The family as the health producer - When spouses are Nash-bargainers

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 349-362

  Bolin, Kristian ^a   Jacobson, Lena ^a   Lindgren, Björn ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Family; Grossman model; Health; Human capital; Nash bargaining

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CAPITAL; CHILD HEALTH; CONFLICT; CUSTODY; DIVORCE; FAMILY; HEALTH STATUS; HUMAN; INCOME; INVESTMENT; LAW; MARKET; MARRIAGE; MODEL; POLICY;

ADULT; CHILD; CHILD WELFARE; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; DECISION MAKING; DIVORCE; FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS; FAMILY HEALTH; FEMALE; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HUMANS; MALE; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; PATIENT ACCEPTANCE OF HEALTH CARE; SPOUSES; VALUE OF LIFE;

EID: 0035063018     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00086-2     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. A theory of marriage: part 1
2. A theory of marriage: part 2
3. The marriage contract and efficient rules for spousal support
4. Health insurance eligibility, utilisation of medical care, and child health
5. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health
6. The family as producer of health - an extended Grossman model
7. Human capital and the risk of divorce: An asset in search of a property right
8. Non-cooperative families
9. Economics of alimony
10. The demand for health with uncertainty and insurance
11. Marriage and household decision-making: a bargaining analysis
12. Demand for health. A generalised Grossman model
13. The demand for health - some new empirical evidence