Why do policy makers give (permanent) power to policy advisers?

Economics and Politics

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 73-94

  Swank, Otto H ^a   Dur, Robert A J ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; PLANNING PRACTICE; POLICY MAKING; POWER RELATIONS;

EID: 0035104023     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00084     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Formal and real authority in organizations
2. The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political advice
3. A theory of political control and agency discretion
4. Strategic information transmission
5. Cheap talk with two audiences
6. Specialization decisions within committee
7. Politics and choice of durability
8. Learning and signalling by advisor selection
9. Information aggregation through costly political action
10. Political institutions: The neglected side of the story
11. The institutional foundations of democratic government: A comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems
12. An economic analysis of economic advice giving
13. Voting on the budget deficit: Comment. American
14. Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns
15. A theory of policy advice
16. Voting on the budget deficit