Iran and iraq as rational crisis actors: Dangers and dynamics of survivable nuclear war

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 52-73

  James, Carolyn C ^a  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034418488     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437778     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. A game-theoretic version of this project has been developed to assess the range of possible behavior among rivalries that include first-, second-, third-level and mini-arsenal states (Carolyn C. James, 'Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping With Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries', paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Los Angeles, CA, 15-18 March 2000. 'NAG', or Nuclear Arsenal Games, are based on Brams' Theory of Moves (Steven J. Brams, Theory of Moves [Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1994]).
2. A game-theoretic version of this project has been developed to assess the range of possible behavior among rivalries that include first-, second-, third-level and mini-arsenal states (Carolyn C. James, 'Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping With Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries', paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Los Angeles, CA, 15-18 March 2000. 'NAG', or Nuclear Arsenal Games, are based on Brams' Theory of Moves (Steven J. Brams, Theory of Moves [Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1994]).
3. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1997)pp.4-5.
4. Ibid.
5. See Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in international Politics (Princeton UP 1976); Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966); and Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37 (1959).
6. See Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in international Politics (Princeton UP 1976); Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966); and Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37 (1959).
7. See Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in international Politics (Princeton UP 1976); Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966); and Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37 (1959).
8. See Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in international Politics (Princeton UP 1976); Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966); and Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37 (1959).
9. See Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in international Politics (Princeton UP 1976); Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966); and Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37 (1959).
10. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
11. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
12. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
13. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
14. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
15. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
16. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1965), War and Politics (NY: Macmillan 1973); Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (NY: Praeger 1988); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia UP 1974); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton UP 1961); and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (NY: Cambridge UP 1990).
17. Acceptable versus unacceptable damage are purely subjective terms. It is not the intent of this essay to provide either a universal or case-specific formula to determine these levels. There are many examples, however, of states and societies surviving extreme damage (even if lhe war was lost). For example, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not approach the destruction of Japanese leadership or society. There also has existed a tendency to overestimate the extent of damage in certain situations; projections by the British in 1945 indicated it would take 30 years to remove the rubble from Berlin (Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance-America. Europe, Japan: Makers of the Poshrar World [NY: Simon and Schuster 1983] p. 19). For other examples of damage assessment, see Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (NY: MacMillan 1980) pp.32-6, for Germany in 1945; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (NY: Basic Books 1981); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University US Air Force 1992) pp.55-119, for an assessment of the 1991 Gulf War damage to Iraq.
18. Acceptable versus unacceptable damage are purely subjective terms. It is not the intent of this essay to provide either a universal or case-specific formula to determine these levels. There are many examples, however, of states and societies surviving extreme damage (even if lhe war was lost). For example, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not approach the destruction of Japanese leadership or society. There also has existed a tendency to overestimate the extent of damage in certain situations; projections by the British in 1945 indicated it would take 30 years to remove the rubble from Berlin (Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance-America. Europe, Japan: Makers of the Poshrar World [NY: Simon and Schuster 1983] p. 19). For other examples of damage assessment, see Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (NY: MacMillan 1980) pp.32-6, for Germany in 1945; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (NY: Basic Books 1981); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University US Air Force 1992) pp.55-119, for an assessment of the 1991 Gulf War damage to Iraq.
19. Acceptable versus unacceptable damage are purely subjective terms. It is not the intent of this essay to provide either a universal or case-specific formula to determine these levels. There are many examples, however, of states and societies surviving extreme damage (even if lhe war was lost). For example, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not approach the destruction of Japanese leadership or society. There also has existed a tendency to overestimate the extent of damage in certain situations; projections by the British in 1945 indicated it would take 30 years to remove the rubble from Berlin (Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance-America. Europe, Japan: Makers of the Poshrar World [NY: Simon and Schuster 1983] p. 19). For other examples of damage assessment, see Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (NY: MacMillan 1980) pp.32-6, for Germany in 1945; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (NY: Basic Books 1981); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University US Air Force 1992) pp.55-119, for an assessment of the 1991 Gulf War damage to Iraq.
20. Acceptable versus unacceptable damage are purely subjective terms. It is not the intent of this essay to provide either a universal or case-specific formula to determine these levels. There are many examples, however, of states and societies surviving extreme damage (even if lhe war was lost). For example, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not approach the destruction of Japanese leadership or society. There also has existed a tendency to overestimate the extent of damage in certain situations; projections by the British in 1945 indicated it would take 30 years to remove the rubble from Berlin (Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance-America. Europe, Japan: Makers of the Poshrar World [NY: Simon and Schuster 1983] p. 19). For other examples of damage assessment, see Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (NY: MacMillan 1980) pp.32-6, for Germany in 1945; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (NY: Basic Books 1981); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University US Air Force 1992) pp.55-119, for an assessment of the 1991 Gulf War damage to Iraq.
21. 'Rational' is defined according to Morgan's discussion of deterrence under rational decisionmaking. 'What is '"rational" action varies with one's goals and resources; what does not vary is the process itself: specifying and ordering objectives, defining the particular situation, gathering relevant information on alternatives, and choosing the alternative that maximizes one's welfare' (Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis [Beverley Hills, CA: Sage 1983] p.84).
22. Before the 1991 Gulf War, it was known that Iraq had been trying to assemble one crude warhead using enriched uranium derived from energy reactors. While the expertise existed, other impediments (such as those imposed by the international effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons) forced Iraq to proliferate at this minimal level (Judith Miller and James Risen, New York Times [16 Aug. 1998]).
23. I will be referring only to nuclear, rather than conventional, deterrence. I also do not cover similar phenomena associated with biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
24. Brodie (note 6) p.74.
25. Ibid. p.26.
26. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (NY: Oxford UP 1987) and Kenneth N Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security 18/1 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
27. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (NY: Oxford UP 1987) and Kenneth N Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security 18/1 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
28. Frank Zagare, 'Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment', International Interactions 21/4 (1996).
29. See Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'The Stability of Mutual Deterrence' in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Denver: Lynne Reinner 1987); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (NY: John Wiley 1957); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). More specifically, a bipolar system is often regarded as more stable than a multipolar system, nuclear weapons (when properly managed) increase stability, and the weapons provide a defensive rather than an offensive advantage (Zagare, note 13, p.368). Other views see multipolarity as more stable. The classic exposition for this is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406.
30. See Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'The Stability of Mutual Deterrence' in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Denver: Lynne Reinner 1987); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (NY: John Wiley 1957); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). More specifically, a bipolar system is often regarded as more stable than a multipolar system, nuclear weapons (when properly managed) increase stability, and the weapons provide a defensive rather than an offensive advantage (Zagare, note 13, p.368). Other views see multipolarity as more stable. The classic exposition for this is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406.
31. See Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'The Stability of Mutual Deterrence' in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Denver: Lynne Reinner 1987); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (NY: John Wiley 1957); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). More specifically, a bipolar system is often regarded as more stable than a multipolar system, nuclear weapons (when properly managed) increase stability, and the weapons provide a defensive rather than an offensive advantage (Zagare, note 13, p.368). Other views see multipolarity as more stable. The classic exposition for this is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406.
32. See Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'The Stability of Mutual Deterrence' in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Denver: Lynne Reinner 1987); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (NY: John Wiley 1957); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). More specifically, a bipolar system is often regarded as more stable than a multipolar system, nuclear weapons (when properly managed) increase stability, and the weapons provide a defensive rather than an offensive advantage (Zagare, note 13, p.368). Other views see multipolarity as more stable. The classic exposition for this is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406.
33. See Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'The Stability of Mutual Deterrence' in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Denver: Lynne Reinner 1987); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (NY: John Wiley 1957); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). More specifically, a bipolar system is often regarded as more stable than a multipolar system, nuclear weapons (when properly managed) increase stability, and the weapons provide a defensive rather than an offensive advantage (Zagare, note 13, p.368). Other views see multipolarity as more stable. The classic exposition for this is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406.
34. Zagare bases this discussion on Intriligator and Brito's formal model of a missile war (Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, 'Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?' Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 [1984] pp.63-84 and Intriligator and Brito, note 14.
35. I offer a summary of Intriligator and Brito's diagramatic exposition of mutual deterrence in laymen's terms.
36. Another interpretation could be that states with the ability to build more threatening arsenals pass through this dangerous state as their programs produce the very first weapons. Nuclear opponents have not reached a mutually secure second strike capability, and may engage in nuclear strategic thought that tends toward 'conventionalization' (James J. Wirtz, 'Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War', in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and idem (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order [Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1998]). While not a subject here, this narrow window of time could be highly unstable and would appear to warrant further investigation.
37. For additional discussions about selective proliferation enhancing systemic stability, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 'An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26/2 (June 1982); Peter Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou 'Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist', International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp.209-33; Steven J. Rosen, 'A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', American Political Science Review 71/4 (Dec. 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bette r, Adelphi Paper 71 (London: IISS 1981). A recent update of the Waltz argument, along with representation of an opposing view based on organizational theory, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995).
38. For additional discussions about selective proliferation enhancing systemic stability, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 'An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26/2 (June 1982); Peter Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou 'Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist', International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp.209-33; Steven J. Rosen, 'A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', American Political Science Review 71/4 (Dec. 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bette r, Adelphi Paper 71 (London: IISS 1981). A recent update of the Waltz argument, along with representation of an opposing view based on organizational theory, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995).
39. For additional discussions about selective proliferation enhancing systemic stability, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 'An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26/2 (June 1982); Peter Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou 'Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist', International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp.209-33; Steven J. Rosen, 'A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', American Political Science Review 71/4 (Dec. 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bette r, Adelphi Paper 71 (London: IISS 1981). A recent update of the Waltz argument, along with representation of an opposing view based on organizational theory, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995).
40. For additional discussions about selective proliferation enhancing systemic stability, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 'An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26/2 (June 1982); Peter Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou 'Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist', International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp.209-33; Steven J. Rosen, 'A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', American Political Science Review 71/4 (Dec. 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bette r, Adelphi Paper 71 (London: IISS 1981). A recent update of the Waltz argument, along with representation of an opposing view based on organizational theory, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995).
41. For additional discussions about selective proliferation enhancing systemic stability, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 'An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 26/2 (June 1982); Peter Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou 'Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist', International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp.209-33; Steven J. Rosen, 'A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', American Political Science Review 71/4 (Dec. 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bette r, Adelphi Paper 71 (London: IISS 1981). A recent update of the Waltz argument, along with representation of an opposing view based on organizational theory, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995).
42. Zagare (note 13) p.383, fn. 10.
43. Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Stability of the Bipolar World', Daedalus 93 (1964) p.884.
44. Daniel Ellsberg, 'The Theory and Practice of Blackmail', in Oran R. Young (ed.), Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press 1975).
45. Zagare (note 13) p.376.
46. Glenn Snyder, 'Crisis Bargaining', in Charles F. Hermann (ed.) international Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (NY: Free Press 1972).
47. Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (NY: Horizon Press 1962) p. 11.
48. Ellsberg (note 21) p.360; and Robert Jervis, 'Bargaining and Bargainings Tactics', in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.) Coercion (Chicago: Aldine 1972) p.285.
49. Ellsberg (note 21) p.360; and Robert Jervis, 'Bargaining and Bargainings Tactics', in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.) Coercion (Chicago: Aldine 1972) p.285.
50. McGeorge Bundy, 'The Bishops and the Bomb', The New York Review of Books 30/10 (16 June 1983); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (NY: Cornell UP); and Kenneth (note 12) pp.53-4.
51. McGeorge Bundy, 'The Bishops and the Bomb', The New York Review of Books 30/10 (16 June 1983); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (NY: Cornell UP); and Kenneth (note 12) pp.53-4.
52. McGeorge Bundy, 'The Bishops and the Bomb', The New York Review of Books 30/10 (16 June 1983); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (NY: Cornell UP); and Kenneth (note 12) pp.53-4.
53. Zagare, note 13, p. 379.
54. See note 18.
55. MacNeal/Lehrer News Hour, 7 Dec. 1993.
56. For a discussion of the concept 'rogue state' as it applies to preventing nuclear use, see Eric Herring, 'Rogue Rage: Can We Prevent Mass Destruction?' in this issue.
57. Robert S. McNamara, 'The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions', Foreign Affairs 62/1 (Fall 1983) p.79. These sentiments were reinforced by McNamara in a 23 Feb. 1993 editorial to the New York Times entitled 'Nobody Needs Nukes', p.A21.
58. Robert S. McNamara, 'The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions', Foreign Affairs 62/1 (Fall 1983) p.79. These sentiments were reinforced by McNamara in a 23 Feb. 1993 editorial to the New York Times entitled 'Nobody Needs Nukes', p.A21.
59. Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions & Impact (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1994) pp.50-5; Patrick Clawson, Iran's Challenge to the West: How, When and Why (Washington DC: The Washington Inst. for Near East Policy 1993) pp.59-66; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From the Northern Gulf (Boulder: Westview 1994) pp.105-7.
60. Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions & Impact (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1994) pp.50-5; Patrick Clawson, Iran's Challenge to the West: How, When and Why (Washington DC: The Washington Inst. for Near East Policy 1993) pp.59-66; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From the Northern Gulf (Boulder: Westview 1994) pp.105-7.
61. Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions & Impact (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1994) pp.50-5; Patrick Clawson, Iran's Challenge to the West: How, When and Why (Washington DC: The Washington Inst. for Near East Policy 1993) pp.59-66; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From the Northern Gulf (Boulder: Westview 1994) pp.105-7.
62. Lewis A. Dunn, 'New Nuclear Threats to US Security', in Robert D. Blackwill and Alben Carnesale (eds.) New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for US Policy (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) p.37.
63. 'H.R. 2709 - Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997', Legislative Notice No. 68, 20 May 1998, US Senate Republican Committee; Tim Weiner, 'Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis', New York Times (23 July 1998).
64. 'H.R. 2709 - Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997', Legislative Notice No. 68, 20 May 1998, US Senate Republican Committee; Tim Weiner, 'Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis', New York Times (23 July 1998).
65. Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, 'Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East', Journal of Conflict Resolution 32/3 (Sept.1988).
66. Michael Brecher and Patrick James, 'Patterns of Crisis Management', Journal of Conflict Resolution 32/3 (Sept. 1988).
67. Mueller notes that the absence of escalation could be one factor that may make nuclear weapons appear usable, citing credibility of a nuclear response to a conventional attack as a weakness; see John Mueller, 'The Escalating Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons', in Paul (note 17) pp.81-2.
68. Overall, however, his argument is against the likelihood of rampant proliferation as nuclear weapons become increasingly 'irrelevant' to preventing international wars. See also Eric Herring, Dangerand Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (Manchester UP 1995) on the link between escalation and the political value of nuclear weapons, which places emphasis on fear of annihilation rather than military advantage.
69. Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, 'Iraq and Nuclear Weapons: Continuing Issues', CRS Issue Brief IB92107, updated 28 Jan. 1994.
70. Martin Indyk, Speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 18 May 1993, as reported in Middle East International 452, 11 June 1993.
71. Jeffrey R. Smith and Daniel Williams, 'White House to Step Up Plans to Isolate Iran, Iraq', The Washington Post, 23 May 1993.
72. Stephen Zunes, 'The Bankruptcy of U.S. Iraq Policy', Middle East Policy 6 (1998).
73. Charles Kurzman, 'Soft on Satan: Challenges for Iranian-U.S. Relations', Middle East Policy 6/1 (June 1998).
74. George Lenczowski, 'Iran: The Great Debate', Middle East Policy 3/2 (Sept. 1994) p.53.
75. Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States', Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994) p.50.
76. Madeleine Albright, Remarks at the Asia Society Dinner, 17 June 1998, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, Dept. of State, 18 June 1998.
77. James P. Rubin, US Dept. of State Daily Press Briefing, 18 June 1998.
78. William Cohen, 'Threat Posed to America by WMD', Dept. of Defense News Briefing, 17 March 1998; Rubin (note 46); and US Government White Paper, 'Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs', 13 Feb. 1998.
79. William Cohen, 'Threat Posed to America by WMD', Dept. of Defense News Briefing, 17 March 1998; Rubin (note 46); and US Government White Paper, 'Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs', 13 Feb. 1998.
80. William Cohen, 'Threat Posed to America by WMD', Dept. of Defense News Briefing, 17 March 1998; Rubin (note 46); and US Government White Paper, 'Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs', 13 Feb. 1998.
81. A policy of assisted proliferation mentioned above may indeed result in robust mutual deterrence between Iran and Iraq, yet defeat attempts to protect other potential adversaries. In other words, what is best for stability within one dyad may well undermine other sets of conflictual actors. This dilemma would complicate any potential scenarios that do not exist according to the assumptions of existential deterrence.
82. Cordesman (note 32).
83. Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview 1997) and Stuart E. Eizenstat, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, 3 June 1998.
84. Rensselaer Lee, 'Smuggling Update', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53/3 (May/June 1997).
85. Brian G. Chow and Kenneth A. Soloman, Limiting the Spread of Weapons-Usable Fissile Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 1994).
86. Lewis A. Dunn, 'Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear Powers', Washington Quarterly 17/1 (Winter 1994) p.20.
87. The resignation of UN Assistant Secretary General Denis Halliday, former UN coordinator in Iraq, over the sanctions issue supports rising criticism among political actors and academics alike that the sanctions were created in a way that would promote the downfall of Saddam Hussein's power more than they would alter policies by the existing Iraqi regime. Halliday believes now that the sanctions will not result in disarmament. Rather, they are responsible for malnutrition among 1/3 of Iraqi children under the age of 5 and in the deaths of 6, 000-7, 000 children per month (Phyllis Dennis, 'The US and Iraq: towards confrontation?', Middle East International 587, 13 Nov. 1998, pp.4-5; Ian Williams, '"Why I resigned"- an interview with Denis Halliday', Middle East International 587, 13 Nov. 1998, pp.6-7.
88. The resignation of UN Assistant Secretary General Denis Halliday, former UN coordinator in Iraq, over the sanctions issue supports rising criticism among political actors and academics alike that the sanctions were created in a way that would promote the downfall of Saddam Hussein's power more than they would alter policies by the existing Iraqi regime. Halliday believes now that the sanctions will not result in disarmament. Rather, they are responsible for malnutrition among 1/3 of Iraqi children under the age of 5 and in the deaths of 6, 000-7, 000 children per month (Phyllis Dennis, 'The US and Iraq: towards confrontation?', Middle East International 587, 13 Nov. 1998, pp.4-5; Ian Williams, '"Why I resigned"- an interview with Denis Halliday', Middle East International 587, 13 Nov. 1998, pp.6-7.
89. Kenneth R. Timmerman, 'Cavaet Venditor', New York Times, 25 Oct. 1993.
90. Cordesman and Hashim (note 50).
91. In 1997 Cordesman wrote that Iran would most likely be able to develop a nuclear warhead using the same triggering system that used in 'Little Boy', the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The estimation at that time stated if Iran was able to purchase the Tissue material from abroad, with that kind of a gun or simple implosion method, it could develop a nuclear weapon in 9 to 48 months. Anthony H. Cordesman, US Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities (Boulder, CO: Westview 1997) p.94.
92. There is debate within the literature on deterrence whether or not MAD is truly robust or if it has an element of permanence. For example, Harvey and James argue that, based on a review of existing studies, crises in nuclear versus non-nuclear dyads do not appear to be resolved differently (Frank P. Harvey and Patrick James, 'Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda', Conflict Management and Peace Science 12/1 (1992) pp.17-45).
93. Bundy (note 26) p.4. The argument that damage from a limited nuclear attack may be considered acceptable if the enemy could be defeated is supported in Lawrence Freedman, 'I Exist; Therefore I Deter', International Security 13/1 (Summer 1988) p.183.
94. Scott D. Sagan, 'More Will Be Worse', in idem and Kenneth N. Waltz (ed.) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (note 18) p.48.
95. David Albright, 'The Shots Heard "Round the World"', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54/4 (July/Aug. 1998).
96. Innovative policies for management of nuclear rivalries also might be relevant to other weapons of mass destruction, ranging from chemical to germ warfare. In addition, mixed WMD capabilities, such as a nuclear capable state facing crisis with a chemical capable states, also may exhibit behavior inconsistent with Cold War, superpower deterrence.
97. Unilateral use, without second strike, has been questioned on both moral and strategic terms. However, Cold War MAD was based on the credibility of nuclear use which, according to Zagare, is an inherent flaw in Classical Deterrence Theory, Zagare (note 13) p.13.
98. For heuristic purposes, these preferences are stated only as 'use' versus 'non-use'. In any crisis situation, of course, state actions are nuanced with multiple options. However, this is appropriate since nuclear use does carry the connotation of 'all or nothing', i.e. stepping over a 'line in the sand'.
99. Recall that the only weapon of mass destruction discussed here is nuclear.
100. Iran also bombed Iraqi cities, but its missile capability was limited and failed to match the devastation inflicted by the Iraqis.
101. Iranian use of chemical weapons against Iraqi troops is not as well publicized, perhaps due to the fact that the use was limited and ineffectual as Iranian chemical capability was quite primitive compared to Iraq's chemical arsenal and delivery capability (Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War [Boulder: Westview Press 1990] pp.517-18; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response [Washington DC: Dept. of Defense April 1996] p.15). It is interesting to note, however, that they did cross the infamous WMD 'line' which violates international norms and should have produced extreme condemnation. The lesson may not be lost on these two antagonists in future conflicts, since the outside world does not appear to dole out consistent levels of punishment for WMD violations.
102. Iranian use of chemical weapons against Iraqi troops is not as well publicized, perhaps due to the fact that the use was limited and ineffectual as Iranian chemical capability was quite primitive compared to Iraq's chemical arsenal and delivery capability (Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War [Boulder: Westview Press 1990] pp.517-18; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response [Washington DC: Dept. of Defense April 1996] p.15). It is interesting to note, however, that they did cross the infamous WMD 'line' which violates international norms and should have produced extreme condemnation. The lesson may not be lost on these two antagonists in future conflicts, since the outside world does not appear to dole out consistent levels of punishment for WMD violations.
103. Morgan states that the only time striking first is not rational, even with nuclear weapons, is when the costs for both sides are extreme to the point of 'virtually total destruction' (Morgan, p.94).
104. Herring (note 30).