The safeguard clause, asymmetric information, and endogenous protection

Review of International Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 52-67

  Kohler, Philippe ^a   Moore, Michael O ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^b GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

IMPORT; PROTECTIONISM; TRADE POLICY; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 0035104331     PISSN: 09657576     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00263     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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