The Dayton agreement and elections in Bosnia: Entrenching ethnic cleansing through democracy

Stanford Journal of International Law

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 303-354

  Malik, John ^a,b,c,d  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^d ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034563734     PISSN: 07315082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (322)

1. The Dayton Peace Agreement, The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, Nov. 21, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., 〈http://www.usis.usemb.se/bosnia/#dayton.htm〉 (visited Mar. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Dayton].
2. The term "Bosniac," often used as a euphemism for "Muslim," is meant in this work to refer to Bosnian nationals who are neither Croat nor Serb.
3. See, e.g., Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1997, at 23-34; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, When Peace Means War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 1995, at 16-18.
4. See, e.g., Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1997, at 23-34; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, When Peace Means War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 1995, at 16-18.
5. Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 3, at 16.
6. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR 232 (1998) (stating that the United States' two goals were to stop the fighting by extending the sixty day cease-fire that made the negotiations possible, and to create a multi-ethnic state.); see also Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 3, at 16 (quoting Warren Christopher "maintain[ing] that 'the agreement is a victory for all those who believe in multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia'").
7. The OSCE was initially established as a regional arrangement and was dubbed the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the 1970s and 1980s, CSCE functioned as a forum for East-West dialogue, and in 1994 it became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, signifying its transition from a negotiating forum to an operational international organization. See OSCE Handbook Online: History 〈http://www.osce.org/ publications/handbook/2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 9, 2000).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 15-31.
9. This analysis focuses on the consequences of the September 1996, September 1997, and November 1997 elections, which arguably laid the foundation for subsequent OSCE-administered elections in the region. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IS DAYTON FAILING?: BOSNIA FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (Oct. 28, 1999), available at 〈www.intl-crisis-group.org〉 [hereinafter ICG, IS DAYTON FAILING?] (arguing that the OSCE's decision to "reward" ethnic cleansers in 1996 and 1997 "still haunts Bosnian elections"); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE: 1998 ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 7 (Sept. 9, 1998), www.intl-crisis-group.com (visited November 7, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE] (detailing the "legacy" of the flawed 1996 elections for the General Election conducted in 1998).
10. This analysis focuses on the consequences of the September 1996, September 1997, and November 1997 elections, which arguably laid the foundation for subsequent OSCE-administered elections in the region. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IS DAYTON FAILING?: BOSNIA FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (Oct. 28, 1999), available at 〈www.intl-crisis-group.org〉 [hereinafter ICG, IS DAYTON FAILING?] (arguing that the OSCE's decision to "reward" ethnic cleansers in 1996 and 1997 "still haunts Bosnian elections"); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE: 1998 ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 7 (Sept. 9, 1998), www.intl-crisis-group.com (visited November 7, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE] (detailing the "legacy" of the flawed 1996 elections for the General Election conducted in 1998).
11. This analysis focuses on the consequences of the September 1996, September 1997, and November 1997 elections, which arguably laid the foundation for subsequent OSCE-administered elections in the region. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IS DAYTON FAILING?: BOSNIA FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (Oct. 28, 1999), available at 〈www.intl-crisis-group.org〉 [hereinafter ICG, IS DAYTON FAILING?] (arguing that the OSCE's decision to "reward" ethnic cleansers in 1996 and 1997 "still haunts Bosnian elections"); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE: 1998 ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 7 (Sept. 9, 1998), www.intl-crisis-group.com (visited November 7, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, DOING DEMOCRACY A DISSERVICE] (detailing the "legacy" of the flawed 1996 elections for the General Election conducted in 1998).
12. See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission, Assessment Issued 15 September by the OSCE Chainnan-in-Office Special Representative Mr. Javier Kuperez,Sepl. 15, 1997 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih2-1.htm〉 (visited Apr. 15, 2000).
13. See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections Report 10 (Nov. 23, 1997) [hereinafter ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report].
14. See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections Report 10 (Nov. 23, 1997) [hereinafter ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report].
15. See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Election 1998, 12-13 September, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/ bih4-1.htm〉 (visited April 15, 2000).
16. A discussion of the status of Bosnia's refugees and displaced persons involves terms and concepts with meanings specific to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In conformity with common usage, "refugees" refers to persons who fled Bosnia because of the conflict and who are now hosted by a number of other states in the region, in Western Europe, and beyond. "Displaced persons" remain in Bosnia but have left their homes of origin. In the context of the conflict, refugees and displaced persons can participate in either majority or minority returns. In the former, the refugee or displaced person returns to an area where, after the war and as a result of cleansing, her ethnic group is in the majority; in the latter, she returns to an area controlled by an ethnic group to which she does not "belong." It is important to acknowledge that in a sense, these terms embrace the logic of partitionists. Ethnic cleansing is the reason why stark ethnic majorities exist in Bosnia; the reason why minority returnees do not "belong" is that majorities created by ethnic cleansing resist their reintegration. Majority returns are tantamount to relocation. Most refugees and displaced persons originate from areas in which they would now belong to a minority group. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, BOSNIA REPATRIATION AND RETURN OPERATION 1997 § III(2) [hereinafter UNHCR, REPATRIATION AND RETURN 1997].
17. A discussion of the status of Bosnia's refugees and displaced persons involves terms and concepts with meanings specific to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In conformity with common usage, "refugees" refers to persons who fled Bosnia because of the conflict and who are now hosted by a number of other states in the region, in Western Europe, and beyond. "Displaced persons" remain in Bosnia but have left their homes of origin. In the context of the conflict, refugees and displaced persons can participate in either majority or minority returns. In the former, the refugee or displaced person returns to an area where, after the war and as a result of cleansing, her ethnic group is in the majority; in the latter, she returns to an area controlled by an ethnic group to which she does not "belong." It is important to acknowledge that in a sense, these terms embrace the logic of partitionists. Ethnic cleansing is the reason why stark ethnic majorities exist in Bosnia; the reason why minority returnees do not "belong" is that majorities created by ethnic cleansing resist their reintegration. Majority returns are tantamount to relocation. Most refugees and displaced persons originate from areas in which they would now belong to a minority group. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, BOSNIA REPATRIATION AND RETURN OPERATION 1997 § III(2) [hereinafter UNHCR, REPATRIATION AND RETURN 1997].
18. This analysis does not address every aspect of the issues presented in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, clauses of international agreements are open to interpretation, and the interpretations embraced in this work are by no means closed to question. This work is restricted to the question of the efficacy of Dayton's provisions for conducting elections that would reverse the consequences of ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, an effort is made to cite thoroughly the relevant provisions of Dayton, enabling the reader to perceive independently their meaning and significance in the context of the conflict. Second, the analysis is necessarily limited to efforts of the international organizations held explicitly accountable in Dayton for implementing the provisions of the peace plan. While other nongovernmental, governmental, and international organizations were involved in the administration of elections and in the refugee return process, only the OSCE and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were endowed with specific responsibilities in Dayton. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annexes 3, 7. Lastly, the study acquiesces to the authority of respected fact-finding organizations at the international, governmental, and nongovernmental levels. While such institutions are not immune from criticism, the objectivity of their methods is widely acknowledged. Clearly, to dismiss the findings of the United Nations Secretary General, the U.N. General Assembly, or the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) as baseless or partisan is to preclude the possibility of meaningful discourse on recent events in the former Yugoslavia. There are relatively few secondary sources regarding the conduct and consequences of the elections. This is especially true for more recent elections. Aside from press reports and several anecdotal accounts by election observers, this analysis draws heavily on the working notes of the OSCE and UNHCR - including internal documents, press releases, official statements and monitoring reports - and on the reports of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the region. Of the NGOs in the region, only three have substantively evaluated the electoral environment and the OSCE regime: the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. Information regarding the background of the conflict is drawn almost exclusively from the findings of various United Nations organs, including the ICTFY, the U.N. Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia, and the reports of the Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights.
19. Susan Woodward was an early critic of this tension in Dayton. See Susan L. Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, 96 CURRENT HISTORY 97 (1997). For a thorough and insightful discussion of the fundamental legal tensions in Dayton, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 957 (1998). See also Sophie Albert, The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peacebuilding with People, 4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1 (1997).
20. Susan Woodward was an early critic of this tension in Dayton. See Susan L. Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, 96 CURRENT HISTORY 97 (1997). For a thorough and insightful discussion of the fundamental legal tensions in Dayton, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 957 (1998). See also Sophie Albert, The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peacebuilding with People, 4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1 (1997).
21. Susan Woodward was an early critic of this tension in Dayton. See Susan L. Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, 96 CURRENT HISTORY 97 (1997). For a thorough and insightful discussion of the fundamental legal tensions in Dayton, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 957 (1998). See also Sophie Albert, The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peacebuilding with People, 4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1 (1997).
22. See S.C.Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).
23. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., ¶ 131, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
24. [hereinafter U.N. Commission of Experts Report].
25. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 85 (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1997) [hereinafter ICTFY-Tadic].
26. Id. at para. 84.
27. See Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace-Chronology, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, 〈http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/apchrono.html〉 (visited Apr. 2, 2000).
28. See NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA 32 (1995).
29. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Human Rights, identifies ethnic cleansing as a practice dedicated to establishing ethnically homogenous regions. See Letter Dated 5 August 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 1st Special Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 6 at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (1992); see also ICTFY-Tadic, supra note 17, at para. 84; U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 131, 133.
30. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Human Rights, identifies ethnic cleansing as a practice dedicated to establishing ethnically homogenous regions. See Letter Dated 5 August 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 1st Special Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 6 at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (1992); see also ICTFY-Tadic, supra note 17, at para. 84; U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 131, 133.
31. Mazowiecki defines "ethnic cleansing" both as a term referring to "the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups." Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992). The U.N. Commission of Experts suggests that "in the context of . . . former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area." See Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) (quoting U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993)).
32. Mazowiecki defines "ethnic cleansing" both as a term referring to "the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups." Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992). The U.N. Commission of Experts suggests that "in the context of . . . former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area." See Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) (quoting U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993)).
33. U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 56.
34. See U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶¶. 110-50. For the JNA's strategic role in creating "Greater Serbia," see ICTFY-Tadic, supra note 17, paras. 76, 84, 90, 104-21.
35. See U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 141-43.
36. See ICTFY-Tadic, supra note 17, at para. 57.
37. After independence, for example, Tudjman backed Mate Boban for the chairmanship of the HDZ branch in Bosnia. Boban rejected calls for an independent, multi-ethnic Bosnia and insinuated support for "Herzeg-Bosna," a Bosnian-Croat parastate. Also, Tudjman had recognized the independence of Bosnia, but went on to meet with Milosevic in March 1992 to discuss the division of the country between the Croats and Serbs. See JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, ETHNIC POLITICS IN EASTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO NATIONALITY POLICIES, ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES 18 (1994).
38. The Washington Agreement, concluded between Croatia and the Bosnian Republic, and brokered by the United States, ended Croat-Bosniac fighting in central Bosnia and established the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Kumar, supra note 3, at 31.
39. See Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 3, at 17. For a discussion of Croatian domestic opposition to Boban's agenda, see CIGAR, supra note 20, at 132-34.
40. On ethnic cleansing by Croat forces, see Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8 (Sept. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, Sept. 26, 1993]; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/4 (May 19, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, May 19, 1993]; see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 3333d mtg., U.N. Doc, S/PRST/1994/6 (1994); U.N. SCOR, 3083d mtg., S/RES/758 (1992); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-1, Prosecutor's Opening Statement (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1996).
41. On ethnic cleansing by Croat forces, see Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8 (Sept. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, Sept. 26, 1993]; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/4 (May 19, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, May 19, 1993]; see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 3333d mtg., U.N. Doc, S/PRST/1994/6 (1994); U.N. SCOR, 3083d mtg., S/RES/758 (1992); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-1, Prosecutor's Opening Statement (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1996).
42. On ethnic cleansing by Croat forces, see Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8 (Sept. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, Sept. 26, 1993]; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/4 (May 19, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki, May 19, 1993]; see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 3333d mtg., U.N. Doc, S/PRST/1994/6 (1994); U.N. SCOR, 3083d mtg., S/RES/758 (1992); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-1, Prosecutor's Opening Statement (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1996).
43. U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 147.
44. See BUGAJSKI, supra note 27, at 26.
45. On atrocities committed by Bosnian forces, see Mazowiecki, Sept. 26, 1993, supra note 30; Mazowiecki, May 19, 1993, supra note 30. See also U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 148.
46. See U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 148.
47. Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c), 142, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992), [hereinafter Mazowiecki Nov. 17, 1992]; citing U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 149.
48. Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c), 142, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992), [hereinafter Mazowiecki Nov. 17, 1992]; citing U.N. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 16, ¶ 149.
49. See Marc Weller, Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 74-78 (1996).
50. Id. at 71-72.
51. See id. at 84-87. An explicit condemnation of ethnic cleansing as genocide is found in G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993); Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18-I, at 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1995) (declaring that ethnic cleansing constitutes genocide).
52. Weller, supra note 36, at 72-73.
53. The goals of the international community, specified as early as 1992, essentially echoed these principles. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Statement on Bosnia, Document Adopted at the London Conference, Doc. No. LC/C5 (Final), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1527 (stating that the goals of the international community, as expressed at the London Conference, were peace; no change in Bosnia's external boundaries; return of refugees; prosecution of war criminals; and a single state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether centralized or federated; no change in Bosnia's external boundaries; and return of refugees).
54. See Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 3, at 18.
55. See Dayton, supra note 1, GFAP, arts. II-VIII.
56. Dayton, supra note 1, GFAP, Preamble.
57. Paola Gaeta, The Dayton Agreement and International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 152-53 (1996) (explaining the result of Bosnian Serb leaders' refusal to participate in the negotiations).
58. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. 1(1).
59. See id art. I (7).
60. See id arts. III (I), VII.
61. See id. art. III (3) (b).
62. See id. arts. IV-VII.
63. See id. Annex 2, Appendix.
64. See id. art. V.
65. See id. Annex 1B, art. IV (mandating arms control negotiations between the entities).
66. For the Bosnian Croats, Dayton effectively terminated the political project premised on the "Greater Croatia" concept. With the Federation's role at Dayton as the representative of both Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs, "Herzeg-Bosna" was laid to rest. See Gaeta, supra note 44, at 159. Nevertheless, local support for "Herzeg-Bosna" flourished. See infra text accompanying note 159.
67. See Sienho Yee, The New Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 182 (1996) (describing how the entity regulates its own citizenship and possesses its own president and legislature). See also Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. III (3)(a) ("[G]overnmental functions and powers not expressly assigned . . . to the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities."); id. art. III (2)(a) ("Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina."); id. art. III (2)(d) ("[Each] entity may also enter into agreements with states and international organizations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly.").
68. A decision of the bicameral national legislature, for example, requires the approval of both chambers. One of these, the House of Peoples, can only meet when a fifteen-person quorum of three delegates from each of the ethnic groups is established. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. IV (1). To block legislation, the delegates from one of the groups simply need not appear. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is comprised of one Croat, one Serb, and one Bosniac member, and decisions are made by majority vote. However, a dissenting member may "declare a decision to be destructive to the vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected." See id. art. V (2)(d). Upon such a declaration, the decision is referred to the legislature of the entity represented by the objecting delegate; with a two-thirds vote, that legislature can nullify the decision.
69. Id. Annex 4, art. IV (4)(b).
70. See Yee, supra note 54, at 186-87.
71. See id. at 186.
72. See Pauline Neville-Jones, Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia, Vol. 38 No. 4 Bosnia, SURVIVAL, Winter 1996-97, at 45, 49.
73. The Contact Group - comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany - served from April 1994 onward as a negotiating forum created to enhance U.S. involvement in settling the conflict. For the origins of the Contact Group, see id. at 46-47.
74. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. V (5)(a).
75. See Yee, supra note 54, at 182.
76. Annex 7 was concluded between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation and Srpska entities. Article I establishes that all "refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin." Moreover, refugees and displaced persons "shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991." Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 7, art. I. The parties agree to "ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to return in safety without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination" and to "take all necessary steps to prevent activities within their territories which would hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons." Id. art. 1(2). The entities further promise to "create in their territories political, economic and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious integration of refugees and displaced persons." Id. art. II(1).
77. See id. arts. I, II, III, XI.
78. Id art. 1(5).
79. Id art. XI.
80. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 10, art. II(91), Annex 1A, art. I. "IFOR" will be used broadly to refer to the international forces responsible for implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, comprising both NATO and non-NATO units and including the SFOR that followed.
81. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 10, art. V.
82. Id. art. II (9).
83. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 1A, art. IV.
84. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 1A, art. IV.
85. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. I(1).
86. Id. art. II(2). Again, IFOR may participate in a "supporting" capacity. The High Representative's ultimate authority in all aspects of civilian implementation, including elections, is established in Annex 10. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 10. Pursuant to Article III of the Elections Agreement, however, the "High Representative or his or her designee" sits on the PEC and is privy to the final decision of the chairing Head of the OSCE Mission. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. III(3). This ambiguity is not directly addressed in Dayton, but implicitly and in practice, the Head of the OSCE Mission served as the final authority of all aspects of the administration of elections.
87. See id. art. II(4). The elections to be conducted by this deadline were for the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the legislatures of the entities, and the Presidency of the Republika Srpska. "If feasible," elections for cantonal assemblies in the Federation and for municipal assemblies in both entities were also to be conducted by this date. See id. art. II(2)
88. See id. art. II(3).
89. Id. art. II(1).
90. Id. art. III(1)-(4).
91. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. IV(1).
92. id.
93. Id. art. IV(1).
94. It necessarily follows that in areas where particular ethnic groups suffered great losses of life, it would be impossible to recreate precisely that area's prewar ethnic diversity.
95. Elizabeth Andersen, The Role of Asylum States in Promoting Safe and Peaceful Repatriation Under the Dayton Agreements, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 193, 199 (1996).
96. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, Preface.
97. The OSCE established an institutional framework for elections monitoring and programming to assist newly developed democracies. Through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE conducted seminars and monitoring missions in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Estonia, Romania, Georgia, and Lithuania. Prior to 1995, ODIHR's experience in the Yugoslav region included monitoring missions in Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 256-62 (1994). ODIHR's activities in Bosnia, however, were conducted as part of a larger OSCE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1995, the OSCE Ministerial Council expanded the existing OSCE office in Sarajevo to establish the Mission, and U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick was appointed as the Head of Mission and subsequently as the Chairman of the PEC. See OSCE Fact Sheet, 〈http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/factsheet.htm〈 (last modified Feb. 6, 1998). The PEC published electoral Rules and Regulations in July 1996. See OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations 〈http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/pec/eng/pec-rr-english.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 8, 2000) [hereinafter PEC, Rules and Regulations]. Part III of the Rules and Regulations established Local Election Commissions (LECs) to organize elections at the municipality level. See id. part VIII, art. 145-80, also provided for a Media Experts Commission (MEC) to "monitor the security of journalists, to gauge whether the access provided to political parties and candidates was equitable and to observe erroneous news reporting." Id.
98. The OSCE established an institutional framework for elections monitoring and programming to assist newly developed democracies. Through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE conducted seminars and monitoring missions in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Estonia, Romania, Georgia, and Lithuania. Prior to 1995, ODIHR's experience in the Yugoslav region included monitoring missions in Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 256-62 (1994). ODIHR's activities in Bosnia, however, were conducted as part of a larger OSCE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1995, the OSCE Ministerial Council expanded the existing OSCE office in Sarajevo to establish the Mission, and U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick was appointed as the Head of Mission and subsequently as the Chairman of the PEC. See OSCE Fact Sheet, 〈http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/factsheet.htm〈 (last modified Feb. 6, 1998). The PEC published electoral Rules and Regulations in July 1996. See OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations 〈http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/pec/eng/pec-rr-english.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 8, 2000) [hereinafter PEC, Rules and Regulations]. Part III of the Rules and Regulations established Local Election Commissions (LECs) to organize elections at the municipality level. See id. part VIII, art. 145-80, also provided for a Media Experts Commission (MEC) to "monitor the security of journalists, to gauge whether the access provided to political parties and candidates was equitable and to observe erroneous news reporting." Id.
99. The OSCE established an institutional framework for elections monitoring and programming to assist newly developed democracies. Through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE conducted seminars and monitoring missions in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Estonia, Romania, Georgia, and Lithuania. Prior to 1995, ODIHR's experience in the Yugoslav region included monitoring missions in Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 256-62 (1994). ODIHR's activities in Bosnia, however, were conducted as part of a larger OSCE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1995, the OSCE Ministerial Council expanded the existing OSCE office in Sarajevo to establish the Mission, and U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick was appointed as the Head of Mission and subsequently as the Chairman of the PEC. See OSCE Fact Sheet, 〈http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/factsheet.htm〈 (last modified Feb. 6, 1998). The PEC published electoral Rules and Regulations in July 1996. See OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations 〈http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/pec/eng/pec-rr-english.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 8, 2000) [hereinafter PEC, Rules and Regulations]. Part III of the Rules and Regulations established Local Election Commissions (LECs) to organize elections at the municipality level. See id. part VIII, art. 145-80, also provided for a Media Experts Commission (MEC) to "monitor the security of journalists, to gauge whether the access provided to political parties and candidates was equitable and to observe erroneous news reporting." Id.
100. The OSCE established an institutional framework for elections monitoring and programming to assist newly developed democracies. Through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE conducted seminars and monitoring missions in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Estonia, Romania, Georgia, and Lithuania. Prior to 1995, ODIHR's experience in the Yugoslav region included monitoring missions in Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 256-62 (1994). ODIHR's activities in Bosnia, however, were conducted as part of a larger OSCE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1995, the OSCE Ministerial Council expanded the existing OSCE office in Sarajevo to establish the Mission, and U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick was appointed as the Head of Mission and subsequently as the Chairman of the PEC. See OSCE Fact Sheet, 〈http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/factsheet.htm〈 (last modified Feb. 6, 1998). The PEC published electoral Rules and Regulations in July 1996. See OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations 〈http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/pec/eng/pec-rr-english.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 8, 2000) [hereinafter PEC, Rules and Regulations]. Part III of the Rules and Regulations established Local Election Commissions (LECs) to organize elections at the municipality level. See id. part VIII, art. 145-80, also provided for a Media Experts Commission (MEC) to "monitor the security of journalists, to gauge whether the access provided to political parties and candidates was equitable and to observe erroneous news reporting." Id.
101. The EASC's mandate was to "ensure compliance with the electoral Rules and Regulations established by the PEC and adjudicate complaints with regard to the electoral process referred to it by the PEC, the MEC, political parties, candidates, individuals and other entities." PEC, Rules and Regulations, supra note 84, art. 138. PEC Rules and Regulations created the EASC as a juridical body with the power to "prohibit a political party from running in the elections, decertify a party already listed on the ballot, remove a candidate from a party list . . . [and to] set and apply pecuniary or other appropriate penalties." Id. art. 141. The EASC's "four members are appointed by the Chairman of the PEC in consultation with its members." Id. It shall be comprised of a "distinguished international lawyer or jurist with election experience" and a jurist from the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation and the Srpska entity, each." Id. art. 137. To protect the judges from political pressure, all cases were discussed in closed meetings and decisions and opinions reflected only the Subcommission Chairman's signature. The decisions of the EASC were binding and not subject to appeal. See id., art. 142.
102. CIM oversaw the September 1996 election. Before the municipal and assembly elections, in September and November of 1997, CIM's responsibilities were appropriated by ODIHR. ODIHR subsequently established an Election Observation Mission (EOM), the function of which was substantially the same as CIM's. In addition to CIM/EOM monitors, election supervisors were seconded to the OSCE by member states for each of the elections. Supervisors provided technical assistance in administering the elections and reported to Head of Mission Frowick. See REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC, OSCE MISSION TO BOSN. & HERZ., LOCAL ANNEX FOR POLLING STATION SUPERVISOR 14-15 (Nov. 1997) [hereinafter REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC].
103. For a discussion of these standards, see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); see also BEIGBEDER, supra note 84, at 27-30; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'LL. 539, 544 (1992).
104. For a discussion of these standards, see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); see also BEIGBEDER, supra note 84, at 27-30; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'LL. 539, 544 (1992).
105. See Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990, 〈http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.htm〉 (visited Apr. 8, 2000) [hereinafter CSCE, Copenhagen Document].
106. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11. A fifth, smaller (but volatile) local election took place in Mostar, six months prior to the September 1996 elections. These were also monitored by the OSCE. See International Crisis Group, Statement on the Elections in Mostar, 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh08rep.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000).
107. See ICG, supra note 8.
108. See REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC, supra note 86, at 20.
109. See id.
110. See International Crisis Group, Beyond Ballot Boxes: Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh26main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes].
111. See International Crisis Group, Beyond Ballot Boxes: Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh26main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes].
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC, supra note 86, at 21-22.
116. See International Crisis Group, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh16main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, Elections in Bosnia].
117. See International Crisis Group, Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia, 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projccts/bosnia/reports/bh22main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) (giving a detailed assessment of the violent obstruction of returns) [hereinafter ICG, Going Nowhere Fast].
118. Since this Note was first written, a number of observers have commented at a level of detail that is beyond the scope of this Note on the failure of the international community to implement Dayton, Annex 7. See, e.g., ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, at 32-39 (detailing a generally pessimistic assessment of the status of returns); Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent? 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091 (1998) (analyzing extensively the issue of refugee return, and commenting on its likely after-effects); see also Madelyn D. Shapiro, The Lack of Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords: Another Palestinian Crisis? 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 545 (1998) (providing comparisons between the situation in Israel and the problems caused by the failed implementation of Annex 7).
119. Since this Note was first written, a number of observers have commented at a level of detail that is beyond the scope of this Note on the failure of the international community to implement Dayton, Annex 7. See, e.g., ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, at 32-39 (detailing a generally pessimistic assessment of the status of returns); Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent? 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091 (1998) (analyzing extensively the issue of refugee return, and commenting on its likely after-effects); see also Madelyn D. Shapiro, The Lack of Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords: Another Palestinian Crisis? 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 545 (1998) (providing comparisons between the situation in Israel and the problems caused by the failed implementation of Annex 7).
120. Since this Note was first written, a number of observers have commented at a level of detail that is beyond the scope of this Note on the failure of the international community to implement Dayton, Annex 7. See, e.g., ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, at 32-39 (detailing a generally pessimistic assessment of the status of returns); Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent? 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091 (1998) (analyzing extensively the issue of refugee return, and commenting on its likely after-effects); see also Madelyn D. Shapiro, The Lack of Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords: Another Palestinian Crisis? 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 545 (1998) (providing comparisons between the situation in Israel and the problems caused by the failed implementation of Annex 7).
121. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
122. See Office of the High Representative, Reconstruction and Return Task Force, April 1997 Report, § 4.1, 〈http://www.ohr.int/rrtf/r9704-00htm〉 (visited Mar. 7,2000).
123. See U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Community Based Reintegration Assistance to Minority Returns in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Demining Programme, 〈http://vvww.uiihcr.ba/demimng/Brochures/DeminingEnglish.htm〉 (visited Mar. 7, 2000) [hereinafter UNHCR, Demining Program].
124. See U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Community Based Reintegration Assistance to Minority Returns in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Demining Programme, 〈http://vvww.uiihcr.ba/demimng/Brochures/DeminingEnglish.htm〉 (visited Mar. 7, 2000) [hereinafter UNHCR, Demining Program].
125. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
126. See id.
127. UNHCR, REPATRIATION AND RETURN 1997, supra note 12, § VII(4).
128. Id § VII(6).
129. See UNHCR, Demining Program, supra note 103.
130. Office of the High Representative, Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 〈http://wvvw.ohr.int/reports/r970416a.htm〈 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter OHR Report].
131. See id.
132. Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, "Who's Living in My House?" Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 〈http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR630011997〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000).
133. See International Crisis Group, Minority Return or Mass Relocation? 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh33main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, Minority Return].
134. See International Crisis Group, Minority Return or Mass Relocation? 〈http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh33main.htm〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICG, Minority Return].
135. See Elizabeth Rehn, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/56 (1997) [hereinafter Rehn Report].
136. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
137. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 11, arts. III(1), VI(1).
138. This authority was granted to IPTF in the Bonn-Petersburg Agreement on April 25, 1996, concluded between IPTF and the Bosnian Federation. See, e.g., Transcript Joint Press Conference, Apr. 30, 1999, M2 Presswire NATO, available in 1999 WL 17560635.
139. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
140. See id.
141. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 1A, art. VI(3).
142. See ICG, Going Nowhere,Fast, supra note 99.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See generally ICG, Minority Return, supra note 112 (discussing the problem of obstruction by nationalist parties).
147. See id.
148. The Sarajevo suburbs were to be surrendered to the Federation in February and March 1996. See id.
149. See id.
150. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 7, art. I.
151. See UNHCR REPATRIATION AND RETURN 1997, supra note 12, § VI(3).
152. See ICG, Minority Return, supra note 112 (detailing the results of the return conferences).
153. Id. For detailed discussions of the Open Cities initiative, see id; U.N. High Commission on Refugees, Open Cities Status Report 〈http://www.unhcr.ba/opencity/ 9908BH1.html〉 (visited Mar. 7, 2000).
154. See ICG, Minority Return, supra note 112.
155. OHR Report, supra note 109.
156. See Rehn Report, supra note 113, ¶ 35.
157. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
158. See Massimo Calabresi, Tallying the Hate, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 28.
159. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 99.
160. Calabresi, supra note 136, at 29 (quoting IFOR spokesman).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See UNHCR, Humanitarian Issues Working Group, Progress in and Prospects for Sustainable Return and Solutions in the Former Yugoslavia, 〈http://www.unhcr.ba/Protection/PTB/989.htm〉 (visited Apr. 15, 2000).
165. See ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, sec. A (citing UNHCR figures).
166. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. IV.
167. See UNHCR, REPATRIATION AND RETURN 1997, supra note 12, § 111(2).
168. See Anna Husarska, "Free and Fair" Are the Missing Bosnia Elements, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1996, at B9.
169. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98 (U.N. estimates based on an analysis of in-country registration figures).
170. See Husarska, supra note 146, at B9.
171. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98.
172. See Case No. 96-103, 96-130, 96-152, 96-160 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996), 〈http://www.oscebih.org/easc/eng/easc-decisions/1996/96-103,130,152,160. pdf〉 (visited Oct. 13, 2000).
173. See id.
174. OSCE, Co-ordinator for International Monitoring, The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 September 1996: Preliminary Statement of the Co-ordinator for International Monitoring, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bihl-1.htm〉 (visited Apr. 15, 2000).
175. See Rehn Report, supra, note 113,¶ 117.
176. JAVIER RUPEREZ, OSCE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 1 (Sept. 14, 1997).
177. See supra text accompanying note 67 for a discussion of the provisions of Dayton governing IFOR's responsibilities.
178. Daniel J. Blessington, From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election Low in Post War Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 553, 598-99 (1998).
179. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § II, at 10-15 (detailing an account of the obstruction of freedom of association in both entities).
180. See id.
181. See Samantha Power, Run for Your Lives: Problems with Impending Elections, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1996, at 16-18 (describing pre-election intimidation of opposition figures in Mostar).
182. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § II, at 9.
183. Advisory Opinion 3, 3 BILTEN 67 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
184. See Advisory Opinion 2, 2 EILTEN 59 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
185. See Case No. 96-IB, 1 BILTEN 5 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
186. See Advisory Opinion 3, supra note 161, at 68.
187. See Case No. 96-20B, 3 BILTEN 63 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, 3 BILTEN 87 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
188. See Case No. 96-20B, 3 BILTEN 63 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, 3 BILTEN 87 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
189. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, §II.
190. See id.
191. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10.
192. See International Crisis Group, Media in Bosnia-Herzegovina Mar. 18, 1997), 〈www.intl-crisis-group.org (visited Nov. 7,2000) [hereinafter ICG, Media in Bosnia].
193. See International Crisis Group, Media in Bosnia-Herzegovina Mar. 18, 1997), 〈www.intl-crisis-group.org (visited Nov. 7,2000) [hereinafter ICG, Media in Bosnia].
194. See INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE REPORTLNG, REPORT 6 (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter IWPR, July 10 REPORT].
195. See INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE REPORTLNG, REPORT 6 (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter IWPR, July 10 REPORT].
196. See ICG, Media in Bosnia, supra note 169.
197. See id.
198. See IWPR, July 10 REPORT, supra note 170, at 1.
199. See ICG, Media in Bosnia, supra note 169.
200. See PRESS STATEMENT, OSCE MISSION TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, (Aug. 8, 1996) (noting with "mounting concern statements from the Republika Srpska arrogating to this Entity the right to assert sovereignty as an independent State").
201. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
202. See ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes, supra note 93.
203. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections, 13-14 September 1997, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih2-2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report].
204. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections, 13-14 September 1997, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih2-2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report].
205. ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 11.
206. See ICG, Media in Bosnia, supra note 169.
207. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 15.
208. See ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes, supra note 93, at 17.
209. ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 11.
210. Id.
211. Institute of War and Peace Reporting, Report 4 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter IWPR, Aug. 8 Report].
212. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, §II.
213. See ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes, supra note 93.
214. ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 11.
215. ICG, Media in Bosnia, supra note 169, § 6a.
216. See id, § 3.
217. Id.
218. See PEC, Rules and Regulations, supra note 84, arts. 145, 180.
219. Id. art. 138(b).
220. Nowhere was this restriction on the power of the EASC more clearly demonstrated than in cases involving the media and secessionist speech. As a first response to speeches, made largely by SDS candidates, which called for the "independence and territorial separation of part of the country" and some of which were televised, the EASC issued an advisory opinion calling for an end to secessionist speech. See Advisory Opinion 5, 3 BILTEN 103 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Finding that the opinion had no effect on the tenor and content of the campaign, the EASC censured the SRT, imposed a civil penalty on the SDS, and warned the party that offending candidates could be removed from party lists. See Case No. 96-2B, 1 BILTEN 25 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Nevertheless, secessionist speech continued and was articulated most fervently by Plavsic. As Blessington notes: In the advisory opinion, [the EASC] had hoped to persuade the SDS from continuing its secessionist rhetoric, but it had come up short. In the subsequent decision, the Subcommission utilized a civil penalty and warning so as not to risk a backlash by immediately terminating the candidacies of major SDS figures with only a few days until the election. This did not work . . . What would the effect be if [Plavsic's] candidacy . . . were terminated just hours before the election? Would SDS supporters be disenfranchised with respect to that office? Would there be a boycott of the elections? . . . In short, would the decision bring chaos to an election day that had been in planning for nine months? Blessington, supra note 156, at 62. Clearly, the EASC had to make a decision with an eye toward Dayton's time line. In a third and tempered decision on this issue, the EASC drafted a statement renouncing secessionist speech and demanded that Plavsic read it on SRT. A delay in making the statement, or a change in its content, would result in the removal of five candidates from the SDA party list. See Case No. 96-34B, 3 BILTEN 147 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Plavsic complied with the ruling.
221. Nowhere was this restriction on the power of the EASC more clearly demonstrated than in cases involving the media and secessionist speech. As a first response to speeches, made largely by SDS candidates, which called for the "independence and territorial separation of part of the country" and some of which were televised, the EASC issued an advisory opinion calling for an end to secessionist speech. See Advisory Opinion 5, 3 BILTEN 103 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Finding that the opinion had no effect on the tenor and content of the campaign, the EASC censured the SRT, imposed a civil penalty on the SDS, and warned the party that offending candidates could be removed from party lists. See Case No. 96-2B, 1 BILTEN 25 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Nevertheless, secessionist speech continued and was articulated most fervently by Plavsic. As Blessington notes: In the advisory opinion, [the EASC] had hoped to persuade the SDS from continuing its secessionist rhetoric, but it had come up short. In the subsequent decision, the Subcommission utilized a civil penalty and warning so as not to risk a backlash by immediately terminating the candidacies of major SDS figures with only a few days until the election. This did not work . . . What would the effect be if [Plavsic's] candidacy . . . were terminated just hours before the election? Would SDS supporters be disenfranchised with respect to that office? Would there be a boycott of the elections? . . . In short, would the decision bring chaos to an election day that had been in planning for nine months? Blessington, supra note 156, at 62. Clearly, the EASC had to make a decision with an eye toward Dayton's time line. In a third and tempered decision on this issue, the EASC drafted a statement renouncing secessionist speech and demanded that Plavsic read it on SRT. A delay in making the statement, or a change in its content, would result in the removal of five candidates from the SDA party list. See Case No. 96-34B, 3 BILTEN 147 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Plavsic complied with the ruling.
222. Nowhere was this restriction on the power of the EASC more clearly demonstrated than in cases involving the media and secessionist speech. As a first response to speeches, made largely by SDS candidates, which called for the "independence and territorial separation of part of the country" and some of which were televised, the EASC issued an advisory opinion calling for an end to secessionist speech. See Advisory Opinion 5, 3 BILTEN 103 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Finding that the opinion had no effect on the tenor and content of the campaign, the EASC censured the SRT, imposed a civil penalty on the SDS, and warned the party that offending candidates could be removed from party lists. See Case No. 96-2B, 1 BILTEN 25 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Nevertheless, secessionist speech continued and was articulated most fervently by Plavsic. As Blessington notes: In the advisory opinion, [the EASC] had hoped to persuade the SDS from continuing its secessionist rhetoric, but it had come up short. In the subsequent decision, the Subcommission utilized a civil penalty and warning so as not to risk a backlash by immediately terminating the candidacies of major SDS figures with only a few days until the election. This did not work . . . What would the effect be if [Plavsic's] candidacy . . . were terminated just hours before the election? Would SDS supporters be disenfranchised with respect to that office? Would there be a boycott of the elections? . . . In short, would the decision bring chaos to an election day that had been in planning for nine months? Blessington, supra note 156, at 62. Clearly, the EASC had to make a decision with an eye toward Dayton's time line. In a third and tempered decision on this issue, the EASC drafted a statement renouncing secessionist speech and demanded that Plavsic read it on SRT. A delay in making the statement, or a change in its content, would result in the removal of five candidates from the SDA party list. See Case No. 96-34B, 3 BILTEN 147 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996). Plavsic complied with the ruling.
223. The September 14, 1996 deadline did not apply to municipal or cantonal elections.
224. See Case No. ME-127 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1997), 〈http://www.oscebih.org/easc/eng/ easc-decisions/1997/ME-127+Statement.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 9, 2000).
225. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 11.
226. ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 6.
227. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 625 n. 476.
228. See id. at 597-98.
229. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. IV(1).
230. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 594-95.
231. See id.
232. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § II. A second and similar effort involved "future municipalities," the registration of refugee voters in the FRY, and their subsequent balloting in person within Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1996. Specifically, officials from the Republika Srpska, the FRY, and the Republic of Serbia discouraged and prevented Serb refugees originally from the Federation and hosted by the FRY from registering to vote in their homes of origin. Instead, Serb election officials directed them to register in a "future municipality" in areas of Srpska that used to have Bosniac majorities. In some cases, refugees ,were simply handed P-2s with polling stations chosen for them. Others were told that "[a]ll those from the Federation can vote in one of the offered places in Republika Srpska."
233. See HELSINKI COMMITIEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, REGISTRATION OF BOSNIA REFUGEES FOR THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS 1-3 (July 31, 1996).
234. Concentrations of refugees in the FRY were twinned with towns in Srpska and on election day, an estimated 37,000 Bosnian Serb refugees were bussed in to vote. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § III. Again, in many cases, refugees were coerced to vote in specific areas of Srpska with promises of benefits or threats pertaining to entitlements in the FRY. See id.
235. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § III.
236. Id. § II (quoting Soren Jessen-Petersen's statement of Aug. 26, 1996).
237. See Advisory Opinion 1, 1 BILTEN 33 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-11D, 2 BILTEN 43 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-9B, 2 BILTEN 7 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
238. See Advisory Opinion 1, 1 BILTEN 33 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-11D, 2 BILTEN 43 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-9B, 2 BILTEN 7 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
239. See Advisory Opinion 1, 1 BILTEN 33 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-11D, 2 BILTEN 43 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996); Case No. 96-9B, 2 BILTEN 7 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
240. Again, the delayed measures were the result of Dayton's directive that the elections take place on September 14. Because of the time line, a complex registration process was rushed and OSCE monitors identified this pattern of abuse only weeks before balloting was to take place.
241. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § 2.
242. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 74.
243. See Chris Hedges, Municipal Elections in Bosnia Postponed, Raising Doubts About Troop Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at A6; Urgent Bosnian Local Elections Postponed Again, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
244. See Chris Hedges, Municipal Elections in Bosnia Postponed, Raising Doubts About Troop Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at A6; Urgent Bosnian Local Elections Postponed Again, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
245. See PEC, Rules and Regulations, supra note 84, arts. 505-06.
246. See id. art. 10 (b)-(c); see also ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 5.
247. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 6.
248. See id. at 7.
249. See Anna Husarska, Polling Alone: Serbs Cow U.S. Diplomat Robert Frowick Into Ratifying Election Fraud in Bosnia, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 19; see also ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178 (detailing EASC rulings dealing with electoral engineering).
250. See Anna Husarska, Polling Alone: Serbs Cow U.S. Diplomat Robert Frowick Into Ratifying Election Fraud in Bosnia, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 19; see also ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178 (detailing EASC rulings dealing with electoral engineering).
251. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 8.
252. ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes, supra note 93.
253. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § IIä.
254. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 72-73; see also Case No. 96-123, 3 BILTEN 159 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See ICG, Beyond Ballot Boxes, supra note 93, at 9.
259. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 7.
260. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 8.
261. Id. at 6.
262. The regulations were spelled out in the original set of PEC Rules and Regulations, as well as in four supplements applicable to the September 1996 elections, issued on August 15, August 27, September 13, and October 9, 1996. See PEC, Rules and Regulations, supra note 84.
263. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 73 n.457.
264. See Colin Soloway, UN Cites Vote Fraud in Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1996, at 13N.
265. See Case Nos. 96-90, 96-94, 96-99, 96-122, 96-132, 96-140, 2 BILTEN 41 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
266. ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 11.
267. See In Republika Srpska, Elections "Technically Correct" but Democracy Still Lacking, 4 OSCE NEWSLETTER 11, Nov. 1997, at 2.
268. ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 14.
269. See Jeff Fischer, Responses, Transcript of IFOR Press Briefing, Sept. 28, 1996, 〈http://www.nato.int/ifor/afsout/t960938a.htm〉 (visited Mar. 1, 2000).
270. The 600,000 people comprised 259,000 refugees who failed to register, 135,300 internally displaced persons who failed to cross the IEBL, 25,000 Serb refugees in the FRY who failed to return on election day, and 160,000 refugee voters who failed to vote. ICG relied on UNHCR, IPTF, and OSCE figures in conducting the calculations. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, §III, at 10-11.
271. See id.
272. Watchdog Says Nearly 104 Percent Cast Ballots in Bosnia, A.P. WIRE, Sept. 20, 1996.
273. See Case Nos. 96-195, 96-193, 96-183, 3 BILTEN 223 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
274. See id.
275. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 76-78.
276. See id.
277. No complaints regarding turnout were filed after these elections. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 15; ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 15.
278. No complaints regarding turnout were filed after these elections. See ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 15; ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 15.
279. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. IX(1).
280. See PEC, Rules and Regulations, supra note 84, art. 43.
281. See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18-I, at 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. - Former Yugo., Trial Chamber 1995).
282. See Serb Leader Bows to International Pressure, Steps Down, USA TODAY, June 30, 1996, 〈http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/jun96/nbos237.htm〉 (visited Apr. 3, 2000).
283. ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98.
284. See Case No. 96-29B, 4 BILIEN 37 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1996).
285. Id.
286. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § II.
287. See supra text accompanying note 194.
288. See Case No. ME-109 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1997), 〈http://www.osce.bih.org/easc/eng/ easc-decisions/1997/me-109.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000); Case No. ME-049 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1997), 〈http://www.osce.bih.org/easc/eng/easc-decisions/1997/me-049.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000).
289. See Case No. ME-109 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1997), 〈http://www.osce.bih.org/easc/eng/ easc-decisions/1997/me-109.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000); Case No. ME-049 (Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n, Provisional Electoral Comm'n, OSCE Mission in Bosn. & Herz. 1997), 〈http://www.osce.bih.org/easc/eng/easc-decisions/1997/me-049.pdf〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000).
290. For example, on September 15, 1997, the day after the municipal elections, the EASC issued a judgment declaring that the SDS maintained Karadzic in a party position and decertifying the party from the elections in the municipality of Pale. This was a bold step. Pale was a symbolic stronghold for SDS hardliners and the decision might have prompted another threat of boycott. Before any move by the SDS, however, Frowick again overruled the EASC, claiming that the ruling would have undermined the ability of the OSCE to implement the election results, put international personnel at risk, and disenfranchised voters. See Husarsaka, supra note 216, at 19.
291. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 5.
292. See Murat Praso, Demographic Consequences of the 1992-1995 War, March-April 1996, 〈http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/bosnia/dem.html〉 (visited Apr. 22,1998).
293. See REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC, supra note 86, at 10-11 (results for the September 1996 elections); see also ICG, Elections in Bosnia, supra note 98, § III.
294. See Dean E. Murphy & Tracy Wilkinson, Serbs Boot Dissenter From Mayor's Post, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1996, at A6.
295. See REGIONAL CTR. SOKOLAC, supra note 86, at 10-11 (results for the September 1997 elections); Municipal Elections Results, BosNET, (Dec. 4, 1997), 〈http://www.bosnet.org/elections.html〉 (visited Apr. 2, 2000).
296. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 16; Lee Hockstader, Bosnian Serb Elections Appear to Deal Setback to Hard-Line Nationalists, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1997, at A20; Vesna Peric, Bosnian Serb Hardliners Likely to Lose Majority, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 1997.
297. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 16; Lee Hockstader, Bosnian Serb Elections Appear to Deal Setback to Hard-Line Nationalists, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1997, at A20; Vesna Peric, Bosnian Serb Hardliners Likely to Lose Majority, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 1997.
298. See ODIHR, Srpska Assembly Election Report, supra note 10, at 16; Lee Hockstader, Bosnian Serb Elections Appear to Deal Setback to Hard-Line Nationalists, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1997, at A20; Vesna Peric, Bosnian Serb Hardliners Likely to Lose Majority, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 1997.
299. CSCE, Copenhagen Document, supra note 88, para. 7.9.
300. Blessington, supra note 156, at 621 n.449.
301. See 〈www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/981212_pic_annexb.html〉 (visited March 27, 2000) (encouraging agreement with Srebrinica Board).
302. See 〈www.nato.int/stor/trans/1998/1980325a.htm〉 〉 (visited March 27, 2000) (listing progress reports for arbitration committees as of Mar. 25, 1998).
303. See Noel Malcolm, Observations on the Bosnian Elections, Sept. 14, 1996, 〈http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/bosnia/elecbs2.html〉 (visited Mar. 16, 2000).
304. Permanent Council of the OSCE, Certification of the Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Declaration of the Chairman-in-Office, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti 4 (June 25, 1996) [hereinafter OSCE, Elections Certification].
305. See ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, at 14 (citing OSCE determination that nationalist parties won 129 of 136 municipalities).
306. The CIM (later EOM) would determine the extent to which an election was free and fair. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 633. CIM and EOM assessments declared that in all three elections, free and fair conditions did not prevail. See COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL MONITORING (CIM), PRELLMINARY REPORT 2 (Sept. 16, 1996); ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 1; see also OSCE Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Report Issued 24 November 1997 by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chainnan-in-Office, Mr. Javier Ruperez, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih3-2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) (preliminary assessment of the November 1997 National Assembly elections in Republika Srpska).
307. The CIM (later EOM) would determine the extent to which an election was free and fair. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 633. CIM and EOM assessments declared that in all three elections, free and fair conditions did not prevail. See COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL MONITORING (CIM), PRELLMINARY REPORT 2 (Sept. 16, 1996); ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 1; see also OSCE Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Report Issued 24 November 1997 by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chainnan-in-Office, Mr. Javier Ruperez, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih3-2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) (preliminary assessment of the November 1997 National Assembly elections in Republika Srpska).
308. The CIM (later EOM) would determine the extent to which an election was free and fair. See Blessington, supra note 156, at 633. CIM and EOM assessments declared that in all three elections, free and fair conditions did not prevail. See COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL MONITORING (CIM), PRELLMINARY REPORT 2 (Sept. 16, 1996); ODIHR, Municipal Elections Report, supra note 178, at 1; see also OSCE Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Report Issued 24 November 1997 by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chainnan-in-Office, Mr. Javier Ruperez, 〈http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/bih3-2.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) (preliminary assessment of the November 1997 National Assembly elections in Republika Srpska).
309. Some observers have suggested that the OSCE bears the onus of responsibility for the failure of the international community to conduct free and fair elections. See Christopher A. Riley, Neither Free nor Fair: The 1996 Bosnian Elections and the Failure of the U.N. Election-Monitoring Mission, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173, 1211 (1997) ("The elections in Bosnia have, in effect, slowed the democratization process because the U.N. and the OSCE lacked the 'essential moral and intellectual courage' to declare that the September 14, 1996, elections were not free and fair."). In the first instance, Dayton, Annex 3 provides no role for the U.N. in monitoring Bosnia's postwar elections. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (describing the monitoring machinery provided by Dayton, Annex 3, art. II). Second, this analysis suggests that the shortcomings of the elections lie, not in the OSCE, but in Dayton's inadequate enforcement and implementation provisions, as well as in Dayton's unreasonable time line for the holding of the September 1996 elections.
310. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 1A, art. VIII.
311. In December 1997, at the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, the mandate of the High Representative was strengthened, enabling him to remove officials who obstructed returns. At the time of this writing, the High Representative had yet to exercise this power and the distinction between civilian administration and the preeminent enforcement authority in Bosnia - IFOR/SFOR - had been preserved.
312. Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 10, art. II (9).
313. Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Humanitarian Issues Working Croup of the Peace Implementation Council: Geneva, 16 December 1996, 〈http://www.unher.ch/refworld/unhcr.hcspeech/ 16de1996.htm〉 (visited Apr. 10, 2000).
314. International Crisis Group, Minority Returns or Mass Relocation,
315. In analyzing the implementation of Dayton, the ICG has endorsed a more ". . . robust approach within the Dayton framework, both by SFOR and the Office of the High Representative . . . ." See ICG, Is DAYTON FAILING?, supra note 8, at ii. It is unlikely, however, that those who favor a more active role by SFOR in civilian implementation can find support for their position in Dayton. Dayton's restrictions on SFOR's mandate - namely, that SFOR may participate in returns or elections-related activity only within the limits of its principle tasks and available resources - are explicit, largely because the international community insisted on a narrow mandate for NATO troops. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 for a discussion of the Dayton provisions governing IFOR's responsibilities.
316. Ilias Bantekas has suggested that the Bosnian elections were perceived by the international community as a means by which regional stability could be ensured, which would in turn facilitate returns. See Ilias Bantekas, International Organized Elections, Communications: The Reality for Bosnia's Failed Repatriation, 10 INT'L J. REF. L. 199, 202 (1998) ("It was envisaged that the results of the election would facilitate the return or refugees and displaced persons because the new municipal authorities would reflect the ethnic reality of prewar Bosnia."); see also Ilias Bantekas, Repatriation as a Human Right Under International Law and the Case of Bosnia, 7 D.C.LJ. INT'LL. & PRAC. 53, 65, n.47 ("[R]egional stability was sought through elections which envisaged a return to the population status quo existing in Bosnia before the war."). Whether the elections were envisaged by Dayton negotiators as a means of securing regional stability is uncertain. The Clinton Administration's justification for Dayton's elections time line echoes Bantekas' reasoning, but only with respect to Bosnia's governing institutions, not regional stability. See Elizabeth Cousens, Making Peace Agreements Work: The Implementation and Enforcement of Peace Agreements Between Sovereigns and Intermediate Sovereigns, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 810 (1997) ("[M]ost diplomats expressed the view that elections were the essential first step in getting Bosnia's new joint institutions off the ground . . . ."). In any case, this line of reasoning puts the cart before the horse: As suggested above, hosting elections before returns elevates the politics of ethnic cleansing, reducing the possibility of further returns. Clearly, elections cannot serve as a catalyst for returns when returns are an essential prerequisite for successful democratic elections.
317. Ilias Bantekas has suggested that the Bosnian elections were perceived by the international community as a means by which regional stability could be ensured, which would in turn facilitate returns. See Ilias Bantekas, International Organized Elections, Communications: The Reality for Bosnia's Failed Repatriation, 10 INT'L J. REF. L. 199, 202 (1998) ("It was envisaged that the results of the election would facilitate the return or refugees and displaced persons because the new municipal authorities would reflect the ethnic reality of prewar Bosnia."); see also Ilias Bantekas, Repatriation as a Human Right Under International Law and the Case of Bosnia, 7 D.C.LJ. INT'LL. & PRAC. 53, 65, n.47 ("[R]egional stability was sought through elections which envisaged a return to the population status quo existing in Bosnia before the war."). Whether the elections were envisaged by Dayton negotiators as a means of securing regional stability is uncertain. The Clinton Administration's justification for Dayton's elections time line echoes Bantekas' reasoning, but only with respect to Bosnia's governing institutions, not regional stability. See Elizabeth Cousens, Making Peace Agreements Work: The Implementation and Enforcement of Peace Agreements Between Sovereigns and Intermediate Sovereigns, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 810 (1997) ("[M]ost diplomats expressed the view that elections were the essential first step in getting Bosnia's new joint institutions off the ground . . . ."). In any case, this line of reasoning puts the cart before the horse: As suggested above, hosting elections before returns elevates the politics of ethnic cleansing, reducing the possibility of further returns. Clearly, elections cannot serve as a catalyst for returns when returns are an essential prerequisite for successful democratic elections.
318. Ilias Bantekas has suggested that the Bosnian elections were perceived by the international community as a means by which regional stability could be ensured, which would in turn facilitate returns. See Ilias Bantekas, International Organized Elections, Communications: The Reality for Bosnia's Failed Repatriation, 10 INT'L J. REF. L. 199, 202 (1998) ("It was envisaged that the results of the election would facilitate the return or refugees and displaced persons because the new municipal authorities would reflect the ethnic reality of prewar Bosnia."); see also Ilias Bantekas, Repatriation as a Human Right Under International Law and the Case of Bosnia, 7 D.C.LJ. INT'LL. & PRAC. 53, 65, n.47 ("[R]egional stability was sought through elections which envisaged a return to the population status quo existing in Bosnia before the war."). Whether the elections were envisaged by Dayton negotiators as a means of securing regional stability is uncertain. The Clinton Administration's justification for Dayton's elections time line echoes Bantekas' reasoning, but only with respect to Bosnia's governing institutions, not regional stability. See Elizabeth Cousens, Making Peace Agreements Work: The Implementation and Enforcement of Peace Agreements Between Sovereigns and Intermediate Sovereigns, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 810 (1997) ("[M]ost diplomats expressed the view that elections were the essential first step in getting Bosnia's new joint institutions off the ground . . . ."). In any case, this line of reasoning puts the cart before the horse: As suggested above, hosting elections before returns elevates the politics of ethnic cleansing, reducing the possibility of further returns. Clearly, elections cannot serve as a catalyst for returns when returns are an essential prerequisite for successful democratic elections.
319. Domestic political considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. An assessment of domestic factors, however, might include the following analysis. In assuming leadership over the mediation effort, the United States agreed in principle with other Contact Group members to commit troops to enforce an agreement. See Saadia Touval, Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEGOTIATION 547, 553-54 (1996). But an important concern of the Clinton administration was domestic political opposition to troop commitments in Bosnia. These concerns intensified as the administration formulated its policy on Bosnia only months before a re-election campaign. The United States also sought an agreement that would uphold the points of legal principle discussed above. It strove, at least ostensibly, to forge a plan that did not reward aggression and which adhered to the tenet that Bosnia should be a unitary state. See Maynard Glitman, U.S. Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach, SURVIVAL, Winter 1996-97, at 66, 67. Concerns that Yugoslavia's disintegration might serve as a precedent for ethnic groups in Russia to rise up against Moscow heightened the U.S. commitment to these principles. This commitment raised tensions between the United States and other Contact Group members, which from the beginning had distributed blame for the conflict more or less equally upon each of the belligerents. As a result of the premise that the belligerents shared the blame for the conflict, the Europeans generally believed that a settlement would involve some form of partition. See id. at 67-68. Refugee repatriation issues served as another source of friction between the United States and other Contact Group members. In the face of domestic political opposition to large-scale influxes of foreigners, the leaders of the European countries hosting large numbers of Bosnian refugees sought an agreement that firmly secured the right of refugees to return. The United States, on the other hand, recognized repatriation as a threat to the security environment and remained preponderantly concerned about the safety of the troops that it would have to contribute to enforce a settlement. In order to minimize the domestic political risks of the military operation, the United States insisted during the negotiations on a narrow definition of IFOR tasks. "The implementation of Agreement was thus divided between the 'territorial and other militarily related provisions,' which were the responsibility of IFOR, and all the other terms, (e.g., Elections, refugees, human rights), which were relegated to the civilian component of the implementation process." Touval, supra, at 565. Dayton also insisted on a firm date for holding national elections. Elections would presumably install a government able to provide civilian and regional security and would enable IFOR (read U.S. troops) to exit Bosnia. Any delays beyond Dayton's time line for elections would require the continued presence of U.S. troops in the region. See Susan Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, CURRENT HISTORY, March 1997, at 97, 101 ("National elections had an additional purpose . . . to enable IFOR to exit Bosnia."). Therefore, when opportunities to reconsider the time line arose, the United States stood firmly opposed. First, in 1996, pursuant to Dayton's pre-election certification requirement, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office was to determine whether conditions existed for free and fair polling in Bosnia. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 1(2). Twelve weeks before the Dayton deadline, Chairman Flavio Cotti encountered intense pressure from U.S. diplomats to certify the elections. See Christopher Hedges, Swiss Diplomat Resists U.S. on Certifying Bosnian Vote, N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 1996, at A4. After much resistance, Cotti finally gave in and issued a half-hearted certification: After carefully weighing all factors, I have come to the conclusion that there are no convincing alternatives on the holding of elections. This being the case, the position of the 'Peace Implementation Council' . . . takes on decisive significance. Its attitude is unanimous and unequivocal in the desire that the elections take place on 14 September 1996, the deadline foreseen in the Peace Agreement. And so it shall be. OSCE, Elections Certification, supra note 266, at 4. Cotti's certification irretrievably committed the international community to the September 14 date for elections. As discussed in Part V, supra, the EASC's recommendation for a recount of the September 1996 elections compromised the Dayton time line. In light of the international community's efforts to conduct the elections by September 14, Frowick was compelled to decline the recommendation. This commitment also explains Frowick's willingness to repeatedly overrule EASC sanctions, which risked the SDS* boycotts and consequent delays in holding the elections. See supra text accompanying note 254.
320. Domestic political considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. An assessment of domestic factors, however, might include the following analysis. In assuming leadership over the mediation effort, the United States agreed in principle with other Contact Group members to commit troops to enforce an agreement. See Saadia Touval, Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEGOTIATION 547, 553-54 (1996). But an important concern of the Clinton administration was domestic political opposition to troop commitments in Bosnia. These concerns intensified as the administration formulated its policy on Bosnia only months before a re-election campaign. The United States also sought an agreement that would uphold the points of legal principle discussed above. It strove, at least ostensibly, to forge a plan that did not reward aggression and which adhered to the tenet that Bosnia should be a unitary state. See Maynard Glitman, U.S. Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach, SURVIVAL, Winter 1996-97, at 66, 67. Concerns that Yugoslavia's disintegration might serve as a precedent for ethnic groups in Russia to rise up against Moscow heightened the U.S. commitment to these principles. This commitment raised tensions between the United States and other Contact Group members, which from the beginning had distributed blame for the conflict more or less equally upon each of the belligerents. As a result of the premise that the belligerents shared the blame for the conflict, the Europeans generally believed that a settlement would involve some form of partition. See id. at 67-68. Refugee repatriation issues served as another source of friction between the United States and other Contact Group members. In the face of domestic political opposition to large-scale influxes of foreigners, the leaders of the European countries hosting large numbers of Bosnian refugees sought an agreement that firmly secured the right of refugees to return. The United States, on the other hand, recognized repatriation as a threat to the security environment and remained preponderantly concerned about the safety of the troops that it would have to contribute to enforce a settlement. In order to minimize the domestic political risks of the military operation, the United States insisted during the negotiations on a narrow definition of IFOR tasks. "The implementation of Agreement was thus divided between the 'territorial and other militarily related provisions,' which were the responsibility of IFOR, and all the other terms, (e.g., Elections, refugees, human rights), which were relegated to the civilian component of the implementation process." Touval, supra, at 565. Dayton also insisted on a firm date for holding national elections. Elections would presumably install a government able to provide civilian and regional security and would enable IFOR (read U.S. troops) to exit Bosnia. Any delays beyond Dayton's time line for elections would require the continued presence of U.S. troops in the region. See Susan Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, CURRENT HISTORY, March 1997, at 97, 101 ("National elections had an additional purpose . . . to enable IFOR to exit Bosnia."). Therefore, when opportunities to reconsider the time line arose, the United States stood firmly opposed. First, in 1996, pursuant to Dayton's pre-election certification requirement, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office was to determine whether conditions existed for free and fair polling in Bosnia. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 1(2). Twelve weeks before the Dayton deadline, Chairman Flavio Cotti encountered intense pressure from U.S. diplomats to certify the elections. See Christopher Hedges, Swiss Diplomat Resists U.S. on Certifying Bosnian Vote, N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 1996, at A4. After much resistance, Cotti finally gave in and issued a half-hearted certification: After carefully weighing all factors, I have come to the conclusion that there are no convincing alternatives on the holding of elections. This being the case, the position of the 'Peace Implementation Council' . . . takes on decisive significance. Its attitude is unanimous and unequivocal in the desire that the elections take place on 14 September 1996, the deadline foreseen in the Peace Agreement. And so it shall be. OSCE, Elections Certification, supra note 266, at 4. Cotti's certification irretrievably committed the international community to the September 14 date for elections. As discussed in Part V, supra, the EASC's recommendation for a recount of the September 1996 elections compromised the Dayton time line. In light of the international community's efforts to conduct the elections by September 14, Frowick was compelled to decline the recommendation. This commitment also explains Frowick's willingness to repeatedly overrule EASC sanctions, which risked the SDS* boycotts and consequent delays in holding the elections. See supra text accompanying note 254.
321. Domestic political considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. An assessment of domestic factors, however, might include the following analysis. In assuming leadership over the mediation effort, the United States agreed in principle with other Contact Group members to commit troops to enforce an agreement. See Saadia Touval, Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEGOTIATION 547, 553-54 (1996). But an important concern of the Clinton administration was domestic political opposition to troop commitments in Bosnia. These concerns intensified as the administration formulated its policy on Bosnia only months before a re-election campaign. The United States also sought an agreement that would uphold the points of legal principle discussed above. It strove, at least ostensibly, to forge a plan that did not reward aggression and which adhered to the tenet that Bosnia should be a unitary state. See Maynard Glitman, U.S. Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach, SURVIVAL, Winter 1996-97, at 66, 67. Concerns that Yugoslavia's disintegration might serve as a precedent for ethnic groups in Russia to rise up against Moscow heightened the U.S. commitment to these principles. This commitment raised tensions between the United States and other Contact Group members, which from the beginning had distributed blame for the conflict more or less equally upon each of the belligerents. As a result of the premise that the belligerents shared the blame for the conflict, the Europeans generally believed that a settlement would involve some form of partition. See id. at 67-68. Refugee repatriation issues served as another source of friction between the United States and other Contact Group members. In the face of domestic political opposition to large-scale influxes of foreigners, the leaders of the European countries hosting large numbers of Bosnian refugees sought an agreement that firmly secured the right of refugees to return. The United States, on the other hand, recognized repatriation as a threat to the security environment and remained preponderantly concerned about the safety of the troops that it would have to contribute to enforce a settlement. In order to minimize the domestic political risks of the military operation, the United States insisted during the negotiations on a narrow definition of IFOR tasks. "The implementation of Agreement was thus divided between the 'territorial and other militarily related provisions,' which were the responsibility of IFOR, and all the other terms, (e.g., Elections, refugees, human rights), which were relegated to the civilian component of the implementation process." Touval, supra, at 565. Dayton also insisted on a firm date for holding national elections. Elections would presumably install a government able to provide civilian and regional security and would enable IFOR (read U.S. troops) to exit Bosnia. Any delays beyond Dayton's time line for elections would require the continued presence of U.S. troops in the region. See Susan Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, CURRENT HISTORY, March 1997, at 97, 101 ("National elections had an additional purpose . . . to enable IFOR to exit Bosnia."). Therefore, when opportunities to reconsider the time line arose, the United States stood firmly opposed. First, in 1996, pursuant to Dayton's pre-election certification requirement, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office was to determine whether conditions existed for free and fair polling in Bosnia. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 1(2). Twelve weeks before the Dayton deadline, Chairman Flavio Cotti encountered intense pressure from U.S. diplomats to certify the elections. See Christopher Hedges, Swiss Diplomat Resists U.S. on Certifying Bosnian Vote, N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 1996, at A4. After much resistance, Cotti finally gave in and issued a half-hearted certification: After carefully weighing all factors, I have come to the conclusion that there are no convincing alternatives on the holding of elections. This being the case, the position of the 'Peace Implementation Council' . . . takes on decisive significance. Its attitude is unanimous and unequivocal in the desire that the elections take place on 14 September 1996, the deadline foreseen in the Peace Agreement. And so it shall be. OSCE, Elections Certification, supra note 266, at 4. Cotti's certification irretrievably committed the international community to the September 14 date for elections. As discussed in Part V, supra, the EASC's recommendation for a recount of the September 1996 elections compromised the Dayton time line. In light of the international community's efforts to conduct the elections by September 14, Frowick was compelled to decline the recommendation. This commitment also explains Frowick's willingness to repeatedly overrule EASC sanctions, which risked the SDS* boycotts and consequent delays in holding the elections. See supra text accompanying note 254.
322. Domestic political considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. An assessment of domestic factors, however, might include the following analysis. In assuming leadership over the mediation effort, the United States agreed in principle with other Contact Group members to commit troops to enforce an agreement. See Saadia Touval, Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEGOTIATION 547, 553-54 (1996). But an important concern of the Clinton administration was domestic political opposition to troop commitments in Bosnia. These concerns intensified as the administration formulated its policy on Bosnia only months before a re-election campaign. The United States also sought an agreement that would uphold the points of legal principle discussed above. It strove, at least ostensibly, to forge a plan that did not reward aggression and which adhered to the tenet that Bosnia should be a unitary state. See Maynard Glitman, U.S. Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach, SURVIVAL, Winter 1996-97, at 66, 67. Concerns that Yugoslavia's disintegration might serve as a precedent for ethnic groups in Russia to rise up against Moscow heightened the U.S. commitment to these principles. This commitment raised tensions between the United States and other Contact Group members, which from the beginning had distributed blame for the conflict more or less equally upon each of the belligerents. As a result of the premise that the belligerents shared the blame for the conflict, the Europeans generally believed that a settlement would involve some form of partition. See id. at 67-68. Refugee repatriation issues served as another source of friction between the United States and other Contact Group members. In the face of domestic political opposition to large-scale influxes of foreigners, the leaders of the European countries hosting large numbers of Bosnian refugees sought an agreement that firmly secured the right of refugees to return. The United States, on the other hand, recognized repatriation as a threat to the security environment and remained preponderantly concerned about the safety of the troops that it would have to contribute to enforce a settlement. In order to minimize the domestic political risks of the military operation, the United States insisted during the negotiations on a narrow definition of IFOR tasks. "The implementation of Agreement was thus divided between the 'territorial and other militarily related provisions,' which were the responsibility of IFOR, and all the other terms, (e.g., Elections, refugees, human rights), which were relegated to the civilian component of the implementation process." Touval, supra, at 565. Dayton also insisted on a firm date for holding national elections. Elections would presumably install a government able to provide civilian and regional security and would enable IFOR (read U.S. troops) to exit Bosnia. Any delays beyond Dayton's time line for elections would require the continued presence of U.S. troops in the region. See Susan Woodward, Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two, CURRENT HISTORY, March 1997, at 97, 101 ("National elections had an additional purpose . . . to enable IFOR to exit Bosnia."). Therefore, when opportunities to reconsider the time line arose, the United States stood firmly opposed. First, in 1996, pursuant to Dayton's pre-election certification requirement, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office was to determine whether conditions existed for free and fair polling in Bosnia. See Dayton, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 1(2). Twelve weeks before the Dayton deadline, Chairman Flavio Cotti encountered intense pressure from U.S. diplomats to certify the elections. See Christopher Hedges, Swiss Diplomat Resists U.S. on Certifying Bosnian Vote, N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 1996, at A4. After much resistance, Cotti finally gave in and issued a half-hearted certification: After carefully weighing all factors, I have come to the conclusion that there are no convincing alternatives on the holding of elections. This being the case, the position of the 'Peace Implementation Council' . . . takes on decisive significance. Its attitude is unanimous and unequivocal in the desire that the elections take place on 14 September 1996, the deadline foreseen in the Peace Agreement. And so it shall be. OSCE, Elections Certification, supra note 266, at 4. Cotti's certification irretrievably committed the international community to the September 14 date for elections. As discussed in Part V, supra, the EASC's recommendation for a recount of the September 1996 elections compromised the Dayton time line. In light of the international community's efforts to conduct the elections by September 14, Frowick was compelled to decline the recommendation. This commitment also explains Frowick's willingness to repeatedly overrule EASC sanctions, which risked the SDS* boycotts and consequent delays in holding the elections. See supra text accompanying note 254.