Why do poor democracies collect a lot of tariff revenue?

Economics and Politics

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 95-112

  Moutos, Thomas ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

^b ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0035100268     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00085     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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