Deregulation and regulatory backlash in health care

California Management Review

Volumn , Issue 1, 2000, Pages 13-33

  Robinson, James C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034561860     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41166063     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. D.W. Douglass and J.C. Miller, "Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market," American Economic Review, 64 (1974): 657-669; E.E. Bailey, D.R. Graham, and D.P. Kaplan, Deregulating the Airlines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); the classic paper on the cost-increasing effects of competition in the presence of rate regulation is G.J. Stigler, "Price and Non-Price Competition," Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968): 149-154; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
2. D.W. Douglass and J.C. Miller, "Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market," American Economic Review, 64 (1974): 657-669; E.E. Bailey, D.R. Graham, and D.P. Kaplan, Deregulating the Airlines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); the classic paper on the cost-increasing effects of competition in the presence of rate regulation is G.J. Stigler, "Price and Non-Price Competition," Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968): 149-154; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
3. D.W. Douglass and J.C. Miller, "Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market," American Economic Review, 64 (1974): 657-669; E.E. Bailey, D.R. Graham, and D.P. Kaplan, Deregulating the Airlines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); the classic paper on the cost-increasing effects of competition in the presence of rate regulation is G.J. Stigler, "Price and Non-Price Competition," Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968): 149-154; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
4. D.W. Douglass and J.C. Miller, "Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market," American Economic Review, 64 (1974): 657-669; E.E. Bailey, D.R. Graham, and D.P. Kaplan, Deregulating the Airlines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985); the classic paper on the cost-increasing effects of competition in the presence of rate regulation is G.J. Stigler, "Price and Non-Price Competition," Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968): 149-154; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
5. H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Review, 52 (1962): 1052-1069; P.L. Joskow and R. Schmalensee, "Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities," Yale Journal on Regulation, 4/1 (1986): 1-49; P.L. Joskow, "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electric Power Industry," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1989), pp. 125-199.
6. H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Review, 52 (1962): 1052-1069; P.L. Joskow and R. Schmalensee, "Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities," Yale Journal on Regulation, 4/1 (1986): 1-49; P.L. Joskow, "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electric Power Industry," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1989), pp. 125-199.
7. H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Review, 52 (1962): 1052-1069; P.L. Joskow and R. Schmalensee, "Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities," Yale Journal on Regulation, 4/1 (1986): 1-49; P.L. Joskow, "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electric Power Industry," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1989), pp. 125-199.
8. A.F. Friedlander and R.H. Spady, Freight Transport Regulation: Equity, Efficiency, and Competition in the Rail and Trucking Industries (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981); T.E. Keeler, Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983); A.F. Friedlander, E.R. Berndt, and G. McCullough, "Governance Structure, Managerial Characteristics, and Firm Performance in the Deregulated Rail Industry," Brookings Papers:Microeconomics (1992), pp. 95-183.
9. A.F. Friedlander and R.H. Spady, Freight Transport Regulation: Equity, Efficiency, and Competition in the Rail and Trucking Industries (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981); T.E. Keeler, Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983); A.F. Friedlander, E.R. Berndt, and G. McCullough, "Governance Structure, Managerial Characteristics, and Firm Performance in the Deregulated Rail Industry," Brookings Papers:Microeconomics (1992), pp. 95-183.
10. A.F. Friedlander and R.H. Spady, Freight Transport Regulation: Equity, Efficiency, and Competition in the Rail and Trucking Industries (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981); T.E. Keeler, Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983); A.F. Friedlander, E.R. Berndt, and G. McCullough, "Governance Structure, Managerial Characteristics, and Firm Performance in the Deregulated Rail Industry," Brookings Papers:Microeconomics (1992), pp. 95-183.
11. A.N. Berger, A.K. Sashyap, and J.M. Scalise, "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long Strange Trip It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1995): 55-218.
12. A. DeVany and W.D. Walls, "Natural Gas Industry Transformation, Competitive Institutions, and the Role of Regulation," Energy Policy, 22/9 (1994): 755-763; K.W. Costello and D.J. Duann, "Turning Up the Heat in the Natural Gas Industry," Regulation, 1 (1996): 52-59; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
13. A. DeVany and W.D. Walls, "Natural Gas Industry Transformation, Competitive Institutions, and the Role of Regulation," Energy Policy, 22/9 (1994): 755-763; K.W. Costello and D.J. Duann, "Turning Up the Heat in the Natural Gas Industry," Regulation, 1 (1996): 52-59; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
14. A. DeVany and W.D. Walls, "Natural Gas Industry Transformation, Competitive Institutions, and the Role of Regulation," Energy Policy, 22/9 (1994): 755-763; K.W. Costello and D.J. Duann, "Turning Up the Heat in the Natural Gas Industry," Regulation, 1 (1996): 52-59; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
15. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
16. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
17. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
18. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
19. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
20. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
21. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1971): 22-50; S. Pelzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (1976): 211-240; G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983): 371-400; S. Pelzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, (1989), pp. 1-41; A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1971, second edition 1988); P.L. Joskow and R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); M.W. White, "Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets," Brookings Papers: Microeconomics (1996), pp. 201-267.
22. A.E. Kahn, "Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward," Yale Journal on Regulation, 7 (1990): 325-354; C. Winston, "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (1993): 1263-1289; J.R. Meyer and W.B. Tye, "Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach," Yale Journal on Regulation, 5 (1988): 273-297; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
23. A.E. Kahn, "Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward," Yale Journal on Regulation, 7 (1990): 325-354; C. Winston, "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (1993): 1263-1289; J.R. Meyer and W.B. Tye, "Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach," Yale Journal on Regulation, 5 (1988): 273-297; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
24. A.E. Kahn, "Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward," Yale Journal on Regulation, 7 (1990): 325-354; C. Winston, "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (1993): 1263-1289; J.R. Meyer and W.B. Tye, "Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach," Yale Journal on Regulation, 5 (1988): 273-297; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
25. A.E. Kahn, "Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward," Yale Journal on Regulation, 7 (1990): 325-354; C. Winston, "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (1993): 1263-1289; J.R. Meyer and W.B. Tye, "Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach," Yale Journal on Regulation, 5 (1988): 273-297; R.H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
26. These quantitative estimates are derived from the literature survey in C. Winston, "U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12/3 (1998): 89-110.
27. Fare ceilings imposed by Civil Aeronautics Board had stimulated non-price competition through more frequent flights, reducing occupancy rates and raising average costs per passenger mile, and it was anticipated that deregulation would reduce frequency by stimulating price competition. However, the increase in demand stimulated by the lower prices more than compensated for the frequency-reducing impact of higher seat occupancy rates.
28. K.J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," American Economic Review, 53/5 (1963): 941-973.
29. D.A. Banks, S.E. Foreman, and T.E. Keeler, "Cross-Subsidization in Hospital Care: Some Lessons from the Law and Economics of Regulation," Health Matrix Journal of Law-Medicine, 9 (1999): 1-35.
30. For an overview of the economics of professional dominance, see J.C. Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: Competition and Innovation in Health Care (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter 2.
31. R.G. Noll, "Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation," in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989).
32. K. Levit, C. Cowan, B. Braden, et al., "National Health Expenditures in 1997: More Slow Growth," Health Affairs, 17/6 (1998): 99-110.
33. For an overview of organizational innovation in physician group practice, see J.C. Robinson, op. cit., Chapters 5-8.
34. The BNA Health Plan and Provider Reporter provides a weekly summary of federal and state anti-managed care legislation and regulation. The figure on 10,000 bills was derived from analyses by the Health Insurance Association of America and National Conference of State Legislatures. Bureau of National Affairs, BNA Health Plan and Provider Reporter, June 28, 2000): pp. 758-759.
35. The cognoscenti will recognize the debt of this paragraph to J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1942).