The positive political economy of individualism and collectivism: Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau

Politics and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 265-304

  Devine, James ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034420762     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329200028002006     Document Type: Article

References (112)

1. Michael J. Sandel, "America's Search for a New Public Philosophy," The Atlantic Monthly, March 1996, 57-74.
2. Amitai Etzioni, ed., The Essential Communitarian Reader (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
3. See Hal Draper, "The Two Souls of Socialism," in his Socialism from Below, ed. Ernest Haberkern (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992), 2-33.
4. This fits with Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's description of dialectical method in The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
5. See George Akerlof, An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1984); Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989); and Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1990).
6. See George Akerlof, An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1984); Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989); and Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1990).
7. See George Akerlof, An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1984); Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989); and Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1990).
8. See George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, 1937); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1962); and Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought from Socrates to the Age of Ideology, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996).
9. See George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, 1937); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1962); and Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought from Socrates to the Age of Ideology, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996).
10. See George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, 1937); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1962); and Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought from Socrates to the Age of Ideology, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996).
11. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1981).
12. Adapting Max Weber's definition, a state is a specialized organization that successfully monopolizes the legal use of force in a given territory. See "Politics as a Vocation(1918), in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.
13. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government (1689-90).
14. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the Political Economy of Capitalism," Politics & Society 18, no. 2 (1990): 165-222.
15. Writes Amartya K. Sen, "To run an organization entirely on incentives to personal gain is pretty much a hopeless task." See "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds., Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), 102, his emphasis.
16. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), in Robert Heilbroner, ed., The Essential Adam Smith (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986). Below, these two terms are used interchangeably.
17. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), in Robert Heilbroner, ed., The Essential Adam Smith (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986). Below, these two terms are used interchangeably.
18. "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind" (1754) and "The Social Contract" (1762), n J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, ed. Lester G. Crocker (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967).
19. "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind" (1754) and "The Social Contract" (1762), n J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, ed. Lester G. Crocker (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967).
20. "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind" (1754) and "The Social Contract" (1762), n J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, ed. Lester G. Crocker (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967).
21. Nelson, Western Political Thought, 198 f.
22. For recent Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) interpretations, see Hans-Jorg Schmidt-Trenz, "The State of Nature of Contract Formation: Adding a Missing Link to J. M. Buchanan's Social Contract Theory," Public Choice 62, no. 3 (1989): 237-51; or Robert Rider, "War, Pillage, and Markets," Public Choice 75, no. 2 (1993): 149-56.
23. For recent Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) interpretations, see Hans-Jorg Schmidt-Trenz, "The State of Nature of Contract Formation: Adding a Missing Link to J. M. Buchanan's Social Contract Theory," Public Choice 62, no. 3 (1989): 237-51; or Robert Rider, "War, Pillage, and Markets," Public Choice 75, no. 2 (1993): 149-56.
24. See David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract," and Russell Hardin, "Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits," in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 277-306 and 339-54; and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 5. The model of Akira Okada ("The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice 77, no. 3 [1993]: 629-56) or de Jasay (Social Contract, 134 f.) are superior to PD models.
25. See David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract," and Russell Hardin, "Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits," in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 277-306 and 339-54; and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 5. The model of Akira Okada ("The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice 77, no. 3 [1993]: 629-56) or de Jasay (Social Contract, 134 f.) are superior to PD models.
26. See David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract," and Russell Hardin, "Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits," in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 277-306 and 339-54; and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 5. The model of Akira Okada ("The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice 77, no. 3 [1993]: 629-56) or de Jasay (Social Contract, 134 f.) are superior to PD models.
27. See David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract," and Russell Hardin, "Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits," in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 277-306 and 339-54; and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 5. The model of Akira Okada ("The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice 77, no. 3 [1993]: 629-56) or de Jasay (Social Contract, 134 f.) are superior to PD models.
28. See David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract," and Russell Hardin, "Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits," in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 277-306 and 339-54; and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 5. The model of Akira Okada ("The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice 77, no. 3 [1993]: 629-56) or de Jasay (Social Contract, 134 f.) are superior to PD models.
29. Howard Margolis, in Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1982, 21-22), calls this "goods altruism," while to Sen (in "Rational Fools") it is "sympathy."
30. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 65-67.
31. By including external costs, this generalizes de Jasay's concept of degrees of "publicness" (Social Contract, 127-31).
32. Almost all see the need for a state. Smith (Theory) saw the need for a societal consensus to avoid Hobbesian results. See also Robert Heilbroner, Behind the Veil of Economics: Essays in the Worldly Philosophy (New York: Norton, 1988), chap. 1; and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
33. Almost all see the need for a state. Smith (Theory) saw the need for a societal consensus to avoid Hobbesian results. See also Robert Heilbroner, Behind the Veil of Economics: Essays in the Worldly Philosophy (New York: Norton, 1988), chap. 1; and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
34. Ostrom, in Governing the Commons, argues against this modernist either/or approach.
35. This article usually takes the degree of government effectiveness as given and for granted.
36. Finally, a rise in taxes helps pay for the subsidies and also for the government's administrative overhead.
37. Assume that governmental effectiveness does not vary between resources.
38. See the appendix for more complete analysis (available from the author by mail or at http://clawww.lmu.edu/~jdevine/hlr.html).
39. This is similar to de Jasay's view that "it is the public that decides what is a public good" because the status of a good as "public" depends on the method of its distribution (Social Contract, n. 84).
40. A vertical sc might occur at a specific level of S if the overall effectiveness of government regulation fell to zero above that level: laissez-faire partisans severely criticize any government activity beyond the preservation of Lockean Property rights. However, there is no a priori reason to assume that this vertical 5 would correspond to these rights, while the experience of European social democracy suggests the possibility of effective government at relatively high degrees of collectivization. A full critique is beyond the scope of this article.
41. Okada, "The Possibility of Cooperation."
42. See de Jasay, Social Contract, 27-29; and Ostrom, Governing the Commons.
43. See de Jasay, Social Contract, 27-29; and Ostrom, Governing the Commons.
44. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); Douglas W. Rae, "The Limits of Consensual Decision," American Political Science Review 69, no. 4 (1975): 1270-94; and Mueller, Public, 105, table 6.1.
45. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); Douglas W. Rae, "The Limits of Consensual Decision," American Political Science Review 69, no. 4 (1975): 1270-94; and Mueller, Public, 105, table 6.1.
46. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); Douglas W. Rae, "The Limits of Consensual Decision," American Political Science Review 69, no. 4 (1975): 1270-94; and Mueller, Public, 105, table 6.1.
47. See Nelson, Western Political Thought, 200.
48. Mueller, Public, 65-66.
49. Cf. Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 18. Similarly, to Matthew Rabin ("Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 1 [1998]: 20-21), purely self-interested behavior is encouraged by competitive markets.
50. Cf. Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 18. Similarly, to Matthew Rabin ("Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 1 [1998]: 20-21), purely self-interested behavior is encouraged by competitive markets.
51. o = 0, for example, people would spontaneously avoid behaviors that hurt others simply to lower the average person's receipt of goods, but continue to do so if it raises their own direct individual benefits.
52. See Lichbach, Cooperator's, chaps. 3, 5.
53. Ibid., chap. 6.
54. Each involves what Lichbach terms "Community" (Cooperator's, chap. 4).
55. Ibid., 25-26, 220-23.
56. See, for example, Udehn's survey of theory and evidence, centering on the contributions of Margolis, Sen, and Elster, which are reminiscent of Smith's Theory: Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 5. See Margolis, Selfishness; Sen, "Rational Fools"; plus Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
57. See, for example, Udehn's survey of theory and evidence, centering on the contributions of Margolis, Sen, and Elster, which are reminiscent of Smith's Theory: Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 5. See Margolis, Selfishness; Sen, "Rational Fools"; plus Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
58. See, for example, Udehn's survey of theory and evidence, centering on the contributions of Margolis, Sen, and Elster, which are reminiscent of Smith's Theory: Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 5. See Margolis, Selfishness; Sen, "Rational Fools"; plus Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
59. See, for example, Udehn's survey of theory and evidence, centering on the contributions of Margolis, Sen, and Elster, which are reminiscent of Smith's Theory: Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 5. See Margolis, Selfishness; Sen, "Rational Fools"; plus Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
60. See, for example, Udehn's survey of theory and evidence, centering on the contributions of Margolis, Sen, and Elster, which are reminiscent of Smith's Theory: Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 5. See Margolis, Selfishness; Sen, "Rational Fools"; plus Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
61. Robert Sugden, "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1996), sees this as necessary to individual property rights' preservation.
62. Rabin, "Psychology," 21.
63. Akerlof, Economic, chaps. 3,5. Rejected is de Jasay's (Social Contract, 12-14) view of customs as simply based on freely made bilateral Contracts.
64. Akerlof, Economic, chaps. 3,5. Rejected is de Jasay's (Social Contract, 12-14) view of customs as simply based on freely made bilateral Contracts.
65. Jon Elster, "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1989): 105.
66. Ibid. Similarly, we cannot assume that all ideologies and community democracies support the system.
67. See Sugden, "Spontaneous Order," and H. Peyton Young, "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1996).
68. See Sugden, "Spontaneous Order," and H. Peyton Young, "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1996).
69. This is akin to de Jasay's "mutual aid" (Social Contract, 28).
70. If organized as hierarchies, they violate Equality unless the organizations are subordinated to their members via democratic processes and/or the possibility of leaving.
71. See Sandel, "America's Search."
72. Udehn provides empirical evidence on the role of extrastatal supporting institutions (Limits of Public Choice, chap. 7).
73. See also Margaret Levi's profound discussion of compliance in her Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chap. 2).
74. See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
75. See, for example, Margaret Levi's empirical study in Consent of the societal forces encouraging compliance with conscription, a form of taxation.
76. Compare Akerlof, Economic, 76, eq. 3. See also Rabin, "Psychology," 20-21; and Samuel Bowles, "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 1 (1998).
77. Compare Akerlof, Economic, 76, eq. 3. See also Rabin, "Psychology," 20-21; and Samuel Bowles, "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 1 (1998).
78. Compare Akerlof, Economic, 76, eq. 3. See also Rabin, "Psychology," 20-21; and Samuel Bowles, "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 1 (1998).
79. As Erik Wright points out in personal correspondence, cd might become negatively sloped, as a rise in collectivization encourages individualism. Figure 2 incorporates part of this phenomenon by highlighting the way in which cd levels off after a certain degree of collectivization. It might start sloping downward without changing the conclusion that civil society can only help the state fight the free rider problem up to a point. This response might also be to the type of collectivization in place. For example, it might be to the kind of authoritarian collectivism discussed in sections 3B and 3D.
80. A discussed in section 3B. Because disequilibrium movement is only toward H, it is similar to the situation at G and G2.
81. Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem," and Lichbach, Cooperator's, sec. 5.4.
82. Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem," and Lichbach, Cooperator's, sec. 5.4.
83. Okada, "The Possibility of Cooperation."
84. See Elster, The Cement of Society, 1-16.
85. The U.S. Constitution's creation was not a true Social Contract, since the most important issues had already been settled.
86. See Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science 169, no. 3947 (1970): 733-38); and Marvin Harris, Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came from, Where We Are Going (New York: Harper, 1989), 387-95.
87. See Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science 169, no. 3947 (1970): 733-38); and Marvin Harris, Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came from, Where We Are Going (New York: Harper, 1989), 387-95.
88. Nelson, Western Political Thought, 208-9.
89. This presumes that the degrees of equality and cohesion can be measured and aggregated in a simple way.
90. This critique is associated with James Buchanan's Virginia school of political economy.
91. Akerlof, Economic, 87. Similarly, Young's equilibrium conventions may be "punctuated," leading to rapid change ("Economics," 112).
92. Akerlof, Economic, 87. Similarly, Young's equilibrium conventions may be "punctuated," leading to rapid change ("Economics," 112).
93. See Elster, "Social Norms."
94. Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 7. The role of personalities is discussed in section 3 A.
95. See MacPherson, Political Theory, chap. 5.
96. See de Jasay, Social Contract, 43, 67-68; Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 41.
97. See de Jasay, Social Contract, 43, 67-68; Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 41.
98. de Jasay, Social Contract, chap. 4.
99. Locke, Second Treatise, 37. Adam Smith makes this process more explicit (The Wealth of Nations, 1776, bk. 1, chap. 1).
100. Locke, Second Treatise, 37. Adam Smith makes this process more explicit (The Wealth of Nations, 1776, bk. 1, chap. 1).
101. See Rousseau, Discourse, pt. 2. For a less abstract model of this exploitation, see James Devine, "Taxation without Representation: Reconstructing Marx's Theory of Capitalist Exploitation," in William Dugger, ed., Inequality: Radical Institutionalist Views on Race, Class, Gender, and Nation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996).
102. See Rousseau, Discourse, pt. 2. For a less abstract model of this exploitation, see James Devine, "Taxation without Representation: Reconstructing Marx's Theory of Capitalist Exploitation," in William Dugger, ed., Inequality: Radical Institutionalist Views on Race, Class, Gender, and Nation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996).
103. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
104. This is similar to the Marxist vision of Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973).
105. This differs from the situation of workers, for whom the benefits of such subsidies and of the taxes on capital to finance them are both positive and more likely to be in sync.
106. See Buchanan and Tulloch, Calculus.
107. Plato (c. 370 B.C.E.), The Republic of Plato, trans. and ed. Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), chap. 13.
108. On the internal paradox, see Ian Steedman and Ulrich Krause, "Goethe's Faust, Arrow's Possibility Theorem and the Individual Decision-Taker," in Jon Elster, ed., The Multiple Self: Studies in Rationality and Social Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
109. See Sir Thomas More, Utopia (1518), trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin, 1965); and William Morris, News from Nowhere (1890), ed. James Redmond (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
110. See Sir Thomas More, Utopia (1518), trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin, 1965); and William Morris, News from Nowhere (1890), ed. James Redmond (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
111. If cd is tangent from below sc (as suggested in the last note in section 2B), then only the former problem is relevant.
112. See Sandel, "America's Search."