The survival of “Asian values" as “Zivilisationskritik

Theory and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 651-686

  Thompson, Mark R ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN NUREMBERG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034562319     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026550721141     Document Type: Review

References (184)

1. Frank Ching, “Are Asian Values Finished?" Far Eastern Economic Review, January 22, 1998, 32.
2. There is already a large literature on the Asian financial crisis. See, for example, K. S. Jomo, editor, Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1998); Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One (London: Routledge, 1998); T. J. Pempel, editor, The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Even before the crisis had begun, Paul Krugman had expressed skepticism about how long rapid growth in the region could continue: “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 62-78.
3. There is already a large literature on the Asian financial crisis. See, for example, K. S. Jomo, editor, Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1998); Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One (London: Routledge, 1998); T. J. Pempel, editor, The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Even before the crisis had begun, Paul Krugman had expressed skepticism about how long rapid growth in the region could continue: “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 62-78.
4. There is already a large literature on the Asian financial crisis. See, for example, K. S. Jomo, editor, Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1998); Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One (London: Routledge, 1998); T. J. Pempel, editor, The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Even before the crisis had begun, Paul Krugman had expressed skepticism about how long rapid growth in the region could continue: “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 62-78.
5. There is already a large literature on the Asian financial crisis. See, for example, K. S. Jomo, editor, Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1998); Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One (London: Routledge, 1998); T. J. Pempel, editor, The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Even before the crisis had begun, Paul Krugman had expressed skepticism about how long rapid growth in the region could continue: “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, 62-78.
6. Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Asian Values as Reactionary Modernism,” in NIASnytt (Nordic Newsletter for Asian Studies), No. 4 (December 1997), 19-28.
7. Ibid., 19.
8. A good overview of its origins is provided in Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 8.
9. Rodan, “Preserving the One-Party State in Contemporary Singapore,” in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan, editors, Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Capitalism (St. Leonard’s: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 91.
10. Eun-Jeung Lee, Konfuzianismus und Kapitalismus: Markt und Herrschaft (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1997), uses the phrase “a Machiavellian in a Confucian mask" to describe Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. One of the most prominent critics of Asian values has been Christopher Lingle. His most recent book is The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). Lingle’s critical perspective led him into legal troubles with Singapore’s government. He offers an account in his Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency (Barcelona and Fairfax, Va.: Edicions Sirocco and the Locke Institute, 1996).
11. Eun-Jeung Lee, Konfuzianismus und Kapitalismus: Markt und Herrschaft (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1997), uses the phrase “a Machiavellian in a Confucian mask" to describe Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. One of the most prominent critics of Asian values has been Christopher Lingle. His most recent book is The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). Lingle’s critical perspective led him into legal troubles with Singapore’s government. He offers an account in his Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency (Barcelona and Fairfax, Va.: Edicions Sirocco and the Locke Institute, 1996).
12. Eun-Jeung Lee, Konfuzianismus und Kapitalismus: Markt und Herrschaft (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1997), uses the phrase “a Machiavellian in a Confucian mask" to describe Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. One of the most prominent critics of Asian values has been Christopher Lingle. His most recent book is The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). Lingle’s critical perspective led him into legal troubles with Singapore’s government. He offers an account in his Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency (Barcelona and Fairfax, Va.: Edicions Sirocco and the Locke Institute, 1996).
13. Victor Mallet, The Trouble with Tigers: The Rise and Fall of South-East Asia (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 7.
14. See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore), “Asia’s Different Standard,” Foreign Policy, No. 42 (Fall 1993), 24-51, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994), 109-126, and Kishore Mahbubani (also of the Singaporean Foreign Affairs Ministry), “The Pacific Way,” Foreign Affairs 74/1 (January/February 1995), 100-111.
15. See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore), “Asia’s Different Standard,” Foreign Policy, No. 42 (Fall 1993), 24-51, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994), 109-126, and Kishore Mahbubani (also of the Singaporean Foreign Affairs Ministry), “The Pacific Way,” Foreign Affairs 74/1 (January/February 1995), 100-111.
16. See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore), “Asia’s Different Standard,” Foreign Policy, No. 42 (Fall 1993), 24-51, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994), 109-126, and Kishore Mahbubani (also of the Singaporean Foreign Affairs Ministry), “The Pacific Way,” Foreign Affairs 74/1 (January/February 1995), 100-111.
17. J. Gus Liebenow, African Politics: Crises and Challenges (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 225-228. I wish to thank Dr. Richard Crook for this reference.
18. Mark R. Thompson, “The Limits of Democratisation in ASEAN,” Third World Quarterly 14/3 (1993), 481.
19. The World Bank, The East Asian Economic Miracle: Economic Growth and Public-Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 2. Figure 1 covers the years 1965-1990 but this trend continued until 1997.
20. “Competitive Order,” The Economist, February 15, 1992, 58-59.
21. Tommy Koh, “In Fact, East Asia is Diverse, Resilient and Unstoppable,” International Herald Tribune, December 12, 1997, 8.
22. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” The Economist, February 9, 1980, 67-72 and George Lodge and Ezra Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987).
23. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” The Economist, February 9, 1980, 67-72 and George Lodge and Ezra Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987).
24. Max Weber, The Religion of China, translated and edited by H.H. Gerth (New York: Collier and Macmillan, 1964).
25. Garry Rodan, “Theorizing Political Opposition" in Rodan, editors, Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia (London: Routledge, 1996), 16, points out that such relativistic critiques of “Western imperialism" can rationalize governmental actions that elsewhere would be considered human rights violations.
26. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), particularly chapters 9 and 12. One of the most puzzling aspects of Huntington’s writings is that despite his positively Schmittian proclivity to distinguish friends from foes ("the West and the rest"), he has elsewhere offered a Tocqueville-like perspective on the world-wide spread of democracy: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). For an appropriately sarcastic analysis, see Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Clash of Samuel Huntingtons,” The American Prospect, No. 39 (July-August 1998), 22-28.
27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), particularly chapters 9 and 12. One of the most puzzling aspects of Huntington’s writings is that despite his positively Schmittian proclivity to distinguish friends from foes ("the West and the rest"), he has elsewhere offered a Tocqueville-like perspective on the world-wide spread of democracy: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). For an appropriately sarcastic analysis, see Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Clash of Samuel Huntingtons,” The American Prospect, No. 39 (July-August 1998), 22-28.
28. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), particularly chapters 9 and 12. One of the most puzzling aspects of Huntington’s writings is that despite his positively Schmittian proclivity to distinguish friends from foes ("the West and the rest"), he has elsewhere offered a Tocqueville-like perspective on the world-wide spread of democracy: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). For an appropriately sarcastic analysis, see Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Clash of Samuel Huntingtons,” The American Prospect, No. 39 (July-August 1998), 22-28.
29. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher claimed that Asia’s economic success was “the result of unremitting hard work, an unquenchable spirit of enterprise, and sound economic policies": Margaret Thatcher, “The Triumph of Trade,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2, 1993, 23. As will be shown later in this article, this was based on a misinterpretation of the Asian miracle as the result of laissez faire policies.
30. One of the most spectacular bankruptcies during the recent Asian financial crisis was that of Hong-Kong-based Peregrine which had pointed to “Asian values" to counter criticisms of the human rights records of countries (particularly Indonesia) in which it invested in heavily. Henny Sender with Alkman Granitsas, “Broken Wings,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 22, 1998, 52.
31. Key works in this tradition are Herman Kahn (with the Hudson Institute), World Economic Development 1979 and Beyond (London: Croom Helm, 1979), MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Lodge and Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness. Michael Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore,” paper presented at The New Zealand Asian Studies Society, 13th International Conference, 24-27 November 1999, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, provides an excellent summary of this literature.
32. Key works in this tradition are Herman Kahn (with the Hudson Institute), World Economic Development 1979 and Beyond (London: Croom Helm, 1979), MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Lodge and Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness. Michael Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore,” paper presented at The New Zealand Asian Studies Society, 13th International Conference, 24-27 November 1999, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, provides an excellent summary of this literature.
33. Key works in this tradition are Herman Kahn (with the Hudson Institute), World Economic Development 1979 and Beyond (London: Croom Helm, 1979), MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Lodge and Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness. Michael Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore,” paper presented at The New Zealand Asian Studies Society, 13th International Conference, 24-27 November 1999, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, provides an excellent summary of this literature.
34. Key works in this tradition are Herman Kahn (with the Hudson Institute), World Economic Development 1979 and Beyond (London: Croom Helm, 1979), MacFarquhar, “The post-Confucian Challenge,” Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Lodge and Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Competitiveness. Michael Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore,” paper presented at The New Zealand Asian Studies Society, 13th International Conference, 24-27 November 1999, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, provides an excellent summary of this literature.
35. The five principles of Pancasila, which was originally formulated by Sukarno in 1945 are: belief in one God, humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through unanimity that arises out of the deliberation, and social justice. Except perhaps for the fourth principle, Pancasila is not per se authoritarian. It was the imposed interpretation of the Suharto regime that was anti-democratic. For a thorough analysis the “Pancasila discourse" of the Suharto regime and its impact on Indonesian society, see Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995).
36. Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
37. Bertil Lintner, “Just as Ugly,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 27, 1997, 23.
38. Ibid., 24.
39. This argument lay behind the declaration of a UN regional conference in April 1993 held in Bangkok in which the Asia-Pacific countries condemned the West’s use of human rights as a condition for foreign aid. Michael Richardson, “Value Clash Looms for U.S. and Asia,” International Herald Tribune, May 3, 1993, 1.
40. Proponents of “Asian values" found implicit support among Reaganites and Thatcherites who also pointed to the danger of powerful “distributional coalitions,” as Manfred Olson termed them, while arguing that a return to moral values is needed to guide social life: Richard Robison, “The Politics of ‘Asian Values,’" The Pacific Review 9/3 (1996), 321-322.
41. In an address to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry Conference in Manila in December 1992, Singapore’s Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, said that the Philippines needed “discipline more than democracy." Cited in “Mr. Lee goes to Manila,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 10, 1992, 4. have addressed this issue of the relationship between democracy and development in Asia-Pacific elsewhere: “Democracy is no Enemy of Growth,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 1996, 32.
42. In an address to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry Conference in Manila in December 1992, Singapore’s Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, said that the Philippines needed “discipline more than democracy." Cited in “Mr. Lee goes to Manila,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 10, 1992, 4. have addressed this issue of the relationship between democracy and development in Asia-Pacific elsewhere: “Democracy is no Enemy of Growth,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 1996, 32.
43. On Indonesia’s economic crisis, see Ross H. McLeod, “Indonesia,” in McLeod and Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis. On the resulting political crisis, see Geoff Forrester and R. J. May, editors, The Fall of Suharto (Bathhurst: Crawford House, 1998).
44. On Indonesia’s economic crisis, see Ross H. McLeod, “Indonesia,” in McLeod and Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis. On the resulting political crisis, see Geoff Forrester and R. J. May, editors, The Fall of Suharto (Bathhurst: Crawford House, 1998).
45. Denny Roy, “Singapore, China, and the ‘Soft Authoritarian Challenge,’" Asian Survey, XXXIV/3 (March 1994), 231-242.
46. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
47. Jayasuriya, “Asian Values as Reactionary Modernism,” 19-28; Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, “The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness,” in Robison and Goodman, The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and Middle-Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996), 4; and Mark R. Thompson, “Late Industrialisers, Late Democratisers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific, Third World Quarterly 17/4 (1996), 642-644.
48. Jayasuriya, “Asian Values as Reactionary Modernism,” 19-28; Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, “The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness,” in Robison and Goodman, The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and Middle-Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996), 4; and Mark R. Thompson, “Late Industrialisers, Late Democratisers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific, Third World Quarterly 17/4 (1996), 642-644.
49. Jayasuriya, “Asian Values as Reactionary Modernism,” 19-28; Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, “The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness,” in Robison and Goodman, The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and Middle-Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996), 4; and Mark R. Thompson, “Late Industrialisers, Late Democratisers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific, Third World Quarterly 17/4 (1996), 642-644.
50. Bernd Martin, Japan and Germany in the Modern World (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), 33-34.
51. David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History (London: Routledge, 1994), 127-132.
52. Martin, Japan and Germany, 43.
53. On Malaysia and Singapore, see Williams, Japan, 155, and Mark T. Berger, “The Triumph of the East? The East Asian Miracle and post-Cold War Capitalism,” in Berger and Douglas A. Borer, editors, The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (London: Routledge, 1997), particularly 267-287. On South Korea and Taiwan, see Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeastern Political Economy,” Frederic C. Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 51-59. See also, Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, orig. 1962), 119-120.
54. On Malaysia and Singapore, see Williams, Japan, 155, and Mark T. Berger, “The Triumph of the East? The East Asian Miracle and post-Cold War Capitalism,” in Berger and Douglas A. Borer, editors, The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (London: Routledge, 1997), particularly 267-287. On South Korea and Taiwan, see Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeastern Political Economy,” Frederic C. Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 51-59. See also, Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, orig. 1962), 119-120.
55. On Malaysia and Singapore, see Williams, Japan, 155, and Mark T. Berger, “The Triumph of the East? The East Asian Miracle and post-Cold War Capitalism,” in Berger and Douglas A. Borer, editors, The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (London: Routledge, 1997), particularly 267-287. On South Korea and Taiwan, see Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeastern Political Economy,” Frederic C. Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 51-59. See also, Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, orig. 1962), 119-120.
56. On Malaysia and Singapore, see Williams, Japan, 155, and Mark T. Berger, “The Triumph of the East? The East Asian Miracle and post-Cold War Capitalism,” in Berger and Douglas A. Borer, editors, The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (London: Routledge, 1997), particularly 267-287. On South Korea and Taiwan, see Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeastern Political Economy,” Frederic C. Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 51-59. See also, Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, orig. 1962), 119-120.
57. See Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan (Lexington, MA: D.C. Hearth, 1996), 203.
58. Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara, The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995).
59. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
60. Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter 1.
61. Ibid.
62. For an interesting discussion of the influence of List’s The Natural System of Political Economy, translated and edited by W. O. Henderson (London: Frank Cass, 1983) in Asia, see James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 179-194.
63. For an interesting discussion of the influence of List’s The Natural System of Political Economy, translated and edited by W. O. Henderson (London: Frank Cass, 1983) in Asia, see James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 179-194.
64. Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Comparative Perspective,” 9.
65. Volker Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 1871-1914. Economy, Society, Culture, and Politics (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994), part IV.
66. An excellent overview of the demobilization of labor in the Asia-Pacific is Frederic Deyo, “State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development,” in Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism: on Malaysia see Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 89-91; and on Singapore, Rodan, “State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore,” in Rodan, editor, Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, 100-101.
67. An excellent overview of the demobilization of labor in the Asia-Pacific is Frederic Deyo, “State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development,” in Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism: on Malaysia see Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 89-91; and on Singapore, Rodan, “State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore,” in Rodan, editor, Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, 100-101.
68. An excellent overview of the demobilization of labor in the Asia-Pacific is Frederic Deyo, “State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development,” in Deyo, editor, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism: on Malaysia see Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 89-91; and on Singapore, Rodan, “State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore,” in Rodan, editor, Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, 100-101.
69. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, 43-46.
70. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 218.
71. On Singapore, see Philippe Regnier, Singapore’ City-State in South-East Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 246-247.
72. Berghahn, Imperial Germany, part IV.
73. For a thoughtful discussion, see Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, chapter 1.
74. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
75. Norbert Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Volume 1 - Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997, orig. 1939), 91-92. This classic work, which Elias wrote in exile in London, is available in English translation: The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
76. Norbert Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Volume 1 - Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997, orig. 1939), 91-92. This classic work, which Elias wrote in exile in London, is available in English translation: The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
77. Elias’s concept of the civilizing process has often been criticized for its apparent inability to explain human barbarism in the modern age in general, and the holocaust in particular. For a good discussion see Robert van Krieken, Norbert Elias (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 4. Elias addressed this issue directly in his The Germans (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). But his distinction between German Kultur as opposed to Western Zivilisation can be read as an indirect analysis of this matter. As we will see, Elias only carries his analysis in this study to World War I, but in the emphasis on Kultur he saw a possible link (but no deterministic connection) to anti-civilizing processes. For another discussion of the link between the culture/civilization distinction and Nazism see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, orig. 1964), introduction.
78. Elias’s concept of the civilizing process has often been criticized for its apparent inability to explain human barbarism in the modern age in general, and the holocaust in particular. For a good discussion see Robert van Krieken, Norbert Elias (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 4. Elias addressed this issue directly in his The Germans (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). But his distinction between German Kultur as opposed to Western Zivilisation can be read as an indirect analysis of this matter. As we will see, Elias only carries his analysis in this study to World War I, but in the emphasis on Kultur he saw a possible link (but no deterministic connection) to anti-civilizing processes. For another discussion of the link between the culture/civilization distinction and Nazism see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, orig. 1964), introduction.
79. Elias’s concept of the civilizing process has often been criticized for its apparent inability to explain human barbarism in the modern age in general, and the holocaust in particular. For a good discussion see Robert van Krieken, Norbert Elias (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 4. Elias addressed this issue directly in his The Germans (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). But his distinction between German Kultur as opposed to Western Zivilisation can be read as an indirect analysis of this matter. As we will see, Elias only carries his analysis in this study to World War I, but in the emphasis on Kultur he saw a possible link (but no deterministic connection) to anti-civilizing processes. For another discussion of the link between the culture/civilization distinction and Nazism see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, orig. 1964), introduction.
80. Elias, Prozeß der Zivilisation, 90.
81. Ibid., 91
82. Ibid., 91-92.
83. Ibid., 108.
84. Ibid., 117.
85. Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
86. Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). Stern uses the phrase “cultural despair,” which is the inverse of “Zivilisationskritik": the sense that Zivilisation has flourished at the expense of Kultur leads to a growing sense of hopelessness among the writers he discusses.
87. Raj Vasil, Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1995), 73.
88. Cho-oon Khong, “Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Managing Conformity,” in Muthiah Alagappa, editor, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 127.
89. R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew (San Francisco: Westview Press, 199), 24.
90. C-M. Seah, editor, Asian Values and Modernization (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977).
91. S. Gopinathan, “Being and Becoming: Education for Values in Singapore,” in K. Cumings, S. Copinathan, and Y. Tomada, editors, The Revival of Values Education in Asia and the West (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 134, cited in Hill, “Reverse Orientalism.
92. S. Gopinathan, “Being and Becoming: Education for Values in Singapore,” in K. Cumings, S. Copinathan, and Y. Tomada, editors, The Revival of Values Education in Asia and the West (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 134, cited in Hill, “Reverse Orientalism.
93. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, 65.
94. Ibid., 65.
95. Mark T. Berger, “The Triumph of the East?,” 270.
96. Vasil, Asianising Singapore, 64 and 71.
97. Berger, “The Triumph of the East?,” 272.
98. Mahathir’s The Malay Dilemma (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publishers, 1982, orig. 1970), along with its theories of genetic inbreeding and the use of culturalist/racialist categories, is concerned with Malay “backwardness." In 1994 Mahathir banned the Islamic sect Al-Arqam as a deviationist, “Muslim extremist" sect that threatened state security and jailed its leader Sheikh Ashaari Muhammad as part of an ongoing crackdown on Islamic “fundamentalism." Doug Tsuruoka, “In the Name of Security: Government Moves to Ban Radical Islamic Sect,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 11, 1994, 25-26.
99. Mahathir’s The Malay Dilemma (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publishers, 1982, orig. 1970), along with its theories of genetic inbreeding and the use of culturalist/racialist categories, is concerned with Malay “backwardness." In 1994 Mahathir banned the Islamic sect Al-Arqam as a deviationist, “Muslim extremist" sect that threatened state security and jailed its leader Sheikh Ashaari Muhammad as part of an ongoing crackdown on Islamic “fundamentalism." Doug Tsuruoka, “In the Name of Security: Government Moves to Ban Radical Islamic Sect,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 11, 1994, 25-26.
100. Michael Vatikiotis, “The Mahathir Paradox,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20, 1992, 17.
101. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For similar arguments about the inversion of “orientalism" for ideological purposes see Stephanie Lawson, “Institutionalising Peaceful Conflict: Political Opposition and the Challenge of Democratization in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, 1993, 28; Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 7; Berger, “The Triumph of the East?"; and Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore.
102. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For similar arguments about the inversion of “orientalism" for ideological purposes see Stephanie Lawson, “Institutionalising Peaceful Conflict: Political Opposition and the Challenge of Democratization in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, 1993, 28; Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 7; Berger, “The Triumph of the East?"; and Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore.
103. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For similar arguments about the inversion of “orientalism" for ideological purposes see Stephanie Lawson, “Institutionalising Peaceful Conflict: Political Opposition and the Challenge of Democratization in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, 1993, 28; Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 7; Berger, “The Triumph of the East?"; and Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore.
104. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For similar arguments about the inversion of “orientalism" for ideological purposes see Stephanie Lawson, “Institutionalising Peaceful Conflict: Political Opposition and the Challenge of Democratization in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, 1993, 28; Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 7; Berger, “The Triumph of the East?"; and Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore.
105. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For similar arguments about the inversion of “orientalism" for ideological purposes see Stephanie Lawson, “Institutionalising Peaceful Conflict: Political Opposition and the Challenge of Democratization in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, 1993, 28; Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), chapter 7; Berger, “The Triumph of the East?"; and Hill, “’Asian Values’ as Reverse Orientalism: The Case of Singapore.
106. Vatikiotis, “The Mahathir Paradox,” 17.
107. Bernd Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1980).
108. Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Berlin: Fischer, 1918). In fairness, it must be added that Mann later changed his position to become an advocate of democracy during the Weimar Republic.
109. Ibid., 260-263. Quoted in, and translated by, Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, 87.
110. Ibid., 260-263. Quoted in, and translated by, Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, 87.
111. Classic statements are Seymour Martin Lispet, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, LIII/1 (March 1959), 69-105 and Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” The American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), 493-514. An overview of the debate is provided by Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 5. Lipset and co-authors provide a spirited defense of modernization theory in Lipset, Kyoung-Rung Seong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, XLV/2 (1993), 155-175.
112. Classic statements are Seymour Martin Lispet, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, LIII/1 (March 1959), 69-105 and Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” The American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), 493-514. An overview of the debate is provided by Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 5. Lipset and co-authors provide a spirited defense of modernization theory in Lipset, Kyoung-Rung Seong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, XLV/2 (1993), 155-175.
113. Classic statements are Seymour Martin Lispet, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, LIII/1 (March 1959), 69-105 and Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” The American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), 493-514. An overview of the debate is provided by Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 5. Lipset and co-authors provide a spirited defense of modernization theory in Lipset, Kyoung-Rung Seong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, XLV/2 (1993), 155-175.
114. Classic statements are Seymour Martin Lispet, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, LIII/1 (March 1959), 69-105 and Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” The American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), 493-514. An overview of the debate is provided by Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 5. Lipset and co-authors provide a spirited defense of modernization theory in Lipset, Kyoung-Rung Seong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, XLV/2 (1993), 155-175.
115. Geoff Eley, “The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History before 1914,” in David Blackbourn and Eley, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 75-90.
116. For a classic analysis of the four German milieus see M. Rainer Lepsius, “From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany,” in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, editors, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
117. Berghahn, Imperial Germany, chapter 14.
118. Weber, Gesammelte Schriften, (2 Auflage, Tübingen 1958), 19, cited in Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Deutschen in ihrem Jahrhundert, 1890-1990 (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1992), 390.
119. Weber, Gesammelte Schriften, (2 Auflage, Tübingen 1958), 19, cited in Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Deutschen in ihrem Jahrhundert, 1890-1990 (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1992), 390.
120. Cited in David Blackbourn, “The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century,” in Blackbourn and Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, 259.
121. Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, introduction and Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 219.
122. Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, introduction and Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 219.
123. Eley, “The British Model and the German Road.
124. Of course, there were many other elements involved as well, in particular the fear of the rise of the social democrats in middle class circles. But the authors of a study (cited in the next footnote) that points to the significance of workers in democratization and the antagonism towards labor as a major reason for the rise of anti-democratic movements place weight on ideological factors not directly related to the strength of the working class.
125. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 115.
126. Data from the Government of Malaysia cited in Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic,” in Hewison, Robinson, and Rodan, editors, Southeast Asia in the 1990s, 142 and 156, n. 1. Crouch points out that these categories, drawn from the International Standard Classification of Occupations, are by no means an exact measure of the “middle class" but rather should be seen as a rough indicator. I would add that they provide a comparative measure of changes in Malaysia over more than three decades. The growth in the size of the middle class in that country may have been even greater than these figures suggest as the 1957 and 1970 data cover the more prosperous peninsular Malaysia while 1990 figures cover all of Malaysia, including the less prosperous provinces in Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo.
127. Republic of Singapore, Information Division, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 1987 (Singapore: IDMCI, 1987), 287 and Republic of Singapore Department of Statistics, Economic and Social Statistics, 1962-1980 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983), 38 cited in Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability,” in James W. Morley, editor, Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 233.
128. Republic of Singapore, Information Division, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 1987 (Singapore: IDMCI, 1987), 287 and Republic of Singapore Department of Statistics, Economic and Social Statistics, 1962-1980 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983), 38 cited in Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability,” in James W. Morley, editor, Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 233.
129. Republic of Singapore, Information Division, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 1987 (Singapore: IDMCI, 1987), 287 and Republic of Singapore Department of Statistics, Economic and Social Statistics, 1962-1980 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983), 38 cited in Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability,” in James W. Morley, editor, Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 233.
130. The rest of the working populace was classified in the service, agricultural, and “other" sectors (11.9%, 1.1%, and 5%, respectively, in 1986).
131. William Case, “Sources of Legitimacy in the Case of Malaysia: Stateness, Regime Form, and Policy Performance" (unpublished ms. 1992).
132. S. Jayasankaran, “Malaysia: Tidal Wave,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 4, 1995, 14-15.
133. See Garry Rodan, “State-Society Relations in Singapore,” 95-127; Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), and Werner Vennewald, Singapur: Herrschaft der Professionals und Technokraten - Ohnmacht der Demokratie? (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994).
134. See Garry Rodan, “State-Society Relations in Singapore,” 95-127; Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), and Werner Vennewald, Singapur: Herrschaft der Professionals und Technokraten - Ohnmacht der Demokratie? (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994).
135. See Garry Rodan, “State-Society Relations in Singapore,” 95-127; Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), and Werner Vennewald, Singapur: Herrschaft der Professionals und Technokraten - Ohnmacht der Demokratie? (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994).
136. Rodan, “Preserving the One-Party State,” 78.
137. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, 238.
138. William Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy,” in Muthiah Alagappa, editor. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 101.
139. “Singapore: West-bashing,” The Economist, August 27, 1994, 46-47.
140. Simon Elegant, “Bogeyman Beware,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1999, 16-17.
141. George Tsebelis, “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter,” American Political Science Review 88/1 (March 1994), 131.
142. Vennewald, Singapur, 228-229.
143. David Lamb, “Hard Times Embolden Asians to Raise Voices for Democracy,” International Herald Tribune, February 15, 1998, 6.
144. Garry Rodan, “State-Society Relations in Singapore,” 118.
145. Cited in Michael Vatikiotis and Doug Tsuruoka, “Democracy Games,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 11, 1993, 22.
146. S. Jayasankaran, “Right Behind You: Dissident joins Mahathir on Asian Values Bandwagon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 22, 1994, 20.
147. Thomas Fuller, “Gore’s Speech Stuns Malaysia,” International Herald Tribune, November 17, 1998, 1 and 4.
148. “Ugly American?" Far Eastern Economic Review. November 26, 1998, 11.
149. Mark R. Thompson, “Why Democracy Does Not Always Follow Economic Ripeness,” in Yossi Shain and Aharon Klieman, Democracy the Challenges Ahead (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 63-84.
150. United Nations, Human Development Report (New York: 1994) table one. The exclusion of oil-producing countries is based on the assumption that with substantial oil revenues, oil sheikdoms do not have to rely on domestic taxation.
151. World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1992: Development and Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 219.
152. Adrian Karatnycky, editor, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1997-1998 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998).
153. Quoted in Murray Hiebert and Andrew Sherry, “After the Fall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 17, 1998, 12. There was also a strong and unprecedented negative reaction from Malaysia’s neighbors in Southeast Asia to these events: Thomas Fuller, “Asians Criticize Treatment of Anwar,” International Herald Tribune, October 2, 1998, 1 and 4.
154. Quoted in Murray Hiebert and Andrew Sherry, “After the Fall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 17, 1998, 12. There was also a strong and unprecedented negative reaction from Malaysia’s neighbors in Southeast Asia to these events: Thomas Fuller, “Asians Criticize Treatment of Anwar,” International Herald Tribune, October 2, 1998, 1 and 4.
155. Cited in Murray Hiebert with S. Jayasankaran, “A Single Spark,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1998, 13.
156. Ibid.
157. Michael Vatikiotis, “The Reform Tango,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 5, 1998, 10-13. Kim Dae Jung, now South Korean president, offers an hard hitting critique of “Asian values" in his “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs, 73 (November/December 1994), 191 and 194.
158. Michael Vatikiotis, “The Reform Tango,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 5, 1998, 10-13. Kim Dae Jung, now South Korean president, offers an hard hitting critique of “Asian values" in his “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs, 73 (November/December 1994), 191 and 194.
159. Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization.
160. Keith Richburg, “Opposition in Malaysia Joins Forces and Rallies,” International Herald Tribune, September 28, 1998, 1 and 9.
161. Seth Mydans, “Bucking the Trend, Malaysia’s Voters Opted for Stability,” International Herald Tribune, December 2, 1999, 7.
162. Mydans, “New Reform Party Does Poorly in Malaysian Election,” New York Times, November 30, 1999: nytimes.com/library/world/asia/113099malaysia-election.html.
163. “Odd Man In,” The Economist, December 4, 1999, 14.
164. Murray Hiebert, “Playing the Chinese Card,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 26, 1999, 18-20.
165. “The Unstoppable Dr Mahathir,” The Economist, December 4, 1999, 67-68 and Thomas Fuller, “Malaysia Well-Oiled Political Machine,” International Herald Tribune, November 20-21, 1999, 5. On the opposition’s use of the internet (Anwar had his own site, Anwar.com.my) see Fuller, “Mahathir Caught in Web of Internet Awareness,” International Herald Tribune, September 10, 1998, 4.
166. “The Unstoppable Dr Mahathir,” The Economist, December 4, 1999, 67-68 and Thomas Fuller, “Malaysia Well-Oiled Political Machine,” International Herald Tribune, November 20-21, 1999, 5. On the opposition’s use of the internet (Anwar had his own site, Anwar.com.my) see Fuller, “Mahathir Caught in Web of Internet Awareness,” International Herald Tribune, September 10, 1998, 4.
167. “The Unstoppable Dr Mahathir,” The Economist, December 4, 1999, 67-68 and Thomas Fuller, “Malaysia Well-Oiled Political Machine,” International Herald Tribune, November 20-21, 1999, 5. On the opposition’s use of the internet (Anwar had his own site, Anwar.com.my) see Fuller, “Mahathir Caught in Web of Internet Awareness,” International Herald Tribune, September 10, 1998, 4.
168. Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability,” in Morley, Driven by Growth, 233-234.
169. For an overview, see Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), chapter 3. For what promises to be an excellent statistical study see Adam Przeworski, Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Ferrando Lirrongi, Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Performance, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
170. For an overview, see Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), chapter 3. For what promises to be an excellent statistical study see Adam Przeworski, Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Ferrando Lirrongi, Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Performance, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
171. Robinson, “The Politics of ‘Asian Values,’" 318-320.
172. See Chung-in Moon and Yong-Cheol Kim, “A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics, and Democracy in South Korea,” in Adrian Leftwich, editor, Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 139-167 and John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 41 and 135.
173. See Chung-in Moon and Yong-Cheol Kim, “A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics, and Democracy in South Korea,” in Adrian Leftwich, editor, Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 139-167 and John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 41 and 135.
174. An objection might be raised here that while Malaysia’s Mahathir has been critical, the Singaporean leadership has been much more low key in attacking the global financial community. But while Singapore may be more diplomatic (which is wise because it is a world financial center), its leading technocrats are self-confidently dirigiste, heftily objecting, for example, to Milton Friedman’s claim during a visit to the island-state some years ago that its economic growth was due to the magic of the marketplace.
175. Ben Dolwen, “Where’s the Buzz?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 24, 1998, 13.
176. Murray Hiebert, “Keep the Door Open,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 1999, 23.
177. Dolwen, “Where’s the Buzz?,” 13.
178. Garry Silverman, “Education: Silence of the Lambs,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 14, 1996, 24-26.
179. Cited in Murray Hiebert, “Good Idea: Singapore Wants Students with a Creative Bent,” Far Eastern Economic Revieiw, November 14, 1996, 29-30.
180. Dolwen, “Taiwan’s Trump,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1998, 13.
181. Werner Sombart, Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1906). Democracy has long since displaced socialism as the most predicted outcome of capitalist development. Despite their concern with the political role of the working class, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, the word “socialism" is not even listed in the book’s index!
182. Philip Bowring, “Hong Kong Votes with Its Feet for a Greater Voice,” International Herald Tribune, May 26, 1998, 8.
183. Roy, “Singapore, China, and the ‘Soft Authoritarian’ Challenge.
184. Berger, “The Triumph of the East?,” 271.