Budgeting procedures and democratic ideals: An evaluation of Swedish reforms

Journal of Public Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 23-52

  Molander, P ^a  

^a Ctr for Business/Policy Studies   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; FISCAL POLICY; PUBLIC SPENDING; REFORM PROCESS;

SWEDEN;

EID: 0035181662     PISSN: 0143814X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X01001027     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. Procrastination and obedience
2. Reducing budget deficits
3. Singularity tycory and core existence in the spatial model
4. Shrinking budgets and the shrinkage of budget theory
5. The nature of belief system in mass publics
6. Conservatism in human information processing
7. The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
8. Introduction
9. Temporal limits on the legislative mandate
10. Public choice and cooperation in n-person Prisoner's Dilemma
11. Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?
12. Introduction: Public ignorance and democratic theory
13. Laundering preferences
14. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries
15. The committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias
16. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
17. Rules versus discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans
18. Economists free ride, does anyone else?
19. The politics of flatland
20. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
21. The prevalence of free-riding
22. Reforming budgetary institutions: Swedish experiences
23. Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences
24. The shift to competition in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
25. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule
26. Do better institutions make better policy?
27. Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in industrial democracies
28. General properties of Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
29. Rational fools
30. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Delemma as a function of interperson distance
31. The effects of commitment to future interaction in single plays of three games
32. Institutional arrangements and fiscal performance: The Latin American experience
33. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
34. National budget processes and fiscal performance
35. The politics of blame avoidance