Dynamical systems game theory and dynamics of games

Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena

Volumn 147, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 221-258

  Akiyama, E ^a   Kaneko, K ^b  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0034544440     PISSN: 01672789     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2789(00)00157-3     Document Type: Article

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