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Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 975-984

Weak entrants are welcome

Author keywords

Commitment; D43; Dominant firm; Entry deterrence; F13; L13; Product differentiation; Protection

Indexed keywords


EID: 0034423798     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00021-1     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (27)

References (18)
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  • 5
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    • Location choice, product proliferation and entry deterrence
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    • Crampes, C.1    Hollander, A.2
  • 8
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    • Entry deterrence and the free rider problem
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    • Gilbert, R.1    Vives, X.2
  • 9
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    • Deterrence by market sharing: A strategic incentive for licensing
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    • Gallini, N.T.1
  • 10
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    • Judo economics: Capital limitation and coupon competition
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  • 11
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    • Credible spatial preemption through franchising
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    • Hadfield, G.K.1
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    • Stability in competition
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    • Hotelling, H.1
  • 13
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    • Credible spatial preemption
    • Judd K.L. Credible spatial preemption. RAND Journal of Economics. 16:1985;153-166.
    • (1985) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.16 , pp. 153-166
    • Judd, K.L.1
  • 16
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    • Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry
    • Schmalensee R. Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry. Bell Journal of Economics. 9:1978;305-327.
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    • Schmalensee, R.1
  • 18
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    • Sequential entry, industry structure, and welfare
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    • Vives, X.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.