The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 133-137

  Hokari, Toru ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Aggregate monotonicity; Convex games; Nucleolus

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034418169     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001829900030     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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