Common property institutions in the Alaskan groundfish fisheries

Marine Policy

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 33-42

  Holland, Daniel S ^a   Ginter, Jay J C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH   (United States)

^b NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE   (United States)

Author keywords

Common property; Cooperative; Fisheries; Institutions

Indexed keywords

BYCATCH; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; QUOTA SYSTEM;

UNITED STATES;

POLLACHIUS VIRENS;

EID: 0035053237     PISSN: 0308597X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-597X(00)00033-6     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Questioning the assumptions of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' model of fisheries
2. Common property as a concept in natural resource policy
3. The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions
4. Fisheries co-management: Delegating government responsibility to fishermen's organizations
5. Where do we go from here: Implications for the research agenda
6. Alternative structural solutions to resource dilemmas
7. Mobile flows, storage and self-organized institutions for governing common-pool resources
8. The new frontier of American fisheries governance
9. Obstacles to fisheries self-government
10. A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance
11. Alaskan groundfish resources: 10 years of management under the Magnuson fishery conservation and management act
12. Our living oceans
13. The Alaska community development quota fisheries management program
14. The sea state program