Boundaries and violence: Repertoires of state action along the Bosnia/Yugoslavia divide

Theory and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 609-649

  Ron, James ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034558809     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026546030554     Document Type: Review

References (210)

1. For discussions of the supposed fading salience of borders in a globalizing world, see K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Business, 1990); R. Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75/4 (1996): 45-62; and S. Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
2. For discussions of the supposed fading salience of borders in a globalizing world, see K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Business, 1990); R. Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75/4 (1996): 45-62; and S. Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
3. For discussions of the supposed fading salience of borders in a globalizing world, see K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Business, 1990); R. Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75/4 (1996): 45-62; and S. Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
4. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
5. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
6. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
7. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
8. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
9. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
10. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
11. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefied, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey’s “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’" Sociological Theory 16/3 (1998): 239-259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
12. During the first five months of 1997, I conducted some 100 unstructured interviews in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. My interview subjects were war correspondents, state officials, paramilitary veterans, community leaders, and politicians, most of whom were located through a snowball sampling procedure. My approach was based on the extended case method developed by Michael Burawoy, who advocates the use of detailed micro-descriptions to analyze macro-structural processes. For details, see M. Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method,” Sociological Theory 16/1 (1998): 4-33.
13. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
14. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
15. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
16. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
17. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
18. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim - and especially Croat - forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia’s forced depopulation include N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992-1993); United Nations, Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia’s experience with forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers,” Slavic Review 55/4 (1996): 727-778, and his “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23/4 (1996): 783-801.
19. M. Andrejevich, “The Sandzak: The Next Balkan Theater of War?" RFE/RL Research Report (November 27, 1992): 26-34; Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22 (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 1994); and F. Schmidt, “The Sandzak: Muslims Between Serbia and Montenegro,” RFE/RL Research Report (February 11, 1994); 29-35.
20. M. Andrejevich, “The Sandzak: The Next Balkan Theater of War?" RFE/RL Research Report (November 27, 1992): 26-34; Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22 (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 1994); and F. Schmidt, “The Sandzak: Muslims Between Serbia and Montenegro,” RFE/RL Research Report (February 11, 1994); 29-35.
21. M. Andrejevich, “The Sandzak: The Next Balkan Theater of War?" RFE/RL Research Report (November 27, 1992): 26-34; Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22 (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 1994); and F. Schmidt, “The Sandzak: Muslims Between Serbia and Montenegro,” RFE/RL Research Report (February 11, 1994); 29-35.
22. M. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
23. S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
24. V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security 19/3 (1994-1995): 130-166.
25. The notion that sovereignty permits state elites to display greater brutality toward domestic populations seems intuitive to many scholars. See, for example, J. W. Meyer, “The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State,” Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual, in G. M. Thomas, J. W. Meyer, F. O. Ramirez, and J. Boli, editors (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), 41-71.
26. For a discussion of “appropriateness,” see J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: The Free Press, 1989). For analyses stressing the institutional configuration of costs, benefits, and interests, see W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).
27. For a discussion of “appropriateness,” see J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: The Free Press, 1989). For analyses stressing the institutional configuration of costs, benefits, and interests, see W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).
28. See I. S. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), for an exploration of efforts by nationalist entrepreneurs in Britain, France, and Israel to instill their vision of expanded borders in their society’s collective consciousness.
29. The other five republics were Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The latter two formed the new Yugoslavia in 1992, while the remaining four were recognized as independent, sovereign states.
30. Excellent discussions of the Yugoslav dissolution are L. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
31. Excellent discussions of the Yugoslav dissolution are L. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
32. D. Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995).
33. For details of contemporary Serbian politics, see E. D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); R. Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press); V. Vujacic, Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1995), doctoral thesis; and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
34. For details of contemporary Serbian politics, see E. D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); R. Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press); V. Vujacic, Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1995), doctoral thesis; and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
35. For details of contemporary Serbian politics, see E. D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); R. Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press); V. Vujacic, Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1995), doctoral thesis; and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
36. For details of contemporary Serbian politics, see E. D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); R. Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press); V. Vujacic, Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1995), doctoral thesis; and S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.
37. For details of U.S. calculations on this issue, see W. Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York: Random House, 1996).
38. The Sandzak of Novi Pazar, as it is often referred to in historical writings, was conquered by Serbian forces from the Ottomans during the 1912-1913 Balkan wars, and was then divided between Serbia and Montenegro. The region was part of the Ottoman empire until 1878, when it was seized by the Habsburgs, who then returned it to the Ottomans in 1908. During the first Yugoslavia (1914-1941) the area was referred to by its medieval Serbian name, Raska, and remained part of Serbia and Montenegro. In 1943, the Yugoslav communist party recognized Sandzak as an autonomous region, but the party later reversed its decision, confirming Sandzak’s incorporation into the Serbian and Montenegrin republics. In 1992 this decision proved decisive since Yugoslavia dissolved along republican lines. Sandzak thus remained within rump Yugoslavia. For details on Sandzak’s history, see C. and B. Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), and F. Schmidt, “The Sandzak.
39. The Sandzak of Novi Pazar, as it is often referred to in historical writings, was conquered by Serbian forces from the Ottomans during the 1912-1913 Balkan wars, and was then divided between Serbia and Montenegro. The region was part of the Ottoman empire until 1878, when it was seized by the Habsburgs, who then returned it to the Ottomans in 1908. During the first Yugoslavia (1914-1941) the area was referred to by its medieval Serbian name, Raska, and remained part of Serbia and Montenegro. In 1943, the Yugoslav communist party recognized Sandzak as an autonomous region, but the party later reversed its decision, confirming Sandzak’s incorporation into the Serbian and Montenegrin republics. In 1992 this decision proved decisive since Yugoslavia dissolved along republican lines. Sandzak thus remained within rump Yugoslavia. For details on Sandzak’s history, see C. and B. Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), and F. Schmidt, “The Sandzak.
40. Quoted in J. Rupert, “Borderland Braces for Ethnic War; Serb Militias Active in Muslim Region,” Washington Post, May 29, 1993
41. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia recognized a “Muslim nationality" in 1976. Thereafter, socialist Yugoslavia’s constituent “nations" were Muslims, Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats, while its “national minorities" included ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Macedonians, and others. For more on Muslims in Bosnia and the Sandzak, see T. Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
42. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 144.
43. S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 301.
44. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 279.
45. M. Andrejevich, “The Sandzak.
46. “Sandzak Muslims Confer with Carrington,” Borba, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-061, March 30, 1992).
47. Cited in A. Helfant-Budding, Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1966-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998), doctoral thesis, 395.
48. A. Helfant-Budding, Serb Intellectuals, 396.
49. “Sandzak Official Calls for Deployment of UN Forces Following Incidents,” Radio Belgrade, February 20, 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1619/C1, February 22, 1993).
50. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Pantheon, 1964).
51. A. Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
52. A. Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, 15.
53. A. Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, 187.
54. M. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results, Archives Europeanes de Sociologie 25 (1984): 185-213, and his Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1993), 60.
55. M. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results, Archives Europeanes de Sociologie 25 (1984): 185-213, and his Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1993), 60.
56. M. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 190.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1979).
60. A. Silver, “The Demand for Order in Civil Society,” The Police: Six Sociological Essays, in David Bordua, editor (New York: Wiley, 1967), 8.
61. S. Herbert, Policing Space: Territoriality and the Los Angeles Police Department (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3.
62. Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). For details of campaigns by modern states to kill large numbers of their own populations, see R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1994).
63. Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). For details of campaigns by modern states to kill large numbers of their own populations, see R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1994).
64. A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSS,” American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987): 1065-1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21/3 (1993): 245-274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state’s initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their “Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” American Political Review 75/4 (1981): 901-910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
65. A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSS,” American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987): 1065-1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21/3 (1993): 245-274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state’s initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their “Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” American Political Review 75/4 (1981): 901-910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
66. A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSS,” American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987): 1065-1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21/3 (1993): 245-274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state’s initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their “Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” American Political Review 75/4 (1981): 901-910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
67. A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSS,” American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987): 1065-1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21/3 (1993): 245-274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state’s initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their “Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” American Political Review 75/4 (1981): 901-910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
68. A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSS,” American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987): 1065-1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21/3 (1993): 245-274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state’s initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their “Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” American Political Review 75/4 (1981): 901-910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
69. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
70. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
71. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
72. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
73. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
74. For discussions of statecrafting, the “art of the state,” and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, Border Games; D. Carter, “The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions,” Journal of Historical Sociology 7/1 (1994): 73-102; M. Kearney, “Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4/1 (1991): 52-74; T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77-96; and N. Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
75. S. Herbert, Policing Space, 14.
76. T. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State,” 91.
77. Strictly speaking, the preoccupation with territorial boundedness is also a key Weberian concern (see S. Herbert, Policing Space, 14-16). The “statecrafting" perspective builds upon the Weberian approach by highlighting the discursive and/or performative aspects of borders.
78. For a discussion of states’ desires for international legitimacy,” see J. Ron, “Varying Methods of State Violence,” International Organization 51/2 (1997): 275-301. For a discussion of why responsible authorities feel compelled to demonstrate control over “their" territory, see S. Herbert, Policing Space, 123-140.
79. For a discussion of states’ desires for international legitimacy,” see J. Ron, “Varying Methods of State Violence,” International Organization 51/2 (1997): 275-301. For a discussion of why responsible authorities feel compelled to demonstrate control over “their" territory, see S. Herbert, Policing Space, 123-140.
80. “Republic of Yugoslavia Declaration,” Tanjug, April 28, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-083, April 29, 1992).
81. “Customs Administration Sets Up New Checkpoints,” Tanjug, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-057, March 24, 1992).
82. “International Border Crossings Set Up,” Tanjug, April 30, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-085, May 1, 1992).
83. “Determination of New Borders of FRY Viewed,” Politika, May 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-107, June 3, 1992).
84. “FRY Citizens to Leave Bosnia,” Tanjug, May 4, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-087, May 5, 1992).
85. “Presidency Asks Bosnian Leaders to Absorb JNA,” Tanjug, May 5, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-088, May 6, 1992).
86. “Army Not in Contact with Formations in Bosnia,” Tanjug, June 7, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-110, June 8, 1992).
87. “Bozovic Denies Territorial Claim,” April 22, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-078, April 22, 1992).
88. “Milosevic Comments on Peace Talks, U.S. Policy,” RTB Television Network, April 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-080, April 24, 1992).
89. “Seselj Denies Existence of Paramilitary Forces,” Tanjug, April 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-080, April 24, 1992).
90. “Arkan: Only Bosnian SDG Members in Serajevo,” Borba, May 30-31, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-112, June 10, 1992).
91. “Jovanovic Persents Government’s Reply to EC." Radio Beograd Network, April 24, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-081, April 27, 1992).
92. “Karadzic Comments on Division of Republic,’ Borba, March 16, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-061, March 30, 1992).
93. “Leaders Examine EC Involvement in Republic,” NIN, March 13, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-061, March 30, 1992).
94. “Karadzic, Krajisnik Hold News Conference,” Radio Sarajevo Network, April 18, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-076, April 20, 1992).
95. T. Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
96. J. Borger, “Milosevic Case Hardens,” The Guardian, February 3, 1997.
97. M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1992), 150.
98. “Cetnik Duke,” Telegraf, daily, September 28, 1994.
99. Cited in P. Williams and N. Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility: A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic (Washington, D.C.: Balkan Institute, 1996), 7.
100. Interview in Washington, February 1998. The official requested anonymity.
101. Interview with Dejan Pavlovic in Belgrade, February 1997.
102. Interview with Daniel Snidden in Belgrade, March 1997.
103. Interview in Belgrade, February and March, 1997. The lieutenant requested anonymity.
104. For details see N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia; United Nations, Final Report; P. Williams and N. Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility.
105. For details see N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia; United Nations, Final Report; P. Williams and N. Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility.
106. For details see N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia; United Nations, Final Report; P. Williams and N. Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility.
107. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights, Report on Ethnic Cleansing Operations in the Northeast-Bosnia City of Zvornik from April through June 1992 (Vienna: Boltzmann Institute), 1994.
108. Interview with Jovan Dulovic in Belgrade, May 26, 1997.
109. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, Report on Ethnic Cleansing, 23.
110. Interview with Hosein Pelidija in Pljevlja, May 1, 1997.
111. Interview with Velijezer Brajovic in Podgorica, June 6, 1997.
112. Interviews in Pljevlja, May 7, 1997.
113. L. Branson, “On the Line with Serbia’s Bold Weekend Warriors,” Sunday Times, August 16, 1992.
114. Interview with the mayor in Pljevlja, May 7, 1997. The mayor requested anonymity.
115. R. Cohen, “Montenegrin Town, All but at War, Shows Danger that Fight Will Spread,” New York Times, September 13, 1992.
116. Interview with Sevad Delic in Pljevlja, May 24, 1997.
117. Interview with Sukrije Hadjisatirovic in Pljevlja, May 7, 1997.
118. Interviews in Novi Pazar, February 1997.
119. Interview with Safet Bandzovic in Novi Pazar, February 16, 1997.
120. Interview with Sefik Alomerovic in Novi Pazar, February 15, 1997.
121. Interview in Priboj, February 22, 1997. Ekram requested anonymity.
122. Interview in Priboj, February 23, 1997. The café owner requested anonymity.
123. Interview with Dzemo Halilagovic in Priboj, February 21, 1997.
124. B. Harden, “Prelude to Ethnic Cleansing is Heard in Serbia,” Washington Post, November 11, 1992.
125. Y. Chazan, “Serbian Brutality Revives Old Fears,” The Guardian, November 9, 1992.
126. Human Rights Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22.
127. “Police Still Searching for Attackers of Sandzak Village,” Yugoslav Telegraph Service, February 24, 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1625/C1, March 1, 1993).
128. “Yugoslav Army to Reinforce Border Patrols After Priboj Kidnaping,” Tanjug, October 26, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1523/C1/1, October 28, 1992).
129. “Fate of Abducted Muslims Uncertain; Human Rights Minister Memic Protests,” Tanjug, October 23, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1520/C1/7, October 24, 1992); Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22; “Kidnapped!" Vreme, weekly, January 3, 1994; “Silence Wrapped Around Fear,” Borba, November 9, 1992.
130. “Fate of Abducted Muslims Uncertain; Human Rights Minister Memic Protests,” Tanjug, October 23, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1520/C1/7, October 24, 1992); Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22; “Kidnapped!" Vreme, weekly, January 3, 1994; “Silence Wrapped Around Fear,” Borba, November 9, 1992.
131. “Fate of Abducted Muslims Uncertain; Human Rights Minister Memic Protests,” Tanjug, October 23, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1520/C1/7, October 24, 1992); Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22; “Kidnapped!" Vreme, weekly, January 3, 1994; “Silence Wrapped Around Fear,” Borba, November 9, 1992.
132. “Fate of Abducted Muslims Uncertain; Human Rights Minister Memic Protests,” Tanjug, October 23, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1520/C1/7, October 24, 1992); Humanitarian Law Center, Spotlight Report No. 22; “Kidnapped!" Vreme, weekly, January 3, 1994; “Silence Wrapped Around Fear,” Borba, November 9, 1992.
133. “Serbs and Muslims Removed from Train on Belgrade-Bar Line,” Serbian Radio, February 28, 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1626/C1, March 2, 1993).
134. “Captain Pendurevic Has Nothing to do With the Kidnapping Case. Passengers Were Kidnapped and Killed by Milan Lukic,” Dnevni Telegraf, daily, August 26, 1996; “Everyone Knew That Lukic Was a Thug, But No One Dared to Stand Up to Him and Say: ‘Enough!’" Dnevni Telegraf, August 27th, 1996; “Lukic and Pendurevic Were on Blood and Knife. Vino Used to Say: If I Kill Him, They Will Kill Me, Saying I Killed a Serb,” Dnevni Telegraf, August 28th, 1996; “I Have No Connection With the Strpci Kidnapping Case. I Met Lukic Once in My Life, and I Did Not Accept Him Into My Unit,” Dnevni Telegraf, September 9, 1996.
135. “Captain Pendurevic Has Nothing to do With the Kidnapping Case. Passengers Were Kidnapped and Killed by Milan Lukic,” Dnevni Telegraf, daily, August 26, 1996; “Everyone Knew That Lukic Was a Thug, But No One Dared to Stand Up to Him and Say: ‘Enough!’" Dnevni Telegraf, August 27th, 1996; “Lukic and Pendurevic Were on Blood and Knife. Vino Used to Say: If I Kill Him, They Will Kill Me, Saying I Killed a Serb,” Dnevni Telegraf, August 28th, 1996; “I Have No Connection With the Strpci Kidnapping Case. I Met Lukic Once in My Life, and I Did Not Accept Him Into My Unit,” Dnevni Telegraf, September 9, 1996.
136. “Captain Pendurevic Has Nothing to do With the Kidnapping Case. Passengers Were Kidnapped and Killed by Milan Lukic,” Dnevni Telegraf, daily, August 26, 1996; “Everyone Knew That Lukic Was a Thug, But No One Dared to Stand Up to Him and Say: ‘Enough!’" Dnevni Telegraf, August 27th, 1996; “Lukic and Pendurevic Were on Blood and Knife. Vino Used to Say: If I Kill Him, They Will Kill Me, Saying I Killed a Serb,” Dnevni Telegraf, August 28th, 1996; “I Have No Connection With the Strpci Kidnapping Case. I Met Lukic Once in My Life, and I Did Not Accept Him Into My Unit,” Dnevni Telegraf, September 9, 1996.
137. “Captain Pendurevic Has Nothing to do With the Kidnapping Case. Passengers Were Kidnapped and Killed by Milan Lukic,” Dnevni Telegraf, daily, August 26, 1996; “Everyone Knew That Lukic Was a Thug, But No One Dared to Stand Up to Him and Say: ‘Enough!’" Dnevni Telegraf, August 27th, 1996; “Lukic and Pendurevic Were on Blood and Knife. Vino Used to Say: If I Kill Him, They Will Kill Me, Saying I Killed a Serb,” Dnevni Telegraf, August 28th, 1996; “I Have No Connection With the Strpci Kidnapping Case. I Met Lukic Once in My Life, and I Did Not Accept Him Into My Unit,” Dnevni Telegraf, September 9, 1996.
138. Zoran Saponjic: “Paramilitaries Are All Around,” Borba, October 25, 1992; “Night of the Triggers,” Borba, October 28, 1992; “No Witnesses Against Lukic,” Borba, October 29, 1992.
139. Zoran Saponjic: “Paramilitaries Are All Around,” Borba, October 25, 1992; “Night of the Triggers,” Borba, October 28, 1992; “No Witnesses Against Lukic,” Borba, October 29, 1992.
140. Zoran Saponjic: “Paramilitaries Are All Around,” Borba, October 25, 1992; “Night of the Triggers,” Borba, October 28, 1992; “No Witnesses Against Lukic,” Borba, October 29, 1992.
141. Saponjic, “Night of the Triggers.
142. Interview in Priboj, February 25, 1997. The former mayor requested anonymity.
143. Saponjic, “Paramilitaries Are All Around.
144. Zoran Prijevic, “Kidnapped Muslims Alive?" Borba, November 19, 1992.
145. “Yugoslav, Serbian and Local Authorities Call on Muslims to Return to Sjeverin,” Tanjug, October 31, 1992 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1525/C1/6, November 3, 1992).
146. Humanitarian Law Center. Spotlight Report No. 22.
147. “Prijepolje Muslims Protest About Train Kidnaping Inside Bosnia,” Serbian Radio, March 2, 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1630/C1, March 6, 1993).
148. Interview in Prijepolje, February 24, 1997. The Muslim leader requested anonymity.
149. Interview with Antonella Riha in Belgrade, May 29, 1997. Riha had worked as an investigator in the Sandzak for the Humanitarian Law Center.
150. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
151. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
152. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
153. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
154. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
155. For details of Jewish ultranationalism and its relation to successive Israeli governments, see B’Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-à-vis Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1994); Y. Karp, The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence Against Palestinians on the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, English translation); I. S. Lustick, For the Land and for the Lord (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), and Unsettled Lands, Disputed States; N. Masalha, A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-1996 (London; Faber and Faber, 1997); and E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
156. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
157. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
158. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
159. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
160. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
161. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
162. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
163. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
164. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
165. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
166. For details of Israeli actions in Lebanon, see A. Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (1992): 35-53; W. E. Burnett, “Command Responsibility and War Crimes: A Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra,” Military Law Review 107 (1985): 71-189; R. Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1990); M. Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1983); Y. Kahan, A. Barak, and Y. Efrat, Final Report: The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983); W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979); A. R. Norton, “(In)Security Zones in Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 (1993): 61-79; J. C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); K. E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
167. I.S. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands.
168. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
169. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
170. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
171. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
172. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
173. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
174. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
175. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
176. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
177. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
178. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
179. For discussions of Israel’s coercive activities in the Palestinian occupied territories, see Al Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1988): R. B. Margolies, “The Intifada: Palestinian Adaptation to Israeli Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7 (1995): 49-73; D. McDowal, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Middle East Watch, The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (New York: Middle East Watch, 1992), A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against “Wanted" and Masked Palestinians (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993), and Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (New York: Middle East Watch, 1994); J. R. Nasser and R. Heacock, editors, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990); I. Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); D. Peretz, Intifada (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); A Shalev, Intifada: Causes and Effects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); and R. Shehadeh, Occupiers’ Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989).
180. William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996) opposes this logic, proposing instead that states use internal violence as part of a bargaining process between state factions and social elites. Objective threats to state infrastructural control, Stanley believes, are not correlated to actual levels of state violence. Although Stanley’s point is well taken - especially for his El Salvador case - his interpretation is not universally valid. In Turkey and Kosovo, the state clearly did escalate its use of violence as a result of effective insurgent challenges. Stanley’s interpretation might work better for Israeli policy in Lebanon, where shifts in Israeli bombing tactics often follow domestic political struggles rather than actual threats to Israel’s well-being.
181. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
182. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
183. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
184. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
185. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
186. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
187. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994 (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and Violations of the War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
188. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
189. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
190. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
191. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
192. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
193. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
194. For details on Serbia’s policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996 (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
195. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
196. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
197. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
198. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
199. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
200. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
201. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
202. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
203. For details of the KLA’s political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, “Aux Origines de l’Armee de Liberation du Kosovo,” Le Monde Diplomatique, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Long, Hot Summer, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346/http://www.cri…jects/sbalkans/reports/kos05rep.htm); T. Judah, “War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov,” The Guardian, August 29, 1998, “Inside the KLA,” New York Review of Books, June 6, 1999, and Kosovo: War and Revenge; Z. Kusovac, “KLA Power Rising,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30/1 (1998); “Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10/9 (1998), and “The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/4 (1999).
204. Amnesty International, Kosovo: The Evidence (London: Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch); Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), and A Week of Terror in Drenica (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
205. Amnesty International, Kosovo: The Evidence (London: Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch); Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), and A Week of Terror in Drenica (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
206. Amnesty International, Kosovo: The Evidence (London: Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch); Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), and A Week of Terror in Drenica (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
207. For details of the spring 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which drove most of Kosovo’s two million ethnic Albanians from their homes, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Vienna: OSCE, 2000). For a discussion of the debate still raging over the precise number of Serbian-induced Kosovar casualties during that operation, see S. Halima and D. Vidal, “Media and Disinformation,” Le Monde Diplomatique (monthly), English vision, March 2000, 9-10. Although NATO estimates initially put the number of Kosovar casualties in the tens of thousands, the estimates have since been reduced to 2, 000-10, 000, including Kosovar combatants. For an argument suggesting that Serbia would not have engaged in full-scale ethnic cleansing were it not for the NATO air attack, see N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe: Common Courage Perss, 1999), and his “Another Way for Kosovo,” Le Monde Deplomatique, English version, March 2000, pp. 8-9.
208. For details of the spring 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which drove most of Kosovo’s two million ethnic Albanians from their homes, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Vienna: OSCE, 2000). For a discussion of the debate still raging over the precise number of Serbian-induced Kosovar casualties during that operation, see S. Halima and D. Vidal, “Media and Disinformation,” Le Monde Diplomatique (monthly), English vision, March 2000, 9-10. Although NATO estimates initially put the number of Kosovar casualties in the tens of thousands, the estimates have since been reduced to 2, 000-10, 000, including Kosovar combatants. For an argument suggesting that Serbia would not have engaged in full-scale ethnic cleansing were it not for the NATO air attack, see N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe: Common Courage Perss, 1999), and his “Another
209. For details of the spring 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which drove most of Kosovo’s two million ethnic Albanians from their homes, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Vienna: OSCE, 2000). For a discussion of the debate still raging over the precise number of Serbian-induced Kosovar casualties during that operation, see S. Halima and D. Vidal, “Media and Disinformation,” Le Monde Diplomatique (monthly), English vision, March 2000, 9-10. Although NATO estimates initially put the number of Kosovar casualties in the tens of thousands, the estimates have since been reduced to 2, 000-10, 000, including Kosovar combatants. For an argument suggesting that Serbia would not have engaged in full-scale ethnic cleansing were it not for the NATO air attack, see N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe: Common Courage Perss, 1999), and his “Another Way for Kosovo,” Le Monde Deplomatique, English version, March 2000, pp. 8-9.
210. For details of the spring 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which drove most of Kosovo’s two million ethnic Albanians from their homes, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (Vienna: OSCE, 2000). For a discussion of the debate still raging over the precise number of Serbian-induced Kosovar casualties during that operation, see S. Halima and D. Vidal, “Media and Disinformation,” Le Monde Diplomatique (monthly), English vision, March 2000, 9-10. Although NATO estimates initially put the number of Kosovar casualties in the tens of thousands, the estimates have since been reduced to 2, 000-10, 000, including Kosovar combatants. For an argument suggesting that Serbia would not have engaged in full-scale ethnic cleansing were it not for the NATO air attack, see N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe: Common Courage Perss, 1999), and his “Another Way for Kosovo,” Le Monde Deplomatique, English version, March 2000, pp. 8-9.