Allocating control over firms: Stock markets versus membership markets

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 201-218

  Dow, G K ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Control rights; Labor managed firms; Stock markets

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRY; MANAGEMENT; STOCK MARKET; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0035091843     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007827532310     Document Type: Article

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