Rules for followers: Institutional theory and the new politics of economic backwardness in Russia

Politics and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 437-482

  Woodruff, David M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034486357     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329200028004002     Document Type: Article

References (205)

1. For two prominent and relatively recent exceptions, see Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," Politics & Society 21, no. 3 (September 1993): 245-74.
2. For two prominent and relatively recent exceptions, see Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," Politics & Society 21, no. 3 (September 1993): 245-74.
3. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
4. Peter B. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); James R. Kurth, "Industrial Change and Political Change: A European Perspective," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 319-62.
5. Peter B. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); James R. Kurth, "Industrial Change and Political Change: A European Perspective," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 319-62.
6. Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918). For the opposite position, that technology cannot be defined absent its "supporting institutions," see Alice H. Amsden, "A Theory of Government Intervention in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 57.
7. Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918). For the opposite position, that technology cannot be defined absent its "supporting institutions," see Alice H. Amsden, "A Theory of Government Intervention in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 57.
8. Compare the brief intellectual history of the transition "from physical capital to human capital to social capital" given in Christopher Clague, "The New Institutional Economics and Economic Development," in Christopher Clague, ed., Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 13-36. The volume as a whole also illustrates this point.
9. Compare Kathryn Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 228-51. Those fortunate enough to have read this excellent essay, whose influence will be felt throughout the present article and which receives more extensive discussion below, will recognize that this argument is substantially a restatement in more general language of Hendley's main thesis.
10. For the alternative view that the critical transaction technologies for business adaptation to present market conditions are not the those embodied in law at all, see Charles F. Sabel and Jane E. Prokop, "Stabilization through Reorganization? Some Preliminary Implications of Russia's Entry into World Markets in the Age of Discursive Quality Standards," Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, eds., Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996), 151-91. Whatever the accuracy of this viewpoint, it is hoped that the case studies given in the present article will demonstrate that some law-rooted transaction technologies (money and corporate ownership forms) do retain decisive relevance.
11. This point is stressed both by Douglass North and Max Weber. See the account of both theorists in Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," which, however, presents a slightly narrow reading of Weber, understating his substantial anticipation of North's arguments. Cf. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Max Weber, Economy Press, 1978), esp. 311-19, 325-38; and Randall Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization," in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 111-30.
12. This point is stressed both by Douglass North and Max Weber. See the account of both theorists in Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," which, however, presents a slightly narrow reading of Weber, understating his substantial anticipation of North's arguments. Cf. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Max Weber, Economy Press, 1978), esp. 311-19, 325-38; and Randall Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization," in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 111-30.
13. This point is stressed both by Douglass North and Max Weber. See the account of both theorists in Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," which, however, presents a slightly narrow reading of Weber, understating his substantial anticipation of North's arguments. Cf. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Max Weber, Economy Press, 1978), esp. 311-19, 325-38; and Randall Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization," in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 111-30.
14. For a survey of these schools of institutional theory, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44, no. 5 (December 1996): 936-57.
15. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 3-4.
16. Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge )
17. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," in Daniel B. Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 243-66.
18. It will not do to say both players choosing to cheat is equivalent to "no trade," since all this does is admit that the prisoners' dilemma framework is not appropriate, given the radically different meaning of cheating depending on what one's partner plays. Not having dealings with a person and making off with goods she has advanced you are two different actions. Similarly, someone who "cheats" as a way of not playing will have trouble interpreting the payoff that ensues on a "partner's" choice of cooperation.
19. Philip Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept in a Game Theory Context," in Philip Mirowski, ed., The Reconstruction of Economic Theory (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1986), 253. Indeed, one author has chosen to refer to the underlying game as specified by "nature." Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions," 229.
20. Philip Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept in a Game Theory Context," in Philip Mirowski, ed., The Reconstruction of Economic Theory (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1986), 253. Indeed, one author has chosen to refer to the underlying game as specified by "nature." Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions," 229.
21. This distinction is from Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept in a Game Theory Context," 257-58. Mirowski distinguishes between "'natural' rules" and "boot-strap rules," equivalent to our g-rules and h-rules, respectively. The remarks in this section of this article are intended in part clarification, in part extension, and in part application of the approach of Mirowski's extraordinary essay, which should be read by anyone seeking to apply game theory in political science or political economy, and the efforts I have made to give complete citation are probably inadequate. The difficulty of making adequate citation is compounded by the great overlaps between the work of Mirowski and that of Georg Simmel, which is also discussed extensively in this section.
22. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 33-52.
23. Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 91 (November 1985): 481-510. For a demonstration of the appositeness of Polanyi, and an excellent discussion of the embedding of laws in "relational settings," see Margaret Somers, "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy," American Sociological Review 58 (October 1993): 587-620.
24. Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 91 (November 1985): 481-510. For a demonstration of the appositeness of Polanyi, and an excellent discussion of the embedding of laws in "relational settings," see Margaret Somers, "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy," American Sociological Review 58 (October 1993): 587-620.
25. Cf. Weber's discussion of "gaps" in law, Economy and Society, 330.
26. Mirowski ("Institutions as a Solution Concept," 258), may mean something similar when he invokes Wittgenstein to say that "A rule does not certify its own correct application."
27. Ibid., 258.
28. Consider, for instance, the model given in James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 715-35. In this model, which is also based on repeated play of a prisoners' dilemma game by pairs of actors randomly matched with one another, rule violators are members of one of two ethnic groups. Members of the same ethnic group are assumed to have complete information about one another's history of play, allowing them to directly punish violations by co-ethnics, but no information about the history of play of members of other ethnic groups. Fearon and Laitin note that this assumption is a "tractable simplification" intended to capture key aspects of more complicated patterns of social ties (721). It may well be an appropriate simplification, and is rendered plausible by an argument about the functions of ethnicity in maintaining social order (717-18). Nevertheless, the fact that even in a model by authors sensitive to ethnographic nuance, all violators are viewed as belonging to one of two abstract classes, in each of which every member is identical to all others, demonstrates the how game-theory formalism mandates the assumption of the standardization and homogeneity of actors.
29. For example, see Robert M. Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) and more generally Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
30. For example, see Robert M. Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) and more generally Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
31. Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept," 260.
32. Somers, "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere," is very convincing on this point, although game theory is not her target.
33. "Institutions as a Solution Concept," 258.
34. Ibid., 253.
35. For an example of the common juxtaposition of these situations, see Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 164. Some may be inclined to think that these cases are precisely those badly described by game theory, since the actions of any individual cattle grazer, investor, or theatergoer have little impact by themselves and thus there is little strategic interaction. However, the possibility of continued grazing, an orderly exit, or a reasonable price level can be thought of as a public good, and the collective action dilemmas associated with such goods are regularly modeled as multisided prisoners' dilemma games. See, for example, Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 223.
36. For an example of the common juxtaposition of these situations, see Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 164. Some may be inclined to think that these cases are precisely those badly described by game theory, since the actions of any individual cattle grazer, investor, or theatergoer have little impact by themselves and thus there is little strategic interaction. However, the possibility of continued grazing, an orderly exit, or a reasonable price level can be thought of as a public good, and the collective action dilemmas associated with such goods are regularly modeled as multisided prisoners' dilemma games. See, for example, Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 223.
37. Along with natural rules and bootstrap rules (g-rules and h-rules), Mirowski thinks social scientists can discover "evolutionary regularities" in the way bootstrap rules and natural rules interact and change one another over time. Such evolutionary processes can change the conception of the natural. ("Institutions as a Solution Concept," 258-59.) It is somewhat obscure in his formulation whether these processes also give rise to new forms of natural games, presumably adequately modeled by game theory. In any event, the evolutionary emergence of "natural" games is what I will be discussing here.
38. For more detail and references, see below.
39. This, in other words, is the social creation of denumerable analogs to the fish or fed animals of Mirowski's example cited above.
40. Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London: Routledge 1990).
41. Simmel anticipates many themes of Philip Mirowski, "Learning the Meaning of a Dollar: Conservation Principles and the Social Theory of Value in Economic Theory," Social Research 57, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 689-717, an essay that has much influenced this reading of Simmel. See also Philip Mirowski, "Mathematical Formalism and Economic Explanation," in Philip Mirowski, ed., The Reconstruction of Economic Theory (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1986), 178-240; the language of "social construction" is drawn from this essay.
42. Simmel anticipates many themes of Philip Mirowski, "Learning the Meaning of a Dollar: Conservation Principles and the Social Theory of Value in Economic Theory," Social Research 57, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 689-717, an essay that has much influenced this reading of Simmel. See also Philip Mirowski, "Mathematical Formalism and Economic Explanation," in Philip Mirowski, ed., The Reconstruction of Economic Theory (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1986), 178-240; the language of "social construction" is drawn from this essay.
43. Simmel, Philosophy of Money, 124.
44. Ibid., 294. For an interesting sociological account of commodity standardization based on similar arguments, see Mitchell Abolafia, "Self Regulation as Market Maintenance: An Organizational Perspective," in Roger Noll, ed., Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 312-43.
45. Ibid., 294. For an interesting sociological account of commodity standardization based on similar arguments, see Mitchell Abolafia, "Self Regulation as Market Maintenance: An Organizational Perspective," in Roger Noll, ed., Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 312-43.
46. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Uses of Money: Money in the Theory of an Exchange Economy," American Economic Review 61, no. 12 (December 1971): 784-805, as summarized in Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 235.
47. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Uses of Money: Money in the Theory of an Exchange Economy," American Economic Review 61, no. 12 (December 1971): 784-805, as summarized in Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 235.
48. Compare Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept," 259-60, who makes a similar point while discussing other authors.
49. Simmel, Philosophy of Money, 279.
50. Compare also Mirowski, "Learning the Meaning of a Dollar," 709: The first assertion of a modern social theory of value is that the attributes of a commodity which are to be treated as relevant to market activity are themselves socially constructed, in the sense that the mathematical prerequisites of an abstract algebra are socially imposed upon some arbitrary subset of the entire constellation of phenomenological peculiarities found there, in order to endow that category with an 'dentity . . . and to prepare the way for its formal subsumption under the structures of value. . . . This process is . . . the outcome of specific structures which intend that explicit result. . . . In contrast to neoclassical economics, we do not come into the world hard-wired for commodity space; the space in which prices will be defined is fluid, impermanent, and initially hostile to mathematical expression.
51. When two people use money to facilitate exchange, "the pivotal point in the interaction . . . recedes from the direct line of contact between them, and moves to the relationship which each of them, through his interest in money, has with the economic community that accepts the money, and demonstrates this fact by having money minted by its highest representative." Simmel, Philosophy of Money, 177.
52. Compare Mirowski's discussion of the constructed nature of "sameness" in "Mathematical Formalism and Economic Explanation" and "Learning the Meaning of a Dollar."
53. Simmel, Philosophy of Money, 326. Emphasis added.
54. Compare Simmel's discussion of foreign exchange markets (ibid., 121), where he speaks of "objects" divided into "quanta."
55. Mirowski may be driving at something similar when he writes that "institutions provide the invariants so that rules may have some rational interpretation." "Learning the Meaning of a Dollar," 710.
56. In a discussion of money and other market institutions, game theorist Martin Shubik asks "Should we assume that laws and customs are to be modeled as rules of the game which are given and never broken? The other alternative . . . [would] include laws and penalties for violation." Martin Shubik, "Money, Trust, and Equilibrium Points in Games in Extensive Form," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 34, no. 3-4 (1974): 383. Although he is not definitive in his answer, it appears Shubik feels that in circumstances where transactions involve fiat money, are backed by a reliably and cheaply functioning legal system securing contracts, and occur in mass markets, it is appropriate to omit the violation of rules and model of market dynamics in the form of a noncooperative game between the participants (380, 382). This also seems to be an implicit description of a trajectory from standardization to tacit coordination. For an extensive discussion of Shubik's views, see Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept," who has a somewhat different reading.
57. In a discussion of money and other market institutions, game theorist Martin Shubik asks "Should we assume that laws and customs are to be modeled as rules of the game which are given and never broken? The other alternative . . . [would] include laws and penalties for violation." Martin Shubik, "Money, Trust, and Equilibrium Points in Games in Extensive Form," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 34, no. 3-4 (1974): 383. Although he is not definitive in his answer, it appears Shubik feels that in circumstances where transactions involve fiat money, are backed by a reliably and cheaply functioning legal system securing contracts, and occur in mass markets, it is appropriate to omit the violation of rules and model of market dynamics in the form of a noncooperative game between the participants (380, 382). This also seems to be an implicit description of a trajectory from standardization to tacit coordination. For an extensive discussion of Shubik's views, see Mirowski, "Institutions as a Solution Concept," who has a somewhat different reading.
58. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," in Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134-65. Although this article presents no game-theoretic model, it could easily be described in terms of one, and its approach shares game-theoretic assumptions.
59. On the other hand, the specifics of Parliament's role in this episode call North and Weingast's causal mechanisms into significant doubt. Christopher Reed, "The Damn'd South Sea," Harvard Magazine 101, no. 5 (May-June 1999): 36-40.
60. Keith Blackburn and Michael Christensen, "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature 27, no. 1 (March 1989): 8.
61. It may be, however, that analysts have been drawn to a game-theoretic vision of institutions in those circumstances where some social standardization has already been carried out, and at times even the decision to embrace game-theoretic formalism may itself prompt an accompanying attempt to specify how the necessary sociological preconditions came about. The affinities between Milgrom, North, and Weingast's discussion of medieval trade fairs and Simmel's have already been noted. Fearon and Laitin ("Explaining Interethnic Cooperation") also at times seem to be describing the production of the sort of social standardization their modeling apparatus requires - for example, through the policing of ethnic boundaries (722). Note that in both cases, the relevant exclusion mechanisms are either modeled misleadingly (in Milgrom et al.) or not at all (in Laitin and Fearon).
62. Weber, Economy and Society, 326.
63. Discussing promises, Weber argues (ibid., 328) that economic interest may remove the need "to assume conceptually any 'order' outside or above the two parties to guarantee, command, or enforce compliance by means of coercive machinery or social disapproval," since transactors will want to preserve the possibility of future dealings. This point would seem to apply to consent to the definition of abstract commodities, illustrating that convention too need not be based on coercion.
64. Although the literature on institutions in sociology is obviously enormous and varied, the term "sociological institutionalism" has been applied by Hall and Taylor ("Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms") and others to the literature that followed on John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 41-62. This edited volume contains many important examples of such literature.
65. Although the literature on institutions in sociology is obviously enormous and varied, the term "sociological institutionalism" has been applied by Hall and Taylor ("Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms") and others to the literature that followed on John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 41-62. This edited volume contains many important examples of such literature.
66. Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations"; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 63-82.
67. Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations"; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 63-82.
68. John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modem World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 109-38.
69. Ibid., 118-20.
70. Ibid., 128. Meyer also argues that another response to the need for foreign exchange is the diversion of land from food to commodity production, although this would seem to be at odds with his general picture of markets on the retreat.
71. Ibid., 121.
72. Ibid., 130.
73. Ibid., 129. Meyer overdraws the contrast with Polanyi, since the undoing of international markets by national actions was one of the major themes of The Great Transformation.
74. Ibid., 117. Compare Meyer, "World Polity," 110: "We argue that the world polity is a highly institutionalized system, reified in world social life. Critics will, of course, argue that the reification is going on in our arguments, rather than in the real world."
75. Ibid., 117. Compare Meyer, "World Polity," 110: "We argue that the world polity is a highly institutionalized system, reified in world social life. Critics will, of course, argue that the reification is going on in our arguments, rather than in the real world."
76. For the same reason, I will make little reference to developments in sociological institutionalism since Meyer's essay, since many of these have pursued a great precision and sophistication of analysis that is not needed for present purpose.
77. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
78. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers."
79. Meyer, "World Polity," 116.
80. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry and David Woodruff, "Political Origins of Market Institutions." Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC. September 1997.
81. Meyer, "World Polity," 122-23.
82. Ibid., 120.
83. For a somewhat parallel effort that describes a paradigm of "institutionalized free market capitalism," see Gary Hamilton, "Asian Business Networks in Transition: Or, What Alan Greenspan Does Not Know about the Asian Business Crisis," in T. J. Pempel, ed., The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 45-61.
84. These would be example of "rationalized institutional elements" in the terminology given in Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations."
85. Meyer, "World Polity," 121.
86. For suggestive, if rather cryptic remarks in this general direction, see Meyer, 113.
87. On the determination of legitimate organizational forms by the state, see Meyer, 113. Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," and Neil Fligstein, "The Structural Transformation of America Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919-1979," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 311-36.
88. On the determination of legitimate organizational forms by the state, see Meyer, 113. Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," and Neil Fligstein, "The Structural Transformation of America Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919-1979," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 311-36.
89. Jeffrey Sachs, "Russia's Struggle with Stabilization: Conceptual Issues and Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, Annual Conference Supplement (1994): 57-80
90. Economic sociologists who have painstakingly documented the existence of social ties and networks among securities brokers might object to this characterization. But the collectivities defined by abstract commodities consist in all their many buyers and sellers, not merely the brokers with whom one prefers to trade.
91. Compare the discussion of the "reputational vision of the state," in David Woodruff, Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univsity Press, 1999), 181, 188.
92. Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," 50.
93. Meyer, "World Polity," 124.
94. The term "economy of idiosyncrasies" is intended as a summary of the brilliant arguments regarding the resistance of the Soviet economy to quantification and the ubiquity of specificity offered by Gregory Grossman, "Gold and the Sword: Money in the Soviet Command Economy," in Henry Rosovsky, ed., Industrialization in Two Systems (New York: Wiley, 1966), 204-36;
95. idem,
96. "Scarce Capital and Soviet Doctrine," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 67, no. 3 (1953): 311-43;
97. P. O. Aven and V. M Shironin, "Reforma khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma: real'nost' namechaemykh preobrazovanii," Izvestiia sibirskogo otdeleniia adademii nauk SSSR: seriia ekonomika i prikladnaia sotsiologiia 13, no. 3 (1987): 32-40;
98. and Egor Gaidar, Ekonomicheskie reformy i ierarkhicheskie struktury (Moscow: Nauka, 1990).
99. Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Aven and Shironin, "Reforma khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma."
100. Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Aven and Shironin, "Reforma khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma."
101. Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia."
102. Ibid., 244-45.
103. Hendley is so effective at describing the manifest functions of informal relations for Russian enterprises that it becomes somewhat hard to credit the latent function of maintaining directorial power.
104. The extremely helpful language of supply and demand for law is introduced in Cheryl W. Gray and Kathryn Hendley, "Developing Commercial Law in Transition Economies: Examples from Hungary and Russia," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor, eds., The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 139-64.
105. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 21-55.
106. On the politics of the design of the privatization program see Michael McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia," World Politics 47, no. 2 (January 1995): 210-43; Anders Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 223-71; and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995). For a remarkable overview of the practice of privatization in enterprises based on extensive anthropological research, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition (Longman: London, 1995), 142-58.
107. On the politics of the design of the privatization program see Michael McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia," World Politics 47, no. 2 (January 1995): 210-43; Anders Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 223-71; and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995). For a remarkable overview of the practice of privatization in enterprises based on extensive anthropological research, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition (Longman: London, 1995), 142-58.
108. On the politics of the design of the privatization program see Michael McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia," World Politics 47, no. 2 (January 1995): 210-43; Anders Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 223-71; and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995). For a remarkable overview of the practice of privatization in enterprises based on extensive anthropological research, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition (Longman: London, 1995), 142-58.
109. On the politics of the design of the privatization program see Michael McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia," World Politics 47, no. 2 (January 1995): 210-43; Anders Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 223-71; and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995). For a remarkable overview of the practice of privatization in enterprises based on extensive anthropological research, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition (Longman: London, 1995), 142-58.
110. Joseph Blasi and Andrei Shleifer, "Corporate Governance in Russia: An Initial Look," in Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, eds., Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996), 94-95.
111. Kathryn Hendley, Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 1 (January-March 1997): 34.
112. Clarke and Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," 149.
113. Lest this sound needlessly cynical, I note that this is the description now offered by Anatolii Chubais, who designed and managed the auctions. MK-Daily, 23 September 1998, 2; as translated by the Federal News Service, supplied by Dow Jones News Retrieval.
114. Juliet Johnson, "Russia's Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 4 (October-December 1997): 352-54.
115. Steven L. Solnick, "Gubenatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 1 (January-March 1998): 75-76.
116. "Krupneishie kompanii: itogi goda," Ekspert no. 38, 12 October 1998, 28-42.
117. Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia."
118. Clarke and Kabalina, "Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise," 149.
119. Katherina Pistor, "Company Law and Corporate Governance in Russia," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor, eds., The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).
120. "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia."
121. Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," 57.
122. The description of the deployment of law to maintain insider control in a Russian aircraft building enterprise in Saratov, given in Gray and Hendley, "Developing Commercial Law in Transition Economies" accords with this same image. Even if Hendley is correct that "At the heart of the director's behavior is a desire to retain power" ("Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," 243), this desire prompts a more nuanced attitude to law than she argues.
123. In this regard, directors' attitude to h-rules might be compared to Meyer's discussion of the way peripheral elites promote isomorphism to the authoritative forms of the nation-state for sake of the resources this conformity makes available; "World Polity," 123. The discussion of decoupling in Mayer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizatios," is less useful here because it assumes that decoupling is a means of preserving organizational efficiency in the face of formal requirements, rather than a way of winning access to external resources in order to pursue an internal political project. Of course, to the extent that directors' informal ties serve adaptive functions for their firms, Meyer and Rowan's sense of decoupling might also apply.
124. Compare Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 33-52.
125. Meyer, "World Polity," 122.
126. Hendley, "Legal Development," 237.
127. Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Jonathan Hay, "Corporate Law from Scratch," in Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, eds., Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996), 245-302.
128. Timothy Frye, "Governing the Russian Equities Market," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 4 (October-December 1997): 366-95. Quotations in text from an electronic version supplied by Professor Frye. All information about NAUFOR and the stock market in the text is drawn from this article unless otherwise noted.
129. Roderick D. Kiewiet and Mikhail G. Myagkov, "The Emergence of the Private Sector in Russia: A Financial Market Perspective," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 1 (January-March 1998): 33.
130. Frye, "Governing the Russian Equities Market."
131. Meyer, "World Polity," 123.
132. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 183-87.
133. Ibid., 146-76.
134. The enormous growth in the Russian stock market is discussed, Kiewiet and Myagkov, "The Emergence of the Private Sector in Russia," which connects it exclusively to Russia's economic prospects and signs that corporate governance was improving. This article was written before the crash of 1998.
135. Personal communication. For an unconvincing claim that the Russian stock market crash, which coincided with the world financial crisis, was driven by investor concerns about corporate governance, see the interview with stock trader Marlem Manasov in Ekspert no. 26, 13 July 1998, 28-30. Manasov suggests a few flagrant violations of minority shareholder rights, putatively previously a rarity, led investors to "panic." Manasov similarly suggests beginning to address corporate governance problems with "demonstrative" punishments, although he adds that this must be followed by longer term efforts. After all, "the processes of changing the attitudes of investors is a ridiculously long process. Three to six months, at a minimum." This argument is a good example of what was described above as the view from the securities trading floor.
136. Black, Kraakman, and Hay, "Corporate Law from Scratch."
137. Ibid., 250, n. 4.
138. Exceptions seem to be designed to defend the interests of outside investors, a project which, Hendley ("Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," 238) suggests, might have taken precedence.
139. Compare Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," 237-38.
140. Hendley, Ickes, Murrell, and Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enteprises," 34.
141. One should note the parallels between this creation of a new community of homogenized actors and the accounts of exclusion and homogenization that emerge around the margins of game-theoretic analyses of institutions; see Note 48, above.
142. Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy, 102-36.
143. Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 233.
144. For an example of such a model, see Randall Wright, "A Note on Asymmetric and Mixed Strategy Equilibria in the Search-Theoretic Model of Fiat Money," Economic Theory 14, no. 2 (August 1999): 463-71.
145. For a summary from the perspective of the Fund's leadership, see Michel Camdessus, "Russia: Stabilization and Reform." Address at the U.S.-Russia Business Council, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1996. From the IMF Web site, www.imf.org.
146. Unless otherwise referenced, the following account is based on Woodruff, Money Unmade (which, however, makes only unsystematic mention of international influences). See also William Tompson, "The Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing? Unravelling the Workings of Russia's 'Virtual Economy,'" Economy and Society 28, no. 2 (May 1999): 256-80.
147. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 123-24;
148. Tompson, "The Price of Everything."
149. Tompson, "The Price of Everything."
150. This is not an absurd rationale. In California, for instance, purchasers of used cars must pay sales taxes on at least the Blue Book value of the cars, whatever the reported price of the transaction. Tax rules on charging below costs have recently been relaxed.
151. In fact, it took quite a while for the IMF even to notice the spread of nonmonetary exchange and taxation. By April of 1996, the share of federal tax receipts in nonmonetary form had reached on the order 20 percent and was climbing; nonmonetary receipts were even more prevalent in regional taxation (Woodruff, Money Unmade, 169). Yet an authoritative specification of the IMF's priorities in Russia at that time did not even mention the issue. Camdessus, "Russia: Stabilization and Reform."
152. In fact, it took quite a while for the IMF even to notice the spread of nonmonetary exchange and taxation. By April of 1996, the share of federal tax receipts in nonmonetary form had reached on the order 20 percent and was
153. John Odling-Smee and Henri Lorie, "The Economic Reform Process in Russia." International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/93/55, 1993. David Bigman and Sergio Pereira Leite, "Enterprise Arrears in Russia: Causes and Policy Options." International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/93/61, 1993.
154. John Odling-Smee and Henri Lorie, "The Economic Reform Process in Russia." International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/93/55, 1993. David Bigman and Sergio Pereira Leite, "Enterprise Arrears in Russia: Causes and Policy Options." International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/93/61, 1993.
155. Compare the Fund's analysis of an in-kind taxation scheme (disguised as a form of money taxation) as described in Aleksandr Bekker, "Rossiia dolzhna poluchat' shestoi transh kredita MVF," Segodnia (online edition), 21 September 1996.
156. Clifford C. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1998). http://www.foreignaffairs.org/issues/9809/ gaddy.html.
157. "Memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on Economic and Financial Stabilization Policies." 16 July 1998. International Monetary Fund Web site, www.imf.org.
158. "World Polity," 121.
159. "Historical institutionalism" has yet to achieve an authoritative definition, and the following summary is perforce somewhat tendentious. On my view, the modern texts that have most influenced those inclined to identify themselves as practitioners of historical institutionalism include Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978):881-912; Suzanne Berger, "Introduction," in Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-26; and Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46. My rooting of historical institutionalism in a tradition of developmental social science follows Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112.
160. "Historical institutionalism" has yet to achieve an authoritative definition, and the following summary is perforce somewhat tendentious. On my view, the modern texts that have most influenced those inclined to identify themselves as practitioners of historical institutionalism include Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978):881-912; Suzanne Berger, "Introduction," in Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-26; and Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46. My rooting of historical institutionalism in a tradition of developmental social science follows Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112.
161. "Historical institutionalism" has yet to achieve an authoritative definition, and the following summary is perforce somewhat tendentious. On my view, the modern texts that have most influenced those inclined to identify themselves as practitioners of historical institutionalism include Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978):881-912; Suzanne Berger, "Introduction," in Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-26; and Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46. My rooting of historical institutionalism in a tradition of developmental social science follows Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112.
162. "Historical institutionalism" has yet to achieve an authoritative definition, and the following summary is perforce somewhat tendentious. On my view, the modern texts that have most influenced those inclined to identify themselves as practitioners of historical institutionalism include Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978):881-912; Suzanne Berger, "Introduction," in Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-26; and Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46. My rooting of historical institutionalism in a tradition of developmental social science follows Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112.
163. Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1991) exemplifies this line of thinking.
164. John Zysman Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 289. Zysman makes this statement to introduce a summary of Gerschenkron's position, and does not intend it as an exhaustive statement of his own views. On critical junctures, see
165. Krasner, "Approaches to the State" and Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). The formative significance of Gerschenkron for historical institutionalism is especially well analyzed in
166. Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
167. For a discussion of this shift from developmentalism, see Katznelson's "Structure and Configuration." The historical institutionalism argument on the interplay of interests and institutions in politics derives from Berger, "Introduction."
168. Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1996): 126.
169. Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," 85, 86.
170. Ibid., 96.
171. Compare ibid., 85.
172. Such as David L. Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
173. Compare Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 24.
174. Carl Menger, "On the Origin of Money," Economic Journal 2 (June 1893): 239-55.
175. Even if one rejects this Mengerian account of the origins of money, arguing, say, that money arises out of debt relationship rather than as medium of exchange, a similar argument could be constructed.
176. Abolafia, "Self Regulation as Market Maintenance."
177. Weber, Economy and Society, 311-38.
178. Compare especially Philip Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action," International Organization 49, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 595-626.
179. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism."
180. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism."
181. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Vintage, 1977).
182. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
183. Chaudhry, "Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers" -a seminal non-Gerschenkronian account of late development.
184. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 3-4, 6.
185. Chaudhry, "Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers"; Chaudhry and Woodruff, "Political Origins of Market Institutions."
186. Chaudhry, "Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers"; Chaudhry and Woodruff, "Political Origins of Market Institutions."
187. Fligstein, "The Transformation of Corporate Control."
188. Chaudhry, "Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers."
189. This seems to have some affinity with Robert Bates, "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 31-54, which links the creation of institutions to capital's need for stability. For a narrative history of how the switch to FDI affects peripheral countries' relations with international capital, see Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996)
190. This seems to have some affinity with Robert Bates, "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 31-54, which links the creation of institutions to capital's need for stability. For a narrative history of how the switch to FDI affects peripheral countries' relations with international capital, see Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996)
191. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1970). The phrase in the text is a more literal translation of the original Russian title, Politicheskaia ekonomiia rent'e.
192. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1970). The phrase in the text is a more literal translation of the original Russian title, Politicheskaia ekonomiia rent'e.
193. For a very restrained suggestion that the "primary concern" of Westerners preparing economic laws for Russia might have been "large, Moscow-based institutional investors" (many of whom, before the August 1998 crisis, were foreign), see Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," 238. As an example of a more subtle form of link between "base and superstructure," compare how the IMF's executive director sought in 1996 to defend the Fund's record in Russia by citing a rise in international capital flows as a sign that its policies were working. Camdessus, "Address."
194. For an exceptionally perceptive, indeed prophetic, discussion of stock market bubbles in emerging markets, see Paul Krugman, "Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (July-August 1995): 28-44.
195. For another example of coexistence between a stock market bubble and extremely weak legal control over corporate governance, see Andy Ho, "Privatized Statism and Ethnic Capitalism in Malaysia." Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. For a Brazilian example of a switch to alternative means of payment for wage debts coexisting with a strong exchange rate and low inflation, see Diana Jean Schemo, "In a Straitened Brazil, Talk of Pay in Goods," New York Times 22 October 1998, 4.
196. For another example of coexistence between a stock market bubble and extremely weak legal control over corporate governance, see Andy Ho, "Privatized Statism and Ethnic Capitalism in Malaysia." Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. For a Brazilian example of a switch to alternative means of payment for wage debts coexisting with a strong exchange rate and low inflation, see Diana Jean Schemo, "In a Straitened Brazil, Talk of Pay in Goods," New York Times 22 October 1998, 4.
197. Analysis of the links between state building and prior forms of capital flows is given in Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
198. David M. Woodruff, "Why Market Liberalism and the Ruble's Value Are Sinking Together," East European Constitutional Review 7, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 73-76.
199. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 187-90.
200. Compare Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," 236, who notes that Russian business legislation "has been created in a top-down fashion," unlike the evolutionary emergence of business law she finds in the works of Weber and North.
201. Vadim V. Volkov, "Silovoe predprinimatel'stvo v sovremennoi Rossii" (Violent entrepreneurs in contemporary Russia), Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 1 (January 1999): 56-65.
202. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 158-61. In general, it seems worth investigating the hypothesis that the national governments of many less-developed countries may face challenges from subnational governments that use their greater distance from the forces promoting international isomorphism to manage processes of spontaneous evolution of social abstraction denied legitimate formulation on the national level. In this regard, it is very telling that a Russian program to stamp out local alternate monies using a mixture of carrots and sticks was described as involving the transformation of the federal authorities into an "internal IMF." See for example " Regiony zaimutsia ozdorovleniem finansov," Delovoi Ekspress 18 August 1998.
203. Woodruff, Money Unmade, 158-61. In general, it seems worth investigating the hypothesis that the national governments of many less-developed countries may face challenges from subnational governments that use their greater distance from the forces promoting international isomorphism to manage processes of spontaneous evolution of social abstraction denied legitimate formulation on the national level. In this regard, it is very telling that a Russian program to stamp out local alternate monies using a mixture of carrots and sticks was described as involving the transformation of the federal authorities into an "internal IMF." See for example " Regiony zaimutsia ozdorovleniem finansov," Delovoi Ekspress 18 August 1998.
204. David S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1969).
205. The more delicate vocabulary of "moral hazard" became the center of the debate emerging from the financial crisis of 1997-98 over whether institutions such as a "credible commitment to fixed exchange rates" or establishment of a "lender of last resort" might encourage investors to commit funds at lucrative, not to say usurious, emerging-market rates in expectation that they would nat be permitted to bear losses. Of course, this debate also demonstrated that they would not be permitted to bear losses. Of course, this debate also demonstrated that they would not be permitted to bear losses. Of course, this debate property of those who would make them a cover for exploitation of impoverished economies, and perhaps will launch a reconsideration of the game-theoretic vision of society presently dominant in world culture.