Collateralized debt as the optimal contract

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 842-859

  Lacker, Jeffrey M ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Borrowing constraints; Collateral; Debt; Financial contracts; Optimal contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035188457     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.2001.0138     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. "Limited Information and Economic Analysis"
2. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring"
3. "Why Is There Debt?"
4. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification"