NATO's non-proliferation and deterrence policies: Mixed signals and the norm of WMD non-use

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 25-51

  Riecke, Henning ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034421525     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437777     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. The empirical data here is partly based upon an earlier article, see Henning Riecke, 'Nukleare Nichtverbreitung als Aktionsfeld von NATO und GASP' in Helga Haftendorn and Otto Keck (eds.) Kooperation jenseits von Hegemonie und Bedrohung. Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den internationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997) pp.191-232 (211-18).
2. See David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, 'Nuclear First Use revisited', Survival 37/3 (Autumn 1995) pp.27-44.
3. 'NATO's Strategic Concept. Cohesion and Dissent', Strategic Comments 5/1 (Jan. 1998).
4. Joachim Krause, Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 65. Res. Inst, of the German Assoc. for Foreign Policy (Bonn, München: R. Oldenbourg 1998). Focusing on nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwack (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson special studies (Washington DC 1994) pp.335-50; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Secuity Dilemma, INSS Occasional Paper No. 1, July 1994. Inst. for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy (Colorado 1994), and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (U. of Chicago Press 1984).
5. Joachim Krause, Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 65. Res. Inst, of the German Assoc. for Foreign Policy (Bonn, München: R. Oldenbourg 1998). Focusing on nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwack (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson special studies (Washington DC 1994) pp.335-50; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Secuity Dilemma, INSS Occasional Paper No. 1, July 1994. Inst. for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy (Colorado 1994), and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (U. of Chicago Press 1984).
6. Joachim Krause, Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 65. Res. Inst, of the German Assoc. for Foreign Policy (Bonn, München: R. Oldenbourg 1998). Focusing on nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwack (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson special studies (Washington DC 1994) pp.335-50; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Secuity Dilemma, INSS Occasional Paper No. 1, July 1994. Inst. for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy (Colorado 1994), and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (U. of Chicago Press 1984).
7. Joachim Krause, Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 65. Res. Inst, of the German Assoc. for Foreign Policy (Bonn, München: R. Oldenbourg 1998). Focusing on nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwack (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson special studies (Washington DC 1994) pp.335-50; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Secuity Dilemma, INSS Occasional Paper No. 1, July 1994. Inst. for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy (Colorado 1994), and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (U. of Chicago Press 1984).
8. Joachim Krause, Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 65. Res. Inst, of the German Assoc. for Foreign Policy (Bonn, München: R. Oldenbourg 1998). Focusing on nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwack (eds.) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson special studies (Washington DC 1994) pp.335-50; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Secuity Dilemma, INSS Occasional Paper No. 1, July 1994. Inst. for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy (Colorado 1994), and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (U. of Chicago Press 1984).
9. For basic writing on neoliberal institutionalism, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Co-operation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton UP 1984); idem, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism': A Perspective on World Politics, in idem, International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview 1989) pp.1-20. For a thorough discussion see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge Studies on International Relations, 55 (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.23-82 (27-44).
10. For basic writing on neoliberal institutionalism, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Co-operation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton UP 1984); idem, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism': A Perspective on World Politics, in idem, International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview 1989) pp.1-20. For a thorough discussion see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge Studies on International Relations, 55 (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.23-82 (27-44).
11. For basic writing on neoliberal institutionalism, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Co-operation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton UP 1984); idem, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism': A Perspective on World Politics, in idem, International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview 1989) pp.1-20. For a thorough discussion see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge Studies on International Relations, 55 (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.23-82 (27-44).
12. Lisa Martin, 'Interest, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46/4 (1992), pp.765-92 for the relationship between problems of collective action and institutional functions.
13. This has been done by the US intelligence in aiding the UN Special Commission in Iraq, see Susan Wright, 'Hijacking UNSCOM', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 55/3 (May/June 1999) pp.23-5.
14. This situation is different from the one conceptualised by hegemonic stability theory, for which a small group capable of upholding the different non-proliferation regimes is needed. For works of reference Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (NY: Basic Books 1975). For a discussion see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (note 3) pp.86-104; Robert O. Keohane, 'Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole Holsti (ed.) Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview 1980) pp.131-62.
15. This situation is different from the one conceptualised by hegemonic stability theory, for which a small group capable of upholding the different non-proliferation regimes is needed. For works of reference Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (NY: Basic Books 1975). For a discussion see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (note 3) pp.86-104; Robert O. Keohane, 'Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole Holsti (ed.) Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview 1980) pp.131-62.
16. This situation is different from the one conceptualised by hegemonic stability theory, for which a small group capable of upholding the different non-proliferation regimes is needed. For works of reference Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (NY: Basic Books 1975). For a discussion see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (note 3) pp.86-104; Robert O. Keohane, 'Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole Holsti (ed.) Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview 1980) pp.131-62.
17. This situation is different from the one conceptualised by hegemonic stability theory, for which a small group capable of upholding the different non-proliferation regimes is needed. For works of reference Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (NY: Basic Books 1975). For a discussion see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (note 3) pp.86-104; Robert O. Keohane, 'Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole Holsti (ed.) Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview 1980) pp.131-62.
18. There is the faint possibility, however, that a threshold state is induced to use its weapons in a window of opportunity, that is opened by (a) a prolonged planning phase of NATO or (b) any distraction of the alliance's operational capabilities.
19. Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', in International Studies Review 32 (1988) pp.379-96, who distinguishes rationalist and reflectivist branches of IR theory and asks for an empirical test of the latter.
20. For constructivist thinking on state identity, see Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', in American Political Science Review 88/2 (1994) pp.384-96, for a survey see Steve Smith, 'New Approaches to International Theory', in John Balys and idem (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: OUP 1997) pp.165-90 (183-7).
21. For constructivist thinking on state identity, see Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', in American Political Science Review 88/2 (1994) pp.384-96, for a survey see Steve Smith, 'New Approaches to International Theory', in John Balys and idem (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: OUP 1997) pp.165-90 (183-7).
22. Jeffrey W. Legro, Co-operation under Fire. Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1990), a study on restraint in strategic bombing, submarine warfare and CW use in WW II. Legro applies organizational culture theory to account for varying degrees of restraint. This approach would ask for in-depth analysis of bureaucratic decisionmaking processes in proliferating states and thus cannot be applied here.
23. Wolfgang K. H. Panowsky, 'Dismantling the Concept of "Weapons of Mass Destruction"', in Arms Control Today 28/4 (1998) pp.3-8. Panowsky demands not to put the priority for nuclear arms control in question by viewing different sorts of WMD as one type of weapon.
24. William H. Kincade, Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? INSS Occasional Paper No. 6, Proliferation Series (Aspern, CO: Inst. for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Dec. 1995) for this aspect of nuclear proliferation.
25. For the development of the norms of non-use of nuclear weapons - emanating from the national discourse in the US toward the rest of the world - and chemical weapons - diffusing from the international level to the national policies - see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 'Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996) pp. 114-52.
26. For this image and a critical discussion, see Krause (note 2) pp.73, fn.20.
27. The section on 'weak cognitivists, in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (note 3) pp. 139-54.
28. This is superbly done by Price and Tannenwald (note 15).
29. Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'Nuclear Learning in US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organisation 41/3 (Summer 1987) pp.371-402 (380).
30. Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1990) pp.23, 33-40.
31. Nye (note 19) p.380.
32. Haas (note 20) pp.20-23, who defines common knowledge as'any kind of cause and effect linkages about any set of phenomen considered important by society,.' (p.21) also Lloyd S. Etheridge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Politics and Central American Revolutions (NY: Pergamon 1985) p.66, who defines learning as improved intelligence and effectiveness.
33. Haas (note 20) pp.20-23, who defines common knowledge as'any kind of cause and effect linkages about any set of phenomen considered important by society,.' (p.21) also Lloyd S. Etheridge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Politics and Central American Revolutions (NY: Pergamon 1985) p.66, who defines learning as improved intelligence and effectiveness.
34. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, 'Introduction', in idem (eds.) Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview 1991) pp.3-19, who claim that the value of knowledge, in general, contingent to social and historical conditions. Thus, in the complex reality of social life, knowledge consists of beliefs and can refer to values as well (p.7f.).
35. To be sure, effective institutions, beside their functions facilitating co-operation, can also promote learning, see Harald Müller, 'The Intemalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments', in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theories and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993) pp.361-88 (363).
36. For the strategic re-orientation in the US Michael Klare, Rogue States And Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang, 1995). Washington directed its military strategy already in the late 1980s against WMD proliferation. See also Michèle A. Flournoy, 'Implications for US Military Strategy' and Philip Zelikow, Offensive Military Options', both in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds.) New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) pp. 135-61 and 162-95.
37. For the strategic re-orientation in the US Michael Klare, Rogue States And Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang, 1995). Washington directed its military strategy already in the late 1980s against WMD proliferation. See also Michèle A. Flournoy, 'Implications for US Military Strategy' and Philip Zelikow, Offensive Military Options', both in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds.) New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) pp. 135-61 and 162-95.
38. For the strategic re-orientation in the US Michael Klare, Rogue States And Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang, 1995). Washington directed its military strategy already in the late 1980s against WMD proliferation. See also Michèle A. Flournoy, 'Implications for US Military Strategy' and Philip Zelikow, Offensive Military Options', both in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds.) New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) pp. 135-61 and 162-95.
39. It would be myopic to understand Washington's efforts to multilateralise its own counterproliferation program as if it only wanted to share the burdon of deterring or fighting proliferation. Since some of the missions that would have to be prepared for WMD attack would engage the other members' troops anyhow, and since interoperability is a basic principle for force planning, it is a logical consequence to procure equal equipment for NATO troops.
40. Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation, Art. 19, issued by the NAC Meeting in Rome, 7-8 Nov. 1991, NATO Review 39/6 (1991) pp.19-21 (21). See also Michael Rühle, 'View from NATO. NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat', Comparative Strategy, 13/3 (1994) pp.313-20.
41. Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation, Art. 19, issued by the NAC Meeting in Rome, 7-8 Nov. 1991, NATO Review 39/6 (1991) pp.19-21 (21). See also Michael Rühle, 'View from NATO. NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat', Comparative Strategy, 13/3 (1994) pp.313-20.
42. Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Nordatlantikrates, 17 Dec. 1992, Brussels, in NATO Brief 40/6 (1992) pp.28-30 (30); Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Verteidigungs-planungsausschusses und der NPG in Brussels, 25 and 26 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/4 (1993) pp.27-9 (29); Erklärung der NATO-Verteidigungsminister, Brussels, 29 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/2 (1993) pp.34-5 (34f.); and the Kommunique der Ministertagung des NATO-Rates in Athens, 10 June 1993, in NATO Brief 41/3 (1993) pp.31-3 (33).
43. Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Nordatlantikrates, 17 Dec. 1992, Brussels, in NATO Brief 40/6 (1992) pp.28-30 (30); Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Verteidigungs-planungsausschusses und der NPG in Brussels, 25 and 26 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/4 (1993) pp.27-9 (29); Erklärung der NATO-Verteidigungsminister, Brussels, 29 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/2 (1993) pp.34-5 (34f.); and the Kommunique der Ministertagung des NATO-Rates in Athens, 10 June 1993, in NATO Brief 41/3 (1993) pp.31-3 (33).
44. Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Nordatlantikrates, 17 Dec. 1992, Brussels, in NATO Brief 40/6 (1992) pp.28-30 (30); Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Verteidigungs-planungsausschusses und der NPG in Brussels, 25 and 26 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/4 (1993) pp.27-9 (29); Erklärung der NATO-Verteidigungsminister, Brussels, 29 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/2 (1993) pp.34-5 (34f.); and the Kommunique der Ministertagung des NATO-Rates in Athens, 10 June 1993, in NATO Brief 41/3 (1993) pp.31-3 (33).
45. Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Nordatlantikrates, 17 Dec. 1992, Brussels, in NATO Brief 40/6 (1992) pp.28-30 (30); Kommuniqué der Ministertagung des Verteidigungs-planungsausschusses und der NPG in Brussels, 25 and 26 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/4 (1993) pp.27-9 (29); Erklärung der NATO-Verteidigungsminister, Brussels, 29 May 1993, in NATO Brief 41/2 (1993) pp.34-5 (34f.); and the Kommunique der Ministertagung des NATO-Rates in Athens, 10 June 1993, in NATO Brief 41/3 (1993) pp.31-3 (33).
46. Rühle (note 27) and US Information Service. Embassy of the United States of America 'USA bekämpfen Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Ausführungen von Verteidigungsminister Aspin' in amerika dienst 50 (1993). For further comments see Rolf Hallerbach, '"Counter Proliferation". Neue Zauberformel Amerika gegen Terrorwaffen', in Europäische Sicherheit 43/3 (1994) pp. 139-40. The concept can be considered as reflecting US armed forces' need, in times of budgetary constrains, to gain support for acquiring new equipment and to carry on with old programs. Furthermore, the Clinton adminstration countered conservative criticism against its defence policy. The beginnings of the DCP date back in the Bush administration. Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, 'Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles', Washington Quarterly 18/2 (Summer 1995) pp.143-54 (144).
47. Rühle (note 27) and US Information Service. Embassy of the United States of America 'USA bekämpfen Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Ausführungen von Verteidigungsminister Aspin' in amerika dienst 50 (1993). For further comments see Rolf Hallerbach, '"Counter Proliferation". Neue Zauberformel Amerika gegen Terrorwaffen', in Europäische Sicherheit 43/3 (1994) pp. 139-40. The concept can be considered as reflecting US armed forces' need, in times of budgetary constrains, to gain support for acquiring new equipment and to carry on with old programs. Furthermore, the Clinton adminstration countered conservative criticism against its defence policy. The beginnings of the DCP date back in the Bush administration. Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, 'Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles', Washington Quarterly 18/2 (Summer 1995) pp.143-54 (144).
48. Rühle (note 27) and US Information Service. Embassy of the United States of America 'USA bekämpfen Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Ausführungen von Verteidigungsminister Aspin' in amerika dienst 50 (1993). For further comments see Rolf Hallerbach, '"Counter Proliferation". Neue Zauberformel Amerika gegen Terrorwaffen', in Europäische Sicherheit 43/3 (1994) pp. 139-40. The concept can be considered as reflecting US armed forces' need, in times of budgetary constrains, to gain support for acquiring new equipment and to carry on with old programs. Furthermore, the Clinton adminstration countered conservative criticism against its defence policy. The beginnings of the DCP date back in the Bush administration. Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, 'Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles', Washington Quarterly 18/2 (Summer 1995) pp.143-54 (144).
49. Hallerbach (note 29).
50. For the technological advantages the US might instrumentalise on the battlefield in this regard see Robert H. Chandler, Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction, INSS Occas. Paper No.21, Proliferation Series (Inst. for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, CO, Aug. 1998).
51. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 Jan. 1994. NATO Review 42/1 (Jan. 1994) pp.30-33 (32).
52. Politischer Rahmen des Bündnisses zum Problem der Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, 9 June 1994, in NATO Brief 42/3 (1994) pp.28f.
53. Robert Joseph, 'Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO', in Survival 38/1 (Spring 1996) pp.111-30 (116-18).
54. See the German '10 point-initiative' on Nonproliferation policy of Dec. 1993. Point ten clearly states that the use of military force, according to Chapt. VII UN Charter, can merely be regarded as ultima ratio, in Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6985, pp.85f.
55. See the German '10 point-initiative' on Nonproliferation policy of Dec. 1993. Point ten clearly states that the use of military force, according to Chapt. VII UN Charter, can merely be regarded as ultima ratio, in Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6985, pp.85f.
56. Berthold Meyer, Harald Müller and H.-J. Schmidt, NATO 96: Bündnis im Widerspruch. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF-Report/3 (Frankfurt am Main 1996) p.33; sowie Rühle (note 27) p.314.
57. Berthold Meyer, Harald Müller and H.-J. Schmidt, NATO 96: Bündnis im Widerspruch. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF-Report/3 (Frankfurt am Main 1996) p.33; sowie Rühle (note 27) p.314.
58. Gregory Schulte, 'Responding to Proliferation - NATO's Role', in NATO Review 43/4 (July/Aug. 1995) pp.15-19; Joseph (note 34).
59. 'NATO's Response To Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' in Press Release (95) 124, 29 Nov. 1995. NATO Integrated Data Service, nataodata@ccl.kuleuven.ac.be, 29 Nov. 1995.
60. Cord Rather, 'Die Ausstattung des Soldaten im Wandel', Europäische Sicherheit 47/2 (Feb. 1998) pp.37-9 (p.38) on the new ABC equipment for infantry. The modern ABC protection mask M 65A2, servicable in the next century, will enable the soldier to drink liquids out of a specially designed water-bottle while wearing the mask.
61. Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, 'Maßnahmen gegen die Gefahren der Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Anpassung des Bündnisses an das neue Sicherheitsumfeld', in NATO Brief 42/5 (1994) pp.10-15 (14f.). Carter was Assistant Secretary in the Pentagon who was in charge for DCI. He and the Brit Omand were the first chairmen of DGP.
62. Kommunique der Ministertagung des Nordatlantikrates am 3 June 1996, Berlin, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. No.47 (12 June 1996) pp.505-11 (508).
63. Deliberations of Oberstleutnant Günther F. C. Forsteneichner, Dept. for Public Relations and Information of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium. Briefing on 6 Feb. 1997. According to Forsteneichner, there was no consensus to be expected in the alliance for such operations.
64. Joachim Ebersbach and Dieter Naskrunt, 'Erweiterte Luftverteidigung', Europäische Sicherheit 47/1 (1998) pp.17-22; David Martin, 'Auf dem Weg zu einem Rahmenkonzept des Bündnisses für eine erweiterte Luftabwehr/taktische Flugkörperabwehr', NATO Brief 44/3 (1996) pp.32-5; sowie Rühle (note 27) p.319.
65. Joachim Ebersbach and Dieter Naskrunt, 'Erweiterte Luftverteidigung', Europäische Sicherheit 47/1 (1998) pp.17-22; David Martin, 'Auf dem Weg zu einem Rahmenkonzept des Bündnisses für eine erweiterte Luftabwehr/taktische Flugkörperabwehr', NATO Brief 44/3 (1996) pp.32-5; sowie Rühle (note 27) p.319.
66. Joachim Ebersbach and Dieter Naskrunt, 'Erweiterte Luftverteidigung', Europäische Sicherheit 47/1 (1998) pp.17-22; David Martin, 'Auf dem Weg zu einem Rahmenkonzept des Bündnisses für eine erweiterte Luftabwehr/taktische Flugkörperabwehr', NATO Brief 44/3 (1996) pp.32-5; sowie Rühle (note 27) p.319.
67. Constanze Stelzenmüller, 'Kein Sonderweg. Deutschland will NATO zum Verzicht auf den atomaren Erstschlag überreden', Die Zeit, 26 Nov. 1998.
68. William Drozdiak, Urging Shift by NATO, Germany Angers US', International Herald Tribune, 23 Nov. 1998.
69. 'US Rejects Any NATO Shift', International Herald Tribune, 28-29 Nov. 1998.
70. David S. Yost, The US and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 326 (London: OUP for USS 1999) pp.64-7. By the way, the conservative-liberal government preceding the red-green coalition had shared this conviction. Minister of Defence Volker Ruhe has been quoted with a similar argument in 1992, ibid, pp.27; Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper 327 (London: OUP for HSS 1999) pp.35-44. Yos and Teratrais each offer a survey about the European debate about first-use. Gompert, Watman and Wilkening (note 2), incidentally, propose a first-use doctrine restricted to a first-use against WMD-attack only, not against conventional attack.
71. David S. Yost, The US and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 326 (London: OUP for USS 1999) pp.64-7. By the way, the conservative-liberal government preceding the red-green coalition had shared this conviction. Minister of Defence Volker Ruhe has been quoted with a similar argument in 1992, ibid, pp.27; Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper 327 (London: OUP for HSS 1999) pp.35-44. Yos and Teratrais each offer a survey about the European debate about first-use. Gompert, Watman and Wilkening (note 2), incidentally, propose a first-use doctrine restricted to a first-use against WMD-attack only, not against conventional attack.
72. David S. Yost, The US and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 326 (London: OUP for USS 1999) pp.64-7. By the way, the conservative-liberal government preceding the red-green coalition had shared this conviction. Minister of Defence Volker Ruhe has been quoted with a similar argument in 1992, ibid, pp.27; Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper 327 (London: OUP for HSS 1999) pp.35-44. Yos and Teratrais each offer a survey about the European debate about first-use. Gompert, Watman and Wilkening (note 2), incidentally, propose a first-use doctrine restricted to a first-use against WMD-attack only, not against conventional attack.
73. The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
74. The IAEA does already evaluate intelligence information provided by member states, see David A. V. Fischer, 'New Directions and Tools for Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards', Nonproliferation Review 3/2 (1996) pp.69-76 (71); Mark H. Killinger, 'Improving IAEA Safe-guards through Enhanced Information Analysis', Nonproliferation Review 3/1 (1995) pp.43-8.
75. The IAEA does already evaluate intelligence information provided by member states, see David A. V. Fischer, 'New Directions and Tools for Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards', Nonproliferation Review 3/2 (1996) pp.69-76 (71); Mark H. Killinger, 'Improving IAEA Safe-guards through Enhanced Information Analysis', Nonproliferation Review 3/1 (1995) pp.43-8.
76. An ad hoc group of governmental experts called VEREX has been debating possible measures concerning BW verification in Geneva.
77. 'Die Welt wartet weiter auf Beweise', Tagesspiegel, 3 Sept. 1998.
78. This point has also been made by the arms control expert Jack Mendelsohn, stating that NATO's insistence suggest that nuclear weapons have some military roles to play. Remarks at the German American Conference on 'Preventing the Proliferation of WMD: What…Role for Arms Control?' Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 28-29 June 1999, Panel on Preventing Nuclear Proliferation: Strengthening the NPT and Implementing the CTBT, p.15.
79. This was part of a disclaimer the US made on the occasion of signing the Protocol containing security guarantees of the African NWFZ, saying, the protocol 'will not limit the operations available to the United States in Response to an attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction', see Rodney W. Jones and Mark MacDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Int. Peace 1998) p.216.
80. As in the whole study, missiles or other delivery systems are not taken into account here. 55. For the information provided below, see Jones and MacDonough (note 53); Krause (note 4) pp.66-80; SIPRI Yearbooks 1996 and 1997. World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Inst. (Oxford: OUP 1996 and 1997), various pp; and various websites, including www.acda.gov, The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's homepage, and www.fas.org, of the Federation of American Scientists.
81. As in the whole study, missiles or other delivery systems are not taken into account here. 55. For the information provided below, see Jones and MacDonough (note 53); Krause (note 4) pp.66-80; SIPRI Yearbooks 1996 and 1997. World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Inst. (Oxford: OUP 1996 and 1997), various pp; and various websites, including www.acda.gov, The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's homepage, and www.fas.org, of the Federation of American Scientists.
82. As in the whole study, missiles or other delivery systems are not taken into account here. 55. For the information provided below, see Jones and MacDonough (note 53); Krause (note 4) pp.66-80; SIPRI Yearbooks 1996 and 1997. World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Inst. (Oxford: OUP 1996 and 1997), various pp; and various websites, including www.acda.gov, The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's homepage, and www.fas.org, of the Federation of American Scientists.
83. PPNN Newsbrief No. 16 (Winter 1991/92)p.10.
84. PPNN Newsbrief No. 21 (2nd Quarter 1993) p.7.
85. Steve Bowman, 'Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities' CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, April 1998 (25 June 1999, www.fas.org/spp/star wars/crs/98042705_npo.html)
86. SIPRI Yearbook 1997 (note 55) p.456.
87. Oliver Thränert, 'Das Chemiewaffenverbot ein Jahr nach dem Inkrafttreten', Europäische Sicherheit 47/5 (1998) pp.35-8 (38).
88. E.J. Hogendoorn, 'A Chemical Weapons Atlas', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53/5 (Sept./Oct. 1997) (25 June 1999, www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1997/so97/so97hogendoorn .html)
89. SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (note 55) p.662.
90. Julia Malone, 'Group Cites Chemical Weapons Risk In Kosovo', Coxnews, 8 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.coxnews.com/ Washington/ kosovo_chemical.htm); 'US: Yugoslavia Has Chemical Agents' (Associated Press, Las Vegas Sun, 15 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/1999/apr/15/041500873.html); William C. Potter and Jonathan B. Tucker, 'Well-Armed and Very Dangerous. Belgrade: The obstacles to Yugoslavia's acquisition and use of unconventional weapons are not that great', Los Angeles Times, 4 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.latimes.com/home/news/reports/yugo/ comment/t000029798.html).
91. Julia Malone, 'Group Cites Chemical Weapons Risk In Kosovo', Coxnews, 8 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.coxnews.com/ Washington/ kosovo_chemical.htm); 'US: Yugoslavia Has Chemical Agents' (Associated Press, Las Vegas Sun, 15 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/1999/apr/15/041500873.html); William C. Potter and Jonathan B. Tucker, 'Well-Armed and Very Dangerous. Belgrade: The obstacles to Yugoslavia's acquisition and use of unconventional weapons are not that great', Los Angeles Times, 4 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.latimes.com/home/news/reports/yugo/ comment/t000029798.html).
92. Julia Malone, 'Group Cites Chemical Weapons Risk In Kosovo', Coxnews, 8 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.coxnews.com/ Washington/ kosovo_chemical.htm); 'US: Yugoslavia Has Chemical Agents' (Associated Press, Las Vegas Sun, 15 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/1999/apr/15/041500873.html); William C. Potter and Jonathan B. Tucker, 'Well-Armed and Very Dangerous. Belgrade: The obstacles to Yugoslavia's acquisition and use of unconventional weapons are not that great', Los Angeles Times, 4 April 1999 (25 June 1999, www.latimes.com/home/news/reports/yugo/ comment/t000029798.html).