Extracting common oil: Cooperation or competition?

Energy Journal

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 105-120

  Hannesson, Rögnvaldur ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INVESTMENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS;

NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES;

PETROLEUM RESERVOIRS;

EID: 0034581901     PISSN: 01956574     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol21-No2-5     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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11. Libecap, G.D. and L.L. Smith (1999). "The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreement: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (forthcoming).
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