The effect of dismissals protection on employment: More on a vexed theme

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 105-122

  Addison, John T ^a,b   Teixeira, Paulino ^c   Grosso, Jean Luc ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA   (Portugal)

^d University of South Carolina Sumter   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034415186     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061615     Document Type: Article

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