Centralized vs. decentralized procurement: Does dispersed information call for decentralized decision-making?

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 949-963

  Vagstad, Steinar ^a,b  

^a NORCE NORWEGIAN RESEARCH CENTRE   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

Auctions; D44; D82; Discrimination; Incentive contracts; L51; Procurement; Quality; R38

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034410770     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00044-7     Document Type: Article

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