Penalties, rewards, and inspection: Provisions for quality in supply chain contracts

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 109-115

  Starbird, S A ^a  

^a SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Inspection policy; Quality; Supply chain management

Indexed keywords

INSPECTION; QUALITY ASSURANCE;

CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 0034831693     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601048     Document Type: Article

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