The selectope for cooperative games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 23-38

  Derks, Jean ^a   Haller, Hans ^b   Peters, Hans ^c  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperative game; Selectope core; Sharing value; Weber set

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034423290     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050003     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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