Bargaining with nuclear weapons: Thomas Schelling’s ‘general’ concept of stability

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 48-71

  Ayson, Robert ^a,b  

^a MASSEY UNIVERSITY   (New Zealand)

^b Royal New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff College   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034413429     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437790     Document Type: Article

References (131)

1. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and NY: Macmillan 1989); Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.18-23; Phil Williams, 'Thomas Schelling', in John Baylis and John Garnett (eds.) Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter 1991) pp. 120-35.
2. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and NY: Macmillan 1989); Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.18-23; Phil Williams, 'Thomas Schelling', in John Baylis and John Garnett (eds.) Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter 1991) pp. 120-35.
3. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and NY: Macmillan 1989); Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.18-23; Phil Williams, 'Thomas Schelling', in John Baylis and John Garnett (eds.) Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter 1991) pp. 120-35.
4. See Ken Booth, 'The Evolution of Strategic Thinking', in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts, 2nd ed.(London: Croom Helm 1987) p.46.
5. See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford UP 1983, 1991) pp.330-36; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: U. of Texas Press 1994) p.5; Freedman (note 1) pp.334-5.
6. See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford UP 1983, 1991) pp.330-36; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: U. of Texas Press 1994) p.5; Freedman (note 1) pp.334-5.
7. Ibid, pp.173-223.
8. See Bernard Brodie, 'War in the Atomic Age' and 'Implications for Military Policy', in Bernard Brodie (ed.) The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and the World Order (NY: Harcourt Brace 1946) pp.21-69, 70-107.
9. For a critique, see Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', Daedalus 109/4 (Fall 1980) pp.135-53.
10. See Albert Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37/2 (Jan. 1959) pp.211-33.
11. Other strategic analysts interested in bargaining included Daniel Ellsberg, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder and Thornton Read. See Freedman (note 1) pp.209, 213-15.
12. By 'general' is meant 'of or affecting all or nearly all, not partial or local or particular', The Oxford Paperback Dictionary 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP 1983) p.268.
13. By 'case' is meant 'an instance or example of the occurrence of something', The Oxford Paperback Dictionary (note 9) p.93.
14. See Schelling's essay on 'Surprise Attack and Disarmament' in Klaus Knorr (ed.) NATO and American Security (Princeton UP 1959) pp. 176-208
15. which became Chapter 6 of the widely read Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1960).
16. Gray (note 6) p. 135.
17. Schelling (note 11) p.235.
18. See Wohlstetter (note 7); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) p.282.
19. See Trachtenberg (note 1) pp.24-5; Walter B. Slocombe, 'Strategic Stability in a Restructured World', Survival 32/4 (July/Aug. 1990) pp.304-8.
20. See Thomas C. Schelling, 'Comment', in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds.) Limited Strategic War (NY: Praeger 1962) p 251.
21. Schelling (note 11) p.5. On Schelling's bargaining theory, see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations; A Comprehensive Survey 4th ed. (NY: Longman 1997) pp.520-4.
22. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT and London: Yale UP 1966) p.v.
23. Schelling (note 18) pp.v-vi.
24. Schelling (note 11) pp.21-2.
25. Ibid. p.70. Also see Williams (note 1) pp. 126-7.
26. Schelling (note 11) p.22.
27. Schelling (note 18) p.7. Also see ibid, p.142.
28. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (NY: The Twentieth Century Fund 1961) p.3.
29. Schelling (note 18) p.216.
30. Schelling (note 11) p.69.
31. See Bernard Brodie, Sea Power and the Machine Age, 2nd ed. (Princeton UP 1943) pp.7, 439.
32. See Bernard Brodie, 'War in the Atomic Age', in Brodie (ed.) (note 5) p.34.
33. For Brodie's citation of Schelling's work 'on how tacit agreements are reached', see Brodie (note 14) p.323, n9.
34. Schelling (note 11) p.71.
35. Ibid. Also see Schelling on the 'idea of burning bridges - of maneuvering into a position where one clearly cannot yield'. Schelling (note 18) p.44.
36. Schelling (note 11) p.71.
37. Ibid. p.68. Also see Freedman (note 1) p.212.
38. Schelling (note 11) p.76.
39. See Richard Whelan, Drawing The Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (London: Faber and Faber 1990) pp.238-52.
40. Schelling (note 18) p.134.
41. Schelling (note 11) p.76.
42. Schelling (note 18) p.159.
43. Ibid. p.133.
44. Schelling (note 11) p.76.
45. Ibid. p.260.
46. Ibid. p.261.
47. Schelling, 'The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack', RANDP-1342 (16 April 1958;revised 28 May 1958) p.4; and slightly revised in Schelling (note 11) p.209.
48. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1976, 1989) p. 119.
49. See Thomas C. Schelling, International Economics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1958) p.418.
50. See Thomas C. Schelling, review of American Foreign Assistance by William Adams Brown Jr
51. and Redvers Opie, World Politics 7/4 (July 1955) pp.606-26;
52. Thomas C. Schelling, 'International Cost-Sharing Arrangements', Essays in International Finance No. 24 (Princeton: Int. Finance Section, Dept. of Economics and Sociology, Princeton Univ., Sept. 1955).
53. On that assistance, see Schelling (note 45) pp.452-5.
54. Schelling (note 18) p.134.
55. Schelling (note 11) p.76.
56. Schelling (note 18) p.135.
57. Ibid. p. 145.
58. For a recent example, see Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (NY: Columbia UP 1998) pp.153-62.
59. See Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 1996) pp.208-43.
60. Schelling (note 18) p. 147.
61. See T.C. Schelling, 'Signals and Feedback in the Arms Dialogue', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21/1 (Jan. 1965) p.8.
62. In particular see Schelling and Halperin (note 24).
63. Schelling (note 55) p.8.
64. Schelling (note 18) p.2.
65. Schelling (note 11) p.262.
66. Ibid. p.77.
67. Schelling (note 18) p.87n5.
68. Ibid. p.87n5. Also see Thomas C. Schelling, 'Nuclears, NATO and the "New strategy"', in Henry A. Kissinger (ed.) Problems of National Strategy (NY: Praeger 1965) p. 173.
69. See Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 1997); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (NY: Norton 1997) pp. 195-7, 249-53.
70. See Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 1997); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (NY: Norton 1997) pp. 195-7, 249-53.
71. Hence Schelling's concern with 'stabilizing the action within limits'. Schelling (note 11) p.78.
72. Ibid. p.77.
73. Thomas C. Schelling, 'Deterrence: Military Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age', Virginia Quarterly Review 39/4 (Autumn 1963) p.539. Also see Schelling, 'The Threat of Violence in International Affairs', Proceedings of The American Society of International Law 57 (25-27 April 1963) p. 106.
74. Thomas C. Schelling, 'Deterrence: Military Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age', Virginia Quarterly Review 39/4 (Autumn 1963) p.539. Also see Schelling, 'The Threat of Violence in International Affairs', Proceedings of The American Society of International Law 57 (25-27 April 1963) p. 106.
75. Schelling (note 11) p.72.
76. Ibid. p.77.
77. Schelling (note 18) p. 18.
78. Ibid, p.259.
79. Ibid. p.33.
80. Schelling (note 11) p.239.
81. Ibid, p.239.
82. Schelling (note 18) p.201.
83. Schelling (note 11) p.44.
84. Ibid. p.44n17.
85. Ibid. p.44.
86. Martin Wight, in Systems of States (ed.) Hedley Bull (Leicester UP 1977) p.31.
87. Schelling (note 18) p.6.
88. Thomas C. Schelling, 'War Without Pain and Other Models', review of Conflict and Defense: A General Theory by Kenneth E. Boulding, World Politics 15/3 (April 1963) pp.483-4.
89. Schelling (note 18) p.195.
90. Ibid, p.132.
91. Schelling (note 11) p.77.
92. For example see Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (NY: Harper and Row 1964) pp.84, 199.
93. For example, see the calculation of stability via 'dynamic exchange modelling' in Stephen J. Cimbala, 'Deterrence Stability with Smaller Forces: Prospects and Problems', Journal of Peace Research 32/1 (1995) pp.65-78.
94. T.C. Schelling, review of The Control of the Arms Race by Hedley Bull, Survival 3/4 (July-Aug. 1961) p.195.
95. Schelling (note 11) p.76.
96. Schelling (note 18) pp.202-3.
97. Ibid, p.198.
98. Ibid. p. 132.
99. Ibid. p.208.
100. Brodie (note 14) p.316.
101. Schelling (note 18) p.222.
102. Ibid, p.228.
103. Schelling (note 11) p.210.
104. Ibid, p.215.
105. Ibid. p.112.
106. Schelling and Halperin (note 24) p.50.
107. Schelling (note 18) p.241.
108. Ibid, p.227.
109. Ibid, p.233.
110. Schelling (note 11) p.75; Schelling (note 18) p.131.
111. See Brodie to Schelling, 9 Jan. 1959, L-557, p.2, Box 2, Folder 11, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Dept. of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, Univ. of California, Los Angeles. For Brodie's repetition of this point in comments on a draft of Schelling's Arms and Influence, see Brodie to Schelling, 15 Dec. 1964, L-25151, p.4, Box 2, Folder 11, Brodie Papers.
112. Brodie to Schelling, 15 Dec. 1964, L-25151 (note 103) p.4.
113. Schelling (note 18) p.129.
114. Ibid, p.130.
115. Thomas Schelling, 'Limited War' (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University: Nov. 1959), Lecture Delivered to the National War College, 18 Nov. 1959, p.3; Box 27, Folder 'Schelling, Thomas C', Brodie Papers.
116. Schelling, 'Limited War' lecture (note 107) p. 11
117. See Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedies and Lessons of Vietnam (NY: Vintage Books 1995) p. 160; H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (NY: HarperCollins 1997) p.73.
118. See Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedies and Lessons of Vietnam (NY: Vintage Books 1995) p. 160; H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (NY: HarperCollins 1997) p.73.
119. See Ilya V. Gaiduk, 'Developing an Alliance: The Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1954-75', in Peter Lowe (ed.) The Vietnam War (NY: St Martin's Press 1998) p.146.
120. See Chen Jian, 'China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-75', in Lowe (note 110) pp.169-70.
121. See Nguyen Vu Tung, 'Hanoi's Search for an Effective Strategy', in Lowe (note 110) pp.45-6.
122. William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996) p.264.
123. See Schelling (note 11) p.14-15; Thomas C. Schelling, 'Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory', World Politics 14/1 (Oct. 1961) pp.47-68.
124. Schelling (note 11) p.83.
125. See T.C. Schelling, 'Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage', Operations Research 9 (May-June 1961) p.365; Schelling (note 62) p.183; T.C. Schelling, 'Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare', Adelphi Paper 19 (London: IISS, June 1965) p.4.
126. See T.C. Schelling, 'Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage', Operations Research 9 (May-June 1961) p.365; Schelling (note 62) p.183; T.C. Schelling, 'Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare', Adelphi Paper 19 (London: IISS, June 1965) p.4.
127. Similarly, ideas of carefully controlled escalation in nuclear strategy have not been immune from harsh criticism. See Desmond Ball, 'Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?', Adelphi Paper 169 (London: IISS, Autumn 1981) pp. 1-2, 30, 35-7.
128. For one critique which cites Schelling's work in particular, see Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell UP 1987) pp. 104-9.
129. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London: Weidenfeld for IISS 1961) p.69.
130. Schelling (note 62) p.178.
131. Their specific contributions to Schelling's stability theory will be addressed in subsequent writing by this author.