei Glaz'ev, a well known Russian parliamentarian, arrived at a similar conclusion. He has been criticised by Michael Ellman for using the 'alarmist' term 'genocide' for Russia's post-Soviet demographic disaster, mis-implying that Russia's fertility experience is off the charts and that the El'tsin administration deliberately tried to exterminate the Russian people. See Michael Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', paper presented at the VI ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, citing, S. Ya. Glaz'ev, Genotsid (Oktyabr' 1993 - Avgust 1998), Rossiya i novyi mirovoi poryadok. Strategiya ekonomicheskogo rosta na poroge XXI veka, 2nd ed. (Moscow, TERRA, 1998). David Powell appears sympathetic with Glaz'ev's assessment but condemns contemporary Russian culture broadly by describing the post-Soviet demographic situation as 'national self-genocide'. Roundtable on 'Health Conditions in the Former Soviet Union', American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 32nd National Convention, Denver, 11 November 2000.
6. Sergei Glaz'ev, a well known Russian parliamentarian, arrived at a similar conclusion. He has been criticised by Michael Ellman for using the 'alarmist' term 'genocide' for Russia's post-Soviet demographic disaster, mis-implying that Russia's fertility experience is off the charts and that the El'tsin administration deliberately tried to exterminate the Russian people. See Michael Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', paper presented at the VI ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, citing, S. Ya. Glaz'ev, Genotsid (Oktyabr' 1993 - Avgust 1998), Rossiya i novyi mirovoi poryadok. Strategiya ekonomicheskogo rosta na poroge XXI veka, 2nd ed. (Moscow, TERRA, 1998). David Powell appears sympathetic with Glaz'ev's assessment but condemns contemporary Russian culture broadly by describing the post-Soviet demographic situation as 'national self-genocide'. Roundtable on 'Health Conditions in the Former Soviet Union', American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 32nd National Convention, Denver, 11 November 2000.
7. See Janine Wedel, 'Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin', The National Interest, Spring 2000; 'Tainted Transactions: An Exchange', The National Interest, Summer 2000, and 'Tainted Transactions Continued', The National Interest, Fall 2000, pp. 117-121. For an analysis of the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory and transition policy see Steven Rosefielde, 'Rethinking Western Advice on Transition: Why Policymakers Don't Listen?', Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 3, May-June 2001, pp. 3-9, and Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems (Blackwell, London, forthcoming 2002), Chapter 14.
8. See Janine Wedel, 'Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin', The National Interest, Spring 2000; 'Tainted Transactions: An Exchange', The National Interest, Summer 2000, and 'Tainted Transactions Continued', The National Interest, Fall 2000, pp. 117-121. For an analysis of the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory and transition policy see Steven Rosefielde, 'Rethinking Western Advice on Transition: Why Policymakers Don't Listen?', Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 3, May-June 2001, pp. 3-9, and Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems (Blackwell, London, forthcoming 2002), Chapter 14.
9. See Janine Wedel, 'Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin', The National Interest, Spring 2000; 'Tainted Transactions: An Exchange', The National Interest, Summer 2000, and 'Tainted Transactions Continued', The National Interest, Fall 2000, pp. 117-121. For an analysis of the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory and transition policy see Steven Rosefielde, 'Rethinking Western Advice on Transition: Why Policymakers Don't Listen?', Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 3, May-June 2001, pp. 3-9, and Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems (Blackwell, London, forthcoming 2002), Chapter 14.
10. See Janine Wedel, 'Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin', The National Interest, Spring 2000; 'Tainted Transactions: An Exchange', The National Interest, Summer 2000, and 'Tainted Transactions Continued', The National Interest, Fall 2000, pp. 117-121. For an analysis of the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory and transition policy see Steven Rosefielde, 'Rethinking Western Advice on Transition: Why Policymakers Don't Listen?', Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 3, May-June 2001, pp. 3-9, and Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems (Blackwell, London, forthcoming 2002), Chapter 14.
11. See Janine Wedel, 'Tainted Transactions: Harvard, The Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin', The National Interest, Spring 2000; 'Tainted Transactions: An Exchange', The National Interest, Summer 2000, and 'Tainted Transactions Continued', The National Interest, Fall 2000, pp. 117-121. For an analysis of the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory and transition policy see Steven Rosefielde, 'Rethinking Western Advice on Transition: Why Policymakers Don't Listen?', Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 3, May-June 2001, pp. 3-9, and Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems (Blackwell, London, forthcoming 2002), Chapter 14.
12. The Bolshevik radical tradition has tsarist precedents that some may find illuminating. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Russia: Patterns and Problems of Economic Development, 1861-1958', in Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA, Belknap, 1966), pp. 119-51. Cf. Stefan Hedlund, 'Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation', Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 2, March 2001, pp. 213-237. The 'rule of law' in the economics literature refers first to the sanctity of private contracts from arbitrary administrative intervention, and second to democratic sovereignty so that laws correspond with popular rather than authoritarian will.
13. The Bolshevik radical tradition has tsarist precedents that some may find illuminating. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Russia: Patterns and Problems of Economic Development, 1861-1958', in Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA, Belknap, 1966), pp. 119-51. Cf. Stefan Hedlund, 'Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation', Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 2, March 2001, pp. 213-237. The 'rule of law' in the economics literature refers first to the sanctity of private contracts from arbitrary administrative intervention, and second to democratic sovereignty so that laws correspond with popular rather than authoritarian will.
14. This view was echoed by George Breslauer and Archie Brown, Roundtable, 'Nine Years After the Collapse of the USSR', 32nd National Convention, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 11 November 2000.
15. A summary measure of overall mortality in a given population is life expectancy at birth, which indicates the amount of time a newborn infant would live if it spent its life under the given regime of age-specific mortality rates. Because life expectancies at birth in the USSR are deceptive owing to the unconventional Soviet definition of infant mortality (children dying up to 1 month after birth are assumed not to have been born), the life expectancies relied on in this article were adjusted by the US Bureau of the Census. Currently, newborns are considered stillborns if they die in less than 7 days after birth. In calculating life expectancies the official infant mortality rate has been corrected for an understatement on the order of 8% of the actual value. See W. Wade Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Vol. 2, (Washington DC, May 1993), p. 807, and the note to Table 10, p. 808.
16. Murray Feshbach, 'Continuing Health Trends in the Former U.S.S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Vol.2 (Washington, DC, May 1993), pp. 847-848.
17. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
18. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
19. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
20. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
21. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
22. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
23. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
24. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
25. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
26. Russian economists developed alternative transition strategies in the late 1980s but were swept aside by Gorbachev's perestroika and then El'tsin's perekhod, although many found it convenient to claim that El'tsinism was 'inevitable'. Josef Brada & Arthur King, 'Is There a J-Curve for the Economic Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?', Economics of Planning, 25, 1, 1992, pp. 37-53; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 1-21; Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Economic Perspectives, 5, 4, 1991, pp. 91-105; Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay & Carlos Vegh, 'Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 45-66; Stanislaw Gomulka, 'The Cause of Recession Following Stabilization', Comparative Economic Studies, 33, 2, 1991, pp. 71-89; Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (London, UCL Press, 1999); Janos Kornai, 'Transformational Recession: The Main Causes', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 39-63; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 'The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 3, 1992, pp. 889-906; Andrei Rapaczynski, 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 2, 1996, pp. 87-104; Lance Taylor, 'The Market Met Its Match: Lessons for the Future from the Transition's Initial Years', Journal of Comparative Economics, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 64-87.
27. Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva, League of Nations, 1946).
28. This sensitivity test was performed by extrapolating excess deaths from the 1926 to the revised 1939 census with vital statistics available during the 1930s; see Steven Rosefielde, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 6, 1996, Table 8, p. 976, and Table 3, this article. The Lorimer method yields an unexplained residual of 11.5 million probable excess deaths; straight extrapolation a figure of 12.5 million.
29. Kingkade's projections of the future population of the RSFSR begin with the distributions of population by age and sex from the 1989 Census. Prior to the projection, the census age distributions reported by Goskomstat were adjusted at the US Bureau of the Census for under-enumeration of young children. The distributions are advanced into the future by application of both observed and assumed future trends in fertility and mortality. Various scenarios depicting possible alternative developments in the components of population growth were considered. The published projections represent the median scenario, which was the most reasonable in the US Census Bureau's judgment. Fertility assumptions differed for the short and long run. Over the short run fertility was extrapolated from the last year of reported data (1990) to 1993 at the 1987-90 pace (2.218/1.888, or 5.8% per annum). Thereafter the fertility rates are assumed to decline more gradually at the average rates observed in the 1970s (1.971/1.895, or 0.4% per annum), eventually reaching long-run limits of less than two children per couple. The limits were selected in relation to the US Census Bureau's guidelines for world population projections. The RSFSR was assigned a limiting value of 1.7, assumed for European countries. In the long run, target life expectancies for the year 2050 were chosen in relation to those assumed for countries of Europe in the US Census Bureau's current world population projections. By the year 2050 the RSFSR was assumed to attain the Census Bureau's European target values of 80 years for males and 86 years for females. The total fertility rate for the RSFSR during the 1970s (1975-76) was 1.969. The fertility rate in the last year of reported data was 1.888, which represented a significant decline from 1987, when it reached 2.218. As with fertility, projected mortality rates are distinguished for the near future and the long run. Kingkade chose assumptions to preserve the rank order of republic life expectancies at birth observed in the last year of reported data (1990). For the remainder of the 1990s the life expectancies were assumed to increase at the pace observed over the 1980s. The male life expectancy for the RSFSR in 1980-81 was 60.4. It was 62.8 in 1990. The compound annual rate of increase was 0.4% and projected life expectancy in 1998 was 64.8 years. The female life expectancy for the RSFSR in 1980-81 was 72.1. It was 73.6 in 1990. The compound annual rate of increase was 0.2% and projected life expectancy in 1998 was 74.8. See W. Wade Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Vol. 2 (Washington DC, May 1993), pp. 809-810, Table 8, p. 804, and Table 10, p. 808. Kingkade's mortality assumptions have been criticised because his mean masks wide variations. This of course does not discredit his central means, but readers should note the dispersion. Objections have also been raised against Kingkade' s fertility assumptions for being too high. To the extent that this is so, the premature death component is understated.
30. See Table A8. The 3.4 million excess deaths are mostly working age adults. See Table 2. Cf. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447.
31. Ellman, citing Rimashevskaya's estimate of 4 million illegal immigrants for the 1980s, infers that there may well have been net illegal immigration in the 1990s, perhaps enough to make the population decline illusory. But even if this were so, the distortion of the death statistics would not be very great. See Michael Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 47, p. 26 forthcoming in UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe in 2000, No. 3 (Geneva and New York, 2000). Cf. N.M. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1998 (Moscow, Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of the Population, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999), p. 95. Unregistered migrants do not significantly affect the premature death estimates here because they are not included in Goskomstat population statistics.
32. Ellman, citing Rimashevskaya's estimate of 4 million illegal immigrants for the 1980s, infers that there may well have been net illegal immigration in the 1990s, perhaps enough to make the population decline illusory. But even if this were so, the distortion of the death statistics would not be very great. See Michael Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 47, p. 26 forthcoming in UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe in 2000, No. 3 (Geneva and New York, 2000). Cf. N.M. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1998 (Moscow, Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of the Population, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999), p. 95. Unregistered migrants do not significantly affect the premature death estimates here because they are not included in Goskomstat population statistics.
33. According to Murray Feshbach abortions averaged 2 million annually during the 1990s and did not spike. Roundtable, 31st National Convention of the AAASS, St. Louis, Missouri, 20 November 1999.
34. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', Table 8, p. 804, and p. 809.
35. Table A8. There were 1.98 million births in 1990. If this level were maintained thereafter through 1998, there would have been 15.9 million new births. Kingkade's estimate was 14.1 million. The difference is 1.8 million.
36. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', pp. 809-810, and Table 8, p. 804; M. Macura, 'Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: 1982-1993', Studia Demograficzne, vol. 4, No. 122, 1995. This article is updated in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1, Chapter 4, 'Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1982-1997: Political, Economic and Social Factors', pp. 181-195. According to Vandycke, 'In the Former Soviet Union, political instability and attendant social crisis, before and immediately after its dissolution, appear to have triggered the decline. Economic decline, with its many adverse consequences for ordinary people, then reinforced the fertility decline and, in the process, probably became the major driving force'. Vandycke sheds further light on the causes of the 'excess' fertility decline by showing that the Russian rust belt (regions with the sharpest declines in industrial production and employment) suffered the greatest fall in fertility; see N. Vandycke, The Economics of the Reproduction 'Crisis' in Transition Europe, London, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis. Ellman concurs, stressing the discontinuous break in dropping Russian fertility rates 1988-98; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 37, p. 22. Ellman cautions against ascribing this decline to 'neoliberal' policies. We agree. El'tsin's reform was more sinister.
37. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', pp. 809-810, and Table 8, p. 804; M. Macura, 'Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: 1982-1993', Studia Demograficzne, vol. 4, No. 122, 1995. This article is updated in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1, Chapter 4, 'Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1982-1997: Political, Economic and Social Factors', pp. 181-195. According to Vandycke, 'In the Former Soviet Union, political instability and attendant social crisis, before and immediately after its dissolution, appear to have triggered the decline. Economic decline, with its many adverse consequences for ordinary people, then reinforced the fertility decline and, in the process, probably became the major driving force'. Vandycke sheds further light on the causes of the 'excess' fertility decline by showing that the Russian rust belt (regions with the sharpest declines in industrial production and employment) suffered the greatest fall in fertility; see N. Vandycke, The Economics of the Reproduction 'Crisis' in Transition Europe, London, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis. Ellman concurs, stressing the discontinuous break in dropping Russian fertility rates 1988-98; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 37, p. 22. Ellman cautions against ascribing this decline to 'neoliberal' policies. We agree. El'tsin's reform was more sinister.
38. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', pp. 809-810, and Table 8, p. 804; M. Macura, 'Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: 1982-1993', Studia Demograficzne, vol. 4, No. 122, 1995. This article is updated in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1, Chapter 4, 'Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1982-1997: Political, Economic and Social Factors', pp. 181-195. According to Vandycke, 'In the Former Soviet Union, political instability and attendant social crisis, before and immediately after its dissolution, appear to have triggered the decline. Economic decline, with its many adverse consequences for ordinary people, then reinforced the fertility decline and, in the process, probably became the major driving force'. Vandycke sheds further light on the causes of the 'excess' fertility decline by showing that the Russian rust belt (regions with the sharpest declines in industrial production and employment) suffered the greatest fall in fertility; see N. Vandycke, The Economics of the Reproduction 'Crisis' in Transition Europe, London, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis. Ellman concurs, stressing the discontinuous break in dropping Russian fertility rates 1988-98; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 37, p. 22. Ellman cautions against ascribing this decline to 'neoliberal' policies. We agree. El'tsin's reform was more sinister.
39. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', pp. 809-810, and Table 8, p. 804; M. Macura, 'Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: 1982-1993', Studia Demograficzne, vol. 4, No. 122, 1995. This article is updated in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1, Chapter 4, 'Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1982-1997: Political, Economic and Social Factors', pp. 181-195. According to Vandycke, 'In the Former Soviet Union, political instability and attendant social crisis, before and immediately after its dissolution, appear to have triggered the decline. Economic decline, with its many adverse consequences for ordinary people, then reinforced the fertility decline and, in the process, probably became the major driving force'. Vandycke sheds further light on the causes of the 'excess' fertility decline by showing that the Russian rust belt (regions with the sharpest declines in industrial production and employment) suffered the greatest fall in fertility; see N. Vandycke, The Economics of the Reproduction 'Crisis' in Transition Europe, London, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis. Ellman concurs, stressing the discontinuous break in dropping Russian fertility rates 1988-98; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 37, p. 22. Ellman cautions against ascribing this decline to 'neoliberal' policies. We agree. El'tsin's reform was more sinister.
40. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', pp. 809-810, and Table 8, p. 804; M. Macura, 'Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: 1982-1993', Studia Demograficzne, vol. 4, No. 122, 1995. This article is updated in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1, Chapter 4, 'Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1982-1997: Political, Economic and Social Factors', pp. 181-195. According to Vandycke, 'In the Former Soviet Union, political instability and attendant social crisis, before and immediately after its dissolution, appear to have triggered the decline. Economic decline, with its many adverse consequences for ordinary people, then reinforced the fertility decline and, in the process, probably became the major driving force'. Vandycke sheds further light on the causes of the 'excess' fertility decline by showing that the Russian rust belt (regions with the sharpest declines in industrial production and employment) suffered the greatest fall in fertility; see N. Vandycke, The Economics of the Reproduction 'Crisis' in Transition Europe, London, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis. Ellman concurs, stressing the discontinuous break in dropping Russian fertility rates 1988-98; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', note 37, p. 22. Ellman cautions against ascribing this decline to 'neoliberal' policies. We agree. El'tsin's reform was more sinister.
41. Kingkade, 'Demographic Prospects in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union', p. 809, and Table 10, p. 808.
42. Ellman attributes surging mortality rates to alcohol consumption, stress and state failure; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 24-25. Cf. France Medé, Vladimir Shkolnikov, Veronique Hertaich & Jacques Vallin, 'Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie 1965-1994', Centre de demographie et d'écologie humaine, No. 2, 1996 (Moscow), Table 12, p. 65; Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Renato Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1996, pp. 95-129. The authors attribute the transition population crisis to growing economic instability, social stress, unfavourable expectations about the future and inadequate policy action. Their econometric findings confirm the argument developed here, but without the comparative dimension. Russia's mortality experience during the 1990s was exceptional among former members of the CMEA. Instead of skyrocketing, mortality declined in the former GDR, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary. See Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', p. 132.
43. Ellman attributes surging mortality rates to alcohol consumption, stress and state failure; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 24-25. Cf. France Medé, Vladimir Shkolnikov, Veronique Hertaich & Jacques Vallin, 'Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie 1965-1994', Centre de demographie et d'écologie humaine, No. 2, 1996 (Moscow), Table 12, p. 65; Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Renato Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1996, pp. 95-129. The authors attribute the transition population crisis to growing economic instability, social stress, unfavourable expectations about the future and inadequate policy action. Their econometric findings confirm the argument developed here, but without the comparative dimension. Russia's mortality experience during the 1990s was exceptional among former members of the CMEA. Instead of skyrocketing, mortality declined in the former GDR, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary. See Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', p. 132.
44. Ellman attributes surging mortality rates to alcohol consumption, stress and state failure; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 24-25. Cf. France Medé, Vladimir Shkolnikov, Veronique Hertaich & Jacques Vallin, 'Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie 1965-1994', Centre de demographie et d'écologie humaine, No. 2, 1996 (Moscow), Table 12, p. 65; Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Renato Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1996, pp. 95-129. The authors attribute the transition population crisis to growing economic instability, social stress, unfavourable expectations about the future and inadequate policy action. Their econometric findings confirm the argument developed here, but without the comparative dimension. Russia's mortality experience during the 1990s was exceptional among former members of the CMEA. Instead of skyrocketing, mortality declined in the former GDR, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary. See Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', p. 132.
45. Ellman attributes surging mortality rates to alcohol consumption, stress and state failure; see Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 24-25. Cf. France Medé, Vladimir Shkolnikov, Veronique Hertaich & Jacques Vallin, 'Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie 1965-1994', Centre de demographie et d'écologie humaine, No. 2, 1996 (Moscow), Table 12, p. 65; Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Renato Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1996, pp. 95-129. The authors attribute the transition population crisis to growing economic instability, social stress, unfavourable expectations about the future and inadequate policy action. Their econometric findings confirm the argument developed here, but without the comparative dimension. Russia's mortality experience during the 1990s was exceptional among former members of the CMEA. Instead of skyrocketing, mortality declined in the former GDR, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary. See Ellman, 'The Social Costs and Consequences of the Transformation Process', p. 132.
46. The exact impact of economic hardship, social disruption and psychological distress will vary from case to case. A parallel hyper-depression in Ukraine has had a proportionally adverse result, but the causal association does not have to be identical everywhere.
47. Discouraged workers are usually considered subsidiary unless there is supporting evidence of long-term involuntary unemployment. This figure for Russia in 1998 was a shocking 42% of reported unemployed. The corresponding figure for the United States, those unemployed for 12 months or more, in 1995 was 0.5%; see United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No. 1 (New York, 1999), p. 135.
48. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447; Stephen Rapawy, 'Labor Force and Employment in the U.S .S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 23 November 1987), pp. 187-212. Cf. Simon Commander & Andsei Tolstopiatenko, 'Unemployment, Restructuring and the Pace of Transition', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 331-350, and S. Commander & F. Coricelli (ed.), Unemployment and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia (Washington DC, World Bank, 1996); Richard Jackman & Catalin Fauna, 'Labor Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labor Across Sectors', in Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition, pp. 273-392.
49. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447; Stephen Rapawy, 'Labor Force and Employment in the U.S .S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 23 November 1987), pp. 187-212. Cf. Simon Commander & Andsei Tolstopiatenko, 'Unemployment, Restructuring and the Pace of Transition', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 331-350, and S. Commander & F. Coricelli (ed.), Unemployment and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia (Washington DC, World Bank, 1996); Richard Jackman & Catalin Fauna, 'Labor Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labor Across Sectors', in Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition, pp. 273-392.
50. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447; Stephen Rapawy, 'Labor Force and Employment in the U.S .S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 23 November 1987), pp. 187-212. Cf. Simon Commander & Andsei Tolstopiatenko, 'Unemployment, Restructuring and the Pace of Transition', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 331-350, and S. Commander & F. Coricelli (ed.), Unemployment and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia (Washington DC, World Bank, 1996); Richard Jackman & Catalin Fauna, 'Labor Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labor Across Sectors', in Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition, pp. 273-392.
51. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447; Stephen Rapawy, 'Labor Force and Employment in the U.S .S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 23 November 1987), pp. 187-212. Cf. Simon Commander & Andsei Tolstopiatenko, 'Unemployment, Restructuring and the Pace of Transition', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 331-350, and S. Commander & F. Coricelli (ed.), Unemployment and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia (Washington DC, World Bank, 1996); Richard Jackman & Catalin Fauna, 'Labor Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labor Across Sectors', in Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition, pp. 273-392.
52. Steven Rosefielde, 'The Civilian Labour Force and Unemployment in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, December 2000, pp. 1433-1447; Stephen Rapawy, 'Labor Force and Employment in the U.S .S.R.', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 1 (Washington DC, 23 November 1987), pp. 187-212. Cf. Simon Commander & Andsei Tolstopiatenko, 'Unemployment, Restructuring and the Pace of Transition', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 331-350, and S. Commander & F. Coricelli (ed.), Unemployment and Restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia (Washington DC, World Bank, 1996); Richard Jackman & Catalin Fauna, 'Labor Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labor Across Sectors', in Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition, pp. 273-392.
53. Masaki Kuboniwa & Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Development of Capitalism in Russia (Tokyo, Maruzen), Chapter 3. The World Bank's and Goskomstat's infamous revision of Russia's GDP statistics in 1995, casting the transition in a less unfavourable light, was seriously flawed by faulty and arbitrary adjustments, as well as large arithmetical errors; see World Bank, Russian Federation: Report on the National Accounts (prepared by the Joint Roskomstat-World Bank Team) (1995). Cf. G. Khanin & N. Suslov, 'The Real Sector of the Russian Economy: Estimation and Analysis', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 8, 1999, pp. 1433-1454.
54. Masaki Kuboniwa & Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Development of Capitalism in Russia (Tokyo, Maruzen), Chapter 3. The World Bank's and Goskomstat's infamous revision of Russia's GDP statistics in 1995, casting the transition in a less unfavourable light, was seriously flawed by faulty and arbitrary adjustments, as well as large arithmetical errors; see World Bank, Russian Federation: Report on the National Accounts (prepared by the Joint Roskomstat-World Bank Team) (1995). Cf. G. Khanin & N. Suslov, 'The Real Sector of the Russian Economy: Estimation and Analysis', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 8, 1999, pp. 1433-1454.
55. Masaki Kuboniwa & Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Development of Capitalism in Russia (Tokyo, Maruzen), Chapter 3. The World Bank's and Goskomstat's infamous revision of Russia's GDP statistics in 1995, casting the transition in a less unfavourable light, was seriously flawed by faulty and arbitrary adjustments, as well as large arithmetical errors; see World Bank, Russian Federation: Report on the National Accounts (prepared by the Joint Roskomstat-World Bank Team) (1995). Cf. G. Khanin & N. Suslov, 'The Real Sector of the Russian Economy: Estimation and Analysis', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 8, 1999, pp. 1433-1454.
56. Jacek Rostowski, 'Comparing Two Great Depressions: 1929-33 to 1989-93', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 225-239; Mark Field & Judyth Twigg (eds), Torn Safety Nets (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000).
57. Jacek Rostowski, 'Comparing Two Great Depressions: 1929-33 to 1989-93', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 225-239; Mark Field & Judyth Twigg (eds), Torn Safety Nets (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000).
58. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation as a Demographic Crisis', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 351-371; Michael Ellman, 'The Russian Economy Under El'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1417-1432; Lincoln Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein & Elizabeth McKeon, 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', Population and Development Review, 22, 3, September 1996; G.A. Cornia & R. Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1, 1996; Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994;
59. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation as a Demographic Crisis', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 351-371; Michael Ellman, 'The Russian Economy Under El'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1417-1432; Lincoln Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein & Elizabeth McKeon, 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', Population and Development Review, 22, 3, September 1996; G.A. Cornia & R. Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1, 1996; Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994;
60. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation as a Demographic Crisis', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 351-371; Michael Ellman, 'The Russian Economy Under El'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1417-1432; Lincoln Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein & Elizabeth McKeon, 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', Population and Development Review, 22, 3, September 1996; G.A. Cornia & R. Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1, 1996; Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994;
61. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman,
62. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation as a Demographic Crisis', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 351-371; Michael Ellman, 'The Russian Economy Under El'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1417-1432; Lincoln Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein & Elizabeth McKeon, 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', Population and Development Review, 22, 3, September 1996; G.A. Cornia & R. Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1, 1996; Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994;
63. It can also be objected that the physical and psychological stresses of Russia's economic collapse do not explain mortality peaks in 1994 or 1999, nor the mortality break in the mid-1960s, but this is the counsel of perfection. Michael Ellman, 'The Increase in Death and Disease under "Katastroika" ', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, 1994, pp. 329-355; Michael Ellman, 'Transformation as a Demographic Crisis', in Salvatore Zecchini (ed.), Lessons From the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (OECD), 1997), pp. 351-371; Michael Ellman, 'The Russian Economy Under El'tsin', Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1417-1432; Lincoln Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein & Elizabeth McKeon, 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', Population and Development Review, 22, 3, September 1996; G.A. Cornia & R. Paniccia, 'The Transition's Population Crisis: An Econometric Investigation of Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality in Severely Distressed Economies', MOST, 6, 1, 1996; Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994;
64. Murray Feshbach, Environment and Health Atlas of Russia (Center for Post-Soviet Studies, Md, 1994);
65. Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995);
66. Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Renato Paniccia, (eds), The Transition Mortality Crisis (Oxford University Press, 1999);
67. Judith Shapiro, 'The Russian Mortality Crisis and Its Causes', in Anders Aslund (ed.), Russian Economic Reform at Risk (London, Pinter, 1995), pp. 149-178.
68. Shapiro shares Ellman's belief that stress caused these excess deaths. Her model comes from the 'biosociopsychological' approach to understanding the sources of illness, and the term stress is not considered a vague reference to 'ills of modernity'. She does not consider the situation in Russia to be 'apocalyptic' (as UNICEF ICDC, Public Policy and Social Conditions: Regional Monitoring Report, No. 1, Florence, 1993),
69. and dismisses Eberstadt's analogy to Operation Barbarossa or the Seige of Leningrad as 'absurd' based on the evidence through 1993, but perhaps the newer evidence will alter her opinion. Also see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Demographic Disaster: The Soviet Legacy', The National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 53-57;
70. cf. Eberstadt, 'Russia: too Sick to Matter?', Policy Review, June and July, 1999, note 13 on fertility;
71. José Louis Bobadilla, Christine Costello & Faith Mitchell (eds), Premature Death in the New Independent States (Washington DC, National Academic Press, 1997);
72. Vladimir Shkolnikov, France Meslé & Jacques Vallin, 'Mortality Levels, Patterns, Trends, and Quality of Data', in Bobadilla et al. (eds), Premature Death in the New Independent States, pp. 34-65;
73. W. Ward Kingkade & Edwardo E. Arriaga, 'Mortality in the New Independent States: Patterns and Impacts', in Bobadilla et al. (eds), Premature Death in the New Independent States, pp. 156-183;
74. George Demko, Gregory Ioffe & Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, Population Under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder, Westview Press, 1999);
75. Anatoly Vishnevsky & Vladimir Shkolnikov, 'Russian Mortality: Past Negative Trends and Recent Improvements', in Demko et al., Population Under Duress, pp. 59-71;
76. Barbara Anderson & Brian Silver, 'Issues of Data Quality in Assessing Mortality Trends and Levels in the New Independent States', in Bobadilla et al. (eds), Premature Deaths in the New Independent States, pp. 120-155;
77. David Leon, Larent Chenet, Vladimir Shkolnikov, Sergei Zakharov, Judith Shapiro, Galina Rakhmanova, Sergei Vassin & Martin McKee, 'Huge Variation in Russian Mortality Rates, 1984-94: Artefact, Alcohol, or What?', The Lancet, 350, 9 August 1997, pp. 383-388;
78. F. Meslé et al., Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie 1965-1994 (Sovremennye tendentsii smertnosti po prichinam smerti v Rossii 1965-1994 (Paris, INED, 1996).
79. Table 5 and Goskomstat, Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Statistical Handbook (Moscow, 1997), Table 8.1, p. 549. The worst scenario predicts an 11.8 million contraction from 146.5 million at the end of 1997 to 134.7 million in 2010. But cf. note 14.
80. Defenders of El'tsin's transition strategy usually blame premature deaths on the collapse of the Soviet empire, structural transformation, non-therapeutic shock policies, or the unforeseen side effects of shock therapy, including rent seeking, asset seizing, hyperinflation, barter, tax arrears, budgetary deficits, oligarchy and organised crime. Demographers attribute it to 'glasnost' in statistics', revealing the exact extent of the health crisis previously concealed; to endogenous long-term trends in environmental degradation and poor lifestyles, and to increased alcoholism; see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Health and Mortality in Eastern Europe 1965-85', Communist Economies, 2, 3, 1990, pp. 347-371. But cf. Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany, 1989-1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 519-533; Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); Murray Feshback & Alfred Friendly Jr, Ecocide in the USSR (New York, Basic Books, 1992). Declines in fertility in Eastern Europe and Russia have been attributed to political and economic factors, and the spread of Western family and reproductive behaviour. The latter is not considered significant in Russia; see note 15.
81. Defenders of El'tsin's transition strategy usually blame premature deaths on the collapse of the Soviet empire, structural transformation, non-therapeutic shock policies, or the unforeseen side effects of shock therapy, including rent seeking, asset seizing, hyperinflation, barter, tax arrears, budgetary deficits, oligarchy and organised crime. Demographers attribute it to 'glasnost' in statistics', revealing the exact extent of the health crisis previously concealed; to endogenous long-term trends in environmental degradation and poor lifestyles, and to increased alcoholism; see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Health and Mortality in Eastern Europe 1965-85', Communist Economies, 2, 3, 1990, pp. 347-371. But cf. Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany, 1989-1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 519-533; Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); Murray Feshback & Alfred Friendly Jr, Ecocide in the USSR (New York, Basic Books, 1992). Declines in fertility in Eastern Europe and Russia have been attributed to political and economic factors, and the spread of Western family and reproductive behaviour. The latter is not considered significant in Russia; see note 15.
82. Defenders of El'tsin's transition strategy usually blame premature deaths on the collapse of the Soviet empire, structural transformation, non-therapeutic shock policies, or the unforeseen side effects of shock therapy, including rent seeking, asset seizing, hyperinflation, barter, tax arrears, budgetary deficits, oligarchy and organised crime. Demographers attribute it to 'glasnost' in statistics', revealing the exact extent of the health crisis previously concealed; to endogenous long-term trends in environmental degradation and poor lifestyles, and to increased alcoholism; see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Health and Mortality in Eastern Europe 1965-85', Communist Economies, 2, 3, 1990, pp. 347-371. But cf. Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany, 1989-1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 519-533; Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); Murray Feshback & Alfred Friendly Jr, Ecocide in the USSR (New York, Basic Books, 1992). Declines in fertility in Eastern Europe and Russia have been attributed to political and economic factors, and the spread of Western family and reproductive behaviour. The latter is not considered significant in Russia; see note 15.
83. Defenders of El'tsin's transition strategy usually blame premature deaths on the collapse of the Soviet empire, structural transformation, non-therapeutic shock policies, or the unforeseen side effects of shock therapy, including rent seeking, asset seizing, hyperinflation, barter, tax arrears, budgetary deficits, oligarchy and organised crime. Demographers attribute it to 'glasnost' in statistics', revealing the exact extent of the health crisis previously concealed; to endogenous long-term trends in environmental degradation and poor lifestyles, and to increased alcoholism; see Nicholas Eberstadt, 'Health and Mortality in Eastern Europe 1965-85', Communist Economies, 2, 3, 1990, pp. 347-371. But cf. Eberstadt, 'Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany, 1989-1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 519-533; Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); Murray Feshback & Alfred Friendly Jr, Ecocide in the USSR (New York, Basic Books, 1992). Declines in fertility in Eastern Europe and Russia have been attributed to political and economic factors, and the spread of Western family and reproductive behaviour. The latter is not considered significant in Russia; see note 15.
84. Vladimir Lenin, State and Revolution (1918).
85. Nikolai Bukharin & Evgeny Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (Baltimore, MD, Penguin Books, 1969). Gross output in 1921 fell 69% below the 1913 level. Money became worthless and the economy was barterised; see Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 66-68.
86. Nikolai Bukharin & Evgeny Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (Baltimore, MD, Penguin Books, 1969). Gross output in 1921 fell 69% below the 1913 level. Money became worthless and the economy was barterised; see Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 66-68.
87. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, pp. 74-82.
88. E. Z. Volkov, Dinamika naseleniya SSSR za vosem' desyat let (Moscow, 1930). The reliability of Volkov's estimate is uncertain because of the poor quality of the data, and the usual problems with assumptions about trends in natality and mortality. However, there is broad agreement that Volkov's estimate is in the ballpark; see R.W. Davis, Mark Harrison & S.G. Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), pp. 62-64. The term 'command communism' is used here instead of the more familiar 'war communism' in order to stress the importance of Lenin's suppression of markets, nationalisation of the means of production, forced requisitioning and barter in causing Russia's economic prostration, as opposed to the ravages of the Civil War. On Red Army casualties see Col.-General G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses (London, Green Hill Books, 1997), Table 19, p. 35.
89. E. Z. Volkov, Dinamika naseleniya SSSR za vosem' desyat let (Moscow, 1930). The reliability of Volkov's estimate is uncertain because of the poor quality of the data, and the usual problems with assumptions about trends in natality and mortality. However, there is broad agreement that Volkov's estimate is in the ballpark; see R.W. Davis, Mark Harrison & S.G. Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), pp. 62-64. The term 'command communism' is used here instead of the more familiar 'war communism' in order to stress the importance of Lenin's suppression of markets, nationalisation of the means of production, forced requisitioning and barter in causing Russia's economic prostration, as opposed to the ravages of the Civil War. On Red Army casualties see Col.-General G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses (London, Green Hill Books, 1997), Table 19, p. 35.
90. E. Z. Volkov, Dinamika naseleniya SSSR za vosem' desyat let (Moscow, 1930). The reliability of Volkov's estimate is uncertain because of the poor quality of the data, and the usual problems with assumptions about trends in natality and mortality. However, there is broad agreement that Volkov's estimate is in the ballpark; see R.W. Davis, Mark Harrison & S.G. Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), pp. 62-64. The term 'command communism' is used here instead of the more familiar 'war communism' in order to stress the importance of Lenin's suppression of markets, nationalisation of the means of production, forced requisitioning and barter in causing Russia's economic prostration, as opposed to the ravages of the Civil War. On Red Army casualties see Col.-General G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses (London, Green Hill Books, 1997), Table 19, p. 35.
91. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p. 86.
92. Ibid., p. 188.
93. Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986).
94. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
95. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
96. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
97. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
98. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
99. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
100. 2 of 0.38, showing that weather may have had some small effect and suggesting that collectivisation and peasant deaths in Gulag were the primary causes; see Davis, Harrison & Wheatcroft, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Table 23, p. 291, and pp. 125-126; Stephane Courtois, Nicholas Werth et al., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (Norton, 1999); Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1999). Cf. J. Arch Getty, 'The Future Did Not Work', review of The Black Book of Communism and The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Atlantic Monthly, 285, 3, March 2000, pp. 113-116, where he argues for a 'balanced' view of communism as a mixed phenomenon, in no way comparable to German fascism because, as 'we now know', excess deaths were no greater than indicated in the NKVD archives, and were for the most part inadvertent. He quotes Jerry Hough's rough calculation of 1.5 million 'premature' deaths under El'tsin to derisively suggest that the concept has no serious merit in evaluating the Soviet period because to him the current toll is somehow innocuous. Getty's assessment of Soviet communism is akin to that of holocaust deniers about Nazi Germany, casting the debate over who was worse, Hitler or Stalin, in a surreal perspective; see D.D. Guttemplan, 'The Holocaust on Trial', Atlantic Monthly, 285, 2, February 2000, pp. 45-66; Galina Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: the Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian Systems (Armonk NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
101. Robert Conquest, 'Communication to the Editor', American Historical Review, June 1994, p. 1039.
102. Earlier estimates of excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort computed from life tables, and accepting the now discredited 1939 census figure of 170.3 million people, indicated that 3.8 million children had died prematurely during the 1930s; see Steven Rosefielde, 'Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialisation 1929-1949', Soviet Studies, 35, 3, July 1983, Table 11, p. 400. But if the same exercise is repeated using the new 1939 census statistic of 167.6 million people, together with the vital statistics discovered by Wheatcroft, estimated actual births decline by 3.2 million (from 57.0 to 53.8 million), implying 600 000 excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort, and 9.1 million adult negligent homicides and killings (9.7 - 0.6 = 9.1); see Steven Rosefielde, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 6, 1996, Table 4, p. 972. However, in contemplating the balance it should be remembered that the data exclude abortions, and treat a large proportion of infant deaths as stillborns. Andreev, Darsky & Khar'kova estimate that as many as 5 million infant deaths may have been unreported or improperly classified as stillborns; see E.M. Andreev, L.E. Darsky & T.L. Khar'kova, Naselenie Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1922-1991 (Moscow, Nauka, 1993).
103. Earlier estimates of excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort computed from life tables, and accepting the now discredited 1939 census figure of 170.3 million people, indicated that 3.8 million children had died prematurely during the 1930s; see Steven Rosefielde, 'Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialisation 1929-1949', Soviet Studies, 35, 3, July 1983, Table 11, p. 400. But if the same exercise is repeated using the new 1939 census statistic of 167.6 million people, together with the vital statistics discovered by Wheatcroft, estimated actual births decline by 3.2 million (from 57.0 to 53.8 million), implying 600 000 excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort, and 9.1 million adult negligent homicides and killings (9.7 - 0.6 = 9.1); see Steven Rosefielde, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 6, 1996, Table 4, p. 972. However, in contemplating the balance it should be remembered that the data exclude abortions, and treat a large proportion of infant deaths as stillborns. Andreev, Darsky & Khar'kova estimate that as many as 5 million infant deaths may have been unreported or improperly classified as stillborns; see E.M. Andreev, L.E. Darsky & T.L. Khar'kova, Naselenie Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1922-1991 (Moscow, Nauka, 1993).
104. Earlier estimates of excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort computed from life tables, and accepting the now discredited 1939 census figure of 170.3 million people, indicated that 3.8 million children had died prematurely during the 1930s; see Steven Rosefielde, 'Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialisation 1929-1949', Soviet Studies, 35, 3, July 1983, Table 11, p. 400. But if the same exercise is repeated using the new 1939 census statistic of 167.6 million people, together with the vital statistics discovered by Wheatcroft, estimated actual births decline by 3.2 million (from 57.0 to 53.8 million), implying 600 000 excess deaths in the 0-11 cohort, and 9.1 million adult negligent homicides and killings (9.7 - 0.6 = 9.1); see Steven Rosefielde, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 6, 1996, Table 4, p. 972. However, in contemplating the balance it should be remembered that the data exclude abortions, and treat a large proportion of infant deaths as stillborns. Andreev, Darsky & Khar'kova estimate that as many as 5 million infant deaths may have been unreported or improperly classified as stillborns; see E.M. Andreev, L.E. Darsky & T.L. Khar'kova, Naselenie Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1922-1991 (Moscow, Nauka, 1993).
105. Martin Malia, Russia under Western Eyes (Cambridge MA, Belknap, 2000); Steven Solnick, Stealing the State (Cambridge, MA, Harvard U.P., 1999).
106. Martin Malia, Russia under Western Eyes (Cambridge MA, Belknap, 2000); Steven Solnick, Stealing the State (Cambridge, MA, Harvard U.P., 1999).
107. For estimates of the cumulative death tolls 1917-53 see Rosefielde, 'Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union', Table 12, p. 401, and note 70, p. 409.
108. Grigory Yavlinsky, 'Russia's Phony Capitalism', Foreign Affairs, 77, 3, May/June 1998, pp. 67-79.
109. Murray Feshbach recently predicted that the Russian population (excluding migration) will fall to 80 million by 2050. See 'A Sick and Shrinking Nation', The Washington Post, 24 October 1999, p. B7. Feshbach stresses infertility, which is increasing 3% per year, over and above the 15-20% of all couples who are infertile. In this regard new incidence of syphilis has increased 77 times since 1990. The death rate is also expected to rise because multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is spiraling (30 000 cases), together with 2 million projected HIV/AIDS cases that are likely to bankrupt the public health system.
110. For the nuances see Ellman, 'Social Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 36-37. Also see Vladimir Kontorovich, 'The Russian Health Crisis and the Economy', paper presented at the VI-ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, 29 July 2000: David Bloom & Pia Malaney, 'The Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', World Development, 26, 11, 1998; Anatolii Vishnevsky & Vladimir Shkol'nikov, Smertnost' v Rossii: Glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deistvii (Moscow Carnegie Center Report, No. 19, 1997).
111. For the nuances see Ellman, 'Social Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 36-37. Also see Vladimir Kontorovich, 'The Russian Health Crisis and the Economy', paper presented at the VI-ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, 29 July 2000: David Bloom & Pia Malaney, 'The Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', World Development, 26, 11, 1998; Anatolii Vishnevsky & Vladimir Shkol'nikov, Smertnost' v Rossii: Glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deistvii (Moscow Carnegie Center Report, No. 19, 1997).
112. For the nuances see Ellman, 'Social Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 36-37. Also see Vladimir Kontorovich, 'The Russian Health Crisis and the Economy', paper presented at the VI-ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, 29 July 2000: David Bloom & Pia Malaney, 'The Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', World Development, 26, 11, 1998; Anatolii Vishnevsky & Vladimir Shkol'nikov, Smertnost' v Rossii: Glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deistvii (Moscow Carnegie Center Report, No. 19, 1997).
113. For the nuances see Ellman, 'Social Consequences of the Transformation Process', pp. 36-37. Also see Vladimir Kontorovich, 'The Russian Health Crisis and the Economy', paper presented at the VI-ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, 29 July 2000: David Bloom & Pia Malaney, 'The Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', World Development, 26, 11, 1998; Anatolii Vishnevsky & Vladimir Shkol'nikov, Smertnost' v Rossii: Glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deistvii (Moscow Carnegie Center Report, No. 19, 1997).