Underwriting and calls of convertible bonds

Decision Sciences

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 57-77

  Cowan, Arnold R ^a   Nayar, Nandkumar ^b   Singh, Ajai K ^c  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

^c CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate finance; Financial models; Game theory; Investment banking; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034416626     PISSN: 00117315     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5915.2000.tb00924.x     Document Type: Article

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