Fault-preserving simplifying transformations for security protocols

Journal of Computer Security

Volumn 9, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 3-46

  Hui, Mei Lin ^a   Lowe, Gavin ^b  

^a Government Communications Headquarters   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY OF DATA; STATE SPACE METHODS; THEOREM PROVING;

FAULT PRESERVING SIMPLIFYING TRANSFORMATIONS; MODEL CHECKING TECHNIQUES; SECURITY PROTOCOL;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 0035067667     PISSN: 0926227X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2001-91-202     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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