An uprising at a crossroads

Middle East Report

Volumn 31, Issue 219, 2001, Pages

  Hammami, Rema ^a   Hilal, Jamil ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MILITARY INTERVENTION; PEACEKEEPING;

ISRAEL; PALESTINE;

EID: 0034911318     PISSN: 08992851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1559247     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Ha'aretz, April 4,2001. In other findings: 79 percent ofthose surveyed agreed with Sharon's policy of no negotiations before the end of violence and 53 percent believed the purpose of the intifada was simply to cause harm to Israel.
2. For an overview of the backdrop to the uprising see Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, "Anatomy of Another Rebellion," Middle East Report 217 (Winter 2000).
3. Even these mostly Saudi donations are stuck in the accounts of the Islamic Development Bank, as the Saudis and others are locked in negotiations with the PA about "development plans" and a "transparent mechanism" for the funds' distribution. Other Gulf aid tended to wind up in the hands of Hamas, which has rebuilt its welfare institutions and, thereby, its popular support.
4. In particular, figures formerly in the left factions (the PFLP, the DFLP, Fida', the PPP and so on) can be found at the forefront of initiatives to create new parties or movements. These figures are motivated by alienation from entrenched factional leaderships (such as those in the PA executive) and the search for political relevance.
5. See Graham Usher, "Fatah's Tanzim; Origins and Politics," Middle East Report 217 (Winter 2000).
6. Many individual members of the Fatah cadres that had been absorbed into the PA in Gaza are now working under the rubric of what are called the Popular Resistance Committees, not in any official PA capacity.