Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol

Journal of Computer Security

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 197-216

  Paulson, L C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; LOGIC PROGRAMMING; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SOFTWARE ENGINEERING; THEOREM PROVING;

BELIEF LOGIC; INDUCTIVE METHOD; SOFTWARE PACKAGE ISABELLE; YAHALOM PROTOCOL;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 0034950756     PISSN: 0926227X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2001-9302     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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9. Towards formal analysis of security protocols
10. Efficient and timely mutual authentication
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12. Inductive analysis of the internet protocol TLS
13. An attack on a recursive authentication protocol: A cautionary tale
14. A taxonomy of replay attacks