Markets for individual health insurance: Can we make them work with incentives to purchase insurance?

Inquiry

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 133-145

  Swartz, K ^a  

^a HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFERENCE PAPER; COST; HEALTH CARE ACCESS; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH INSURANCE; HIGH RISK POPULATION; TAX;

EID: 0034824386     PISSN: 00469580     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_38.2.133     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

1. COBRA qualifying events and elections, 1987-91
2. Solutions for adverse selection in behavioral health care
3. Challenges and options for increasing the number of Americans with health insurance
4. State-sponsored programs for the uninsured: Is there adverse selection?
5. Sliding-scale premium health insurance programs: Four states' experiences
6. Cream skimming, asymmetric information, and a competitive insurance market
7. Patients at risk: Health reform and risk adjustment
8. Reimbursing health plans and health providers: Efficiency in production versus selection
9. A different kind of "new federalism"? The health insurance portability-and accountability act of 1996
10. Cost and performance: A comparison of the individual and group health insurance markets
11. Publicly subsidized health insurance: A typology of state approaches
12. The struggle for the soul of health insurance
13. Hidden assets: Health insurance reform in New Jersey
14. Can adverse selection be avoided in a market for individual health insurance? Evidence from New Jersey
15. Regulating markets: Lessons from New Jersey's individual health coverage program
16. Adverse selection and price sensitivity when low-income people have subsidies to purchase health insurance in the private market