Managing the costs of informational privacy: Pure bundling as a strategy in the individual health insurance market

Journal of Management Information Systems

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 29-57

  Thatcher, Matt E ^a,b   Clemons, Eric K ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Bundling; Information privacy; Insurance markets; Insurance policy; Privacy; Privacy cost

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034434546     PISSN: 07421222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07421222.2000.11045639     Document Type: Article

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