A bound on attacks on payment protocols

Proceedings - Symposium on Logic in Computer Science

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 61-70

  Stoller, S D ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA PROCESSING; ALGORITHMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; SECURITY OF DATA; THEOREM PROVING;

AUTOMATED VERIFICATION; ELECTRONIC PAYMENT PROTOCOLS;

FORMAL LOGIC;

EID: 0034873867     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (24)

1. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
2. Verifying networks of timed processes
3. Abstracting ws1s systems to verify parameterized networks
4. Design, implementation and deployment of a secure account-based electronic payment system
5. Towards the formal verification of electronic commerce protocols
6. Integrating proof-based and model-checking techniques for the formal verification of cryptographic protocols
7. Using state space exploration and a natural deduction style message derivation engine to verify security protocols
8. A machine checkable logic of knowledge for specifying security properties of electronic commerce protocols
9. Verifying parameterized networks using abstractions and regular languages
10. Analyzing a library of security protocols using Casper and FDR
11. Automated verification of parameterized synchronous systems
12. How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols
13. Model checking electronic commerce protocols
14. Transitive closures of regular relations for verifying infinite state systems
15. Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system
16. Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols
17. Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols through compositional analysis techniques
18. Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
19. Proving security protocols with model checkers by data independence techniques
20. A bound on attacks on authentication protocols
21. A bound on attacks on payment protocols
22. Strand spaces: Why is a security protocol correct?