Behavioral and institutional determinants of political business cycles

Public Choice

Volumn 104, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 121-147

  Baleiras, Rui Nuno ^a   Santos, Vasco ^a  

^a NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034408921     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005117901380     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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