Beating the Water: The Terrorist Search for Power, Control and Authority

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 76-96

  Silke, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0034564052     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550008427562     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Mao Tse-Tung, Guerrilla Warfare, (London: Cassell 1962) p.67.
2. For just one example, consider the following: 'The population is the key to the entire struggle. Indeed, although western analysts seem to dislike entertaining this idea, it is the population which is doing the struggling. The guerrilla, who is of the people in a way which the government soldier cannot be, fights with the support of the non-combatant civilian populace: it is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service. Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive.' (Taken from Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (London: Paladin 1969) pp.23-4.
3. Jeffrey Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (London: Jai Press 1989) p.65.
4. Taken from the Green Book, as quoted in Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Fontana 1987) pp.694-7.
5. Eamon Collins (with M. McGovern), Killing Rage (London: Granta Books 1997) p.296.
6. Consider e.g. 'The Three Rules and the Eight Remarks' described by Mao. These were: Rules: 1. All actions are subject to command. 2. Do not steal from the people. 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks: 1. Replace the door when you leave the house. 2. Roll up bedding on which you have slept. 3. Be courteous. 4. Be honest in your transactions. 5. Return what you borrow. 6. Replace what you break. 7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 8. Do not without authority search those you arrest. Taken from Mao (note 1) pp.66-7.
7. Charles Handy, Understanding Organizations, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin 1985) p.118.
8. See Martha Crenshaw, 'Questions to be answered, research to be done, knowledge to be applied', in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism (New York: Woodrow Wilson 1990) p.252.
9. Handy (note 7) p. 118.
10. Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Reference 1513/1993) pp. 130-31.
11. Mao's analogy of the fish fails in this regard. However unpoetic, the terrorist as a beaver presents a much more accurate impression of the reality! Like the fish, the beaver depends on water for protection and sustenance, but unlike the fish, the beaver actively strives to control and influence the water - directing and curbing its levels in line with its own needs and desires. In terms of a metaphor, this provides a much fuller and more realistic impression of the nature of the relationship between terrorists/guerrillas and the people.
12. Raymond Gilmour, Dead Ground: Infiltrating the IRA. (London: Little, Brown 1998) pp.73-4.
13. Handy (note 7) p.130.
14. Machiavelli (note 10) p.131.
15. Taken from Coogan (note 4) p.692.
16. Collins (note 5) pp.164-5.
17. Sluka (note 3) p.144.
18. Ibid.
19. Taken from Coogan (note 4) p.695.
20. One lesson to be taken away from this experience is that the Provisionals would certainly face a similar backlash should their current cease-fire end - a point which also applies to the other paramilitary groups currently observing cease-fires.
21. As quoted in 'IRA attacks law courts', An Phoblacht/Republican News, 9 Jan. 1997, p.3.
22. To be entirely fair, it should be pointed out that that campaign was also plagued by failures - though not as many as the 1996-97 campaign. Some sources have claimed that the increasing failure rate of military operations was a major factor in the IRA's willingness to call cease-fires in 1994 and then again in 1997 (see e.g. Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, Phoenix: Policing the Shadows (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1996) pp.266-8).
23. Handy (note 7) p.138.
24. Ibid., p.131.
25. Figure 1 focuses on the situation when A is attempting to influence B. As a result the important relationships are just those involving A and/or B (hence the C-D relationship is not described). It is important to stress, however, that in theory the various relationships can be exploited by any of the four actors described. For example, D could take advantage of the strong A-C relationship to curry favour with one or other of those two actors. The point is that an awareness of where the strong relationships exist - and whether these relationships are positive or negative - opens up opportunities for an individual actor to increase his or her power and influence over a targeted audience.
26. For a detailed discussion of this point readers are directed to Andrew Silke, 'Rebel's Dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland', Terrorism and Political Violence 11/1 Spring 1999, pp.55-93.
27. Handy (note 7) p.124.
28. Ibid.
29. Adapted from William Culberson, Vigilantism: Political History of Private Power in America (London: Greenwood Press 1990) p.2.
30. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (London: Tavistock 1974) p.108.
31. The implications of this point are discussed more fully in Andrew Silke, 'The Lords of Discipline: The Methods and Motives of Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland', Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 7/2 (1998) pp.121-56.
32. There were only four statements that the experimenter used. These were: (1) Please continue or please go on; (2) The experiment requires that you continue; (3) It is absolutely essential that you continue; and (4) You have no other choice, you must go on.
33. Chris Thornton, 'Residents in fear "of Provo thugs'", News Letter, 6 Sept. 1995, p.3.
34. Milgram (note 30) p.69.
35. Silke (note 26).
36. Milgram (note 26) p.111.
37. Coogan (note 4) p.697.
38. Two examples of such mistakes are: (1) the funding provided by the British government to open Sinn Fein-run 'incident centres' in 1974 and 1975 - the funding was withdrawn within a year but by then the damage had already been done; and (2) the RUC's long-running practice in many areas of treating criminals leniently in return for intelligence on paramilitary activities. Policies such as these can work very effectively in the interests of the terrorist group, regardless of the benefits the security forces think they are receiving in return.
39. This is actually a slight paraphrase of Pfeffer's analysis: I have inserted the word 'communities' where he used 'organizations'. However, elsewhere in his writings, Pfeffer pointed out that the principles did apply to social groups of all types and not just to work organizations which was the main focus of his writing (see Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (London: Pittman 1981) pp.289-90). The generalizability of these principles is something that Charles Handy also stressed (see Handy (note 7)).
40. This is actually a slight paraphrase of Pfeffer's analysis: I have inserted the word 'communities' where he used 'organizations'. However, elsewhere in his writings, Pfeffer pointed out that the principles did apply to social groups of all types and not just to work organizations which was the main focus of his writing (see Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (London: Pittman 1981) pp.289-90). The generalizability of these principles is something that Charles Handy also stressed (see Handy (note 7)).