Democracy in Algeria: Continuity and change in the organisation of political representation

Journal of North African Studies

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 25-40

  Volpi, Frédéric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLITICAL CHANGE; POWER RELATIONS;

ALGERIA;

EID: 0035031557     PISSN: 13629387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13629380008718396     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. For a fuller treatment of the Algerian democratic transition and civil conflict, see Frédéric Volpi, Algeria Between Revolution and Democracy (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University 2000).
2. See also Luis Martinez, La Guerre Civile en Algérie (Paris: Karthala 1998);
3. Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria (London: Ithaca 1996).
4. See Robert Mortimer, 'Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War', The Middle East Journal 50/1 (Winter 1996) pp.74-91.
5. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, trans. A.S. Kahan (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1998) p.222.
6. On the ambiguous outcomes of (successful) democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998);
7. and Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Illusions about Consolidation' in L. Diamond, M. Plattner, Y. Chu and H. Tien (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1997).
8. On this issue see Martinez (note 1).
9. This, too, is not a very novel dilemma of protracted conflicts. As Mao put it vis-à-vis the mechanisms of 'strategic retreat' during the Chinese revolution, 'the faith of the people is closely linked to that of the cadres, hence the main and primary task is to convince the cadres': Mao Tse-Tung, 'Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War' (1936)
10. in Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol.1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1954) pp.223-4.
11. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press 1977) p.389.
12. John P. Entelis, 'State-Society Relations: Algeria as a Case Study' in M. Tessler, J. Nachtwey and A. Banda (eds.), Area Studies and Social Sciences: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999) pp.12-13.
13. See John Dunn, 'The History of Political Theory' in The History of Political Theory and other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
14. Throughout the empire the straightforward policy of divide et impera was complemented by a thorough process of social, economic and political transformation. See David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990);
15. and Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945 (London: I.B. Tauris 1987). At the same time the indigenous elite were busy subverting colonial policies to advance their own agenda.
16. See Julia A. Clancy-Smith, Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protests, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904), (Berkeley CA: University of California Press 1994).
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, 'Travail sur l'Algérie' (1841) in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres Complètes, tome 1, ed. A. Jardin (Paris: Gallimard 1991) p.696.
18. 'America' was very much on Tocqueville's mind when he wrote about Algeria. In a second report on Algeria he warned his fellow countrymen not to start again, 'right into the nineteenth century, the historical episode of the conquest of America', and not to imitate 'the bloody examples that the opinion of mankind has shun': Alexis de Tocqueville, 'Rapport sur l'Algérie' (1847) in Oeuvres Complètes, ibid., p.820.
19. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1840), trans. G. Lawrence (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica 1990) Vol.I, p.99.
20. de Tocqueville (note 12) p.815.
21. See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. F. Rosenthal, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1958).
22. For an appraisal of Ibn Khaldun's political philosophy, see Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981).
23. A tribal group is united by an esprit de corps, or assabiyya in Ibn Khaldun's terminology, which is an intimate, blood-like relationship of loyalty based on shared life experiences - especially of a military kind. The group so obtained is often called assabiyya itself, especially when contrasted with other clans or the rest of the tribe.
24. In a 'materialist' tone, Ibn Khaldun accounted for this dual political structure by referring back to the economic infrastructure (the nature of the 'community of interest'). It should be known, he argued, 'that differences of condition among the people are the result of different ways in which they make their living': Ibn Khaldun (note 15) Vol.1, p.249.
25. Ibid., p.258. For Ibn Khaldun, this egalitarian type of leadership is the exception rather than the norm. As he put it, 'chiefs and leaders who are masters of the affairs of men are few in comparison with the rest. As a rule, man must by necessity be dominated by someone else': ibid., p.306.
26. Ibid. p.262.
27. Ibid. p.263.
28. As Pierre Bourdieu put it, whilst 'primitive forms of domination' cannot become institutionalised because of a lack of social basis for any such institutions, the impersonal (scientific-official) power systems prevalent in modern states make this type of euphemised rule redundant. The process of objectivation permits the commodification and accumulation of political authority: Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977) p.194.
29. About assabiyya in the modern context, see Olivier Roy, 'Patronage and Solidarity Groups: Survival or Reformation' in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), Democracy without Democrats (London: I.B. Tauris 1994);
30. and Ghassan Salamé, '"Strong" and "weak" States: A Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah' in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (London: Routledge 1990).
31. See Volpi (note 1). Were one to take Ibn Khaldun's 'three generations' model literally, however, the Algerian civil war would represent only a difficult succession within a single 'dynasty', as these army strongmen were all members of the original armed movement that led the decolonisation struggle, 40 years earlier.
32. Muammar al-Qaddafi, The Green Book, 10th edn (The World Centre for Studies and Research of the Green Book 1987) p.97.
33. See Abdelkader Yefsah, 'L'armée sans hidjab', Les Temps Modernes (Jan.-Feb. 1995).
34. Unexpectedly, he also received the support of half of the moderate Islamic fundamentalist party of Abdallah Djaballah: Ennahda. The party split in two over the issue of the presidential nomination; the national congress supporting Bouteflika (allegedly under pressure from the political police) while the local branches supported the party's founder and president, Djaballah.
35. Taleb Ibrahimi, a former FLN member, recurrently presented the 'Islamic side' of the Algerian regime under Boumedienne and Chadli - being successively Education Minister, Culture Minister and Foreign Minister. He is also the son of Sheikh Bachir Ibrahimi, a former president of the Association of Ulama, the pre-independence movement of Islamic Reform launched by Ben Badis.
36. A clause in the Algerian constitution requires the presidential candidates who are old enough to have been politically active during the war of decolonisation to attest of their involvement in the FLN-ALN. Nannah's absence from the official records raised numerous controversies but de facto prevented him from joining the race. It became clear afterwards that this decision was a preventive strike to avoid him joining the rest of the political opposition following the election's quagmire.
37. At the last political rally organised by Ibrahimi, the crowd (allegedly) chanted: 'Ali, Abassi, your supporters are doing fine. We want peace.' Cited in Liberté, 14 April 1999. The references were to Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani, the two imprisoned leaders of the FIS.
38. Ses El Watan,15 April 1999;
39. Le Monde,16 April 1999.
40. The joint communiqué from Ibrahimi, Ait Ahmed, Hamrouche, Djaballah, Sifi and Khatib read: '1. We take note of regime's persistence to deny citizens the right to take their destiny into their own hands and choose their President; we render it responsible for the consequences of those acts. 2. We confirm that the commitments taken by the President of the Republic and the Chief of Staff to guarantee a free and honest election have not been followed by acts. 3. We decide collectively to retire from the presidential election and deny the legitimate character of the election'. Cited in El Watan, 15 April 1999.
41. See El Watan, 17 April 1999, 19 April 1999.
42. See La Tribune, 16 April 1999, 17 April 1999.
43. La Tribune, 6 June 1999.
44. Mezrag's letter was reprinted in most Algerian newspapers. See La Tribune, 7 June 1999.
45. El Watan, 7 June 1999. The RND-dominated parliament rubber-stamped the law on 'civil concord' a few weeks later, on 13 July.
46. Several newspapers also reported that independent Islamic groups totalling 'hundreds of terrorists' had signalled their intention to join the peace process. See La Tribune, 14 June 1999.
47. Quoted in La Tribune, 7 June 1999.
48. La Tribune, 29 July 1999.
49. At a press conference organised for the visit of the Egyptian President, Mubarak, Bouteflika declared, 'Algeria faces a complex situation caused by problems of regionalism, tribalism and intolerance, and worsened by political pluralism': quoted in La Tribune, 13 June 1999.
50. Quoted in El Watan, 27 June 1999. Bouteflika fostered his case for the role of peace-broker by announcing that he would free thousands of prisoners (jailed for providing logistic support to armed Islamic groups) on the occasion of the celebrations of independence - on 5 July, 5,000 prisoners were indeed freed.
51. The referendum question was: 'are you for or against the initiative of the President of the Republic to establish peace and civil concord?' (Even in the traditionally hostile Kabyle areas an estimated 40 per cent of the population turned out to endorse it.) See Le Monde, 18 Sept. 1999;
52. El Watan, 18 Sept. 1999.