A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics

Economics Letters

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 179-182

  Milyo, Jeffrey ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D70; Public sector preferences; Spatial models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034399731     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00220-7     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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