National science in the nation's heartland: The Ames laboratory and Iowa State University, 1942-1965

Technology and Culture

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 435-458

  Goldman, Joanne Abel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034398078     PISSN: 0040165X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. Iowa State College did not become a university until 1959, but for the sake of clarity I will refer to it as Iowa State University throughout this article.
2. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
3. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
4. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
5. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
6. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
7. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
8. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
9. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
10. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
11. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
12. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
13. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
14. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
15. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
16. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
17. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
18. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
19. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
20. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented chronicle of prewar, wartime, and postwar national science policy: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, Calif., 1989). Robert W. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Laboratory System," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986): 135-75, discusses the structure and motivation for the particular form of the AEC laboratories. More general studies of federal science policy include Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since 1945," History of Science 32 (1994): 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., Osiris, vol. 7, Science After '40 (Chicago, 1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992).
21. A large body of scholarship exists that examines government-sponsored research and the academy. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), is a comprehensive look at the development of the atomic bomb, with particular emphasis on the personalities involved with the Manhattan Project. Several studies argue that the military-industrial-academic complex promoted the internalization of government priorities by scientists in the university: see Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (1994): 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Amy Sue Bix, "Backing Into Sponsored Research: Physics and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual 13 (1993): 9-53. Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy and Universities: Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993): 197-224, and Leon M. Lederman, "Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science, 11 January 1991, 3-20, testify to the dependence of scientific research on federal funding. Other studies consider still other aspects of the U.S. national laboratories: see, for example, Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge, 1993); Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, Ill., 1997); and Michele Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, Nebr., 1992). The three-volume official history of the AEC offers an extremely detailed and well-documented
22. Ronald C. Tobey defines national science as "the centralized administration of nongovernmental scientific activity by a private agency of the kind that developed during the First World War for war-related research"; The American Ideology of National Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh, 1971), xi. I am using the term in a similar manner. In 1947 the Atomic Energy Commission began a research program to develop and study atomic energy; see Public Law 585, 79th Gong., 2d sess. (1 August 1946).
23. Scientists accepted these terms because the nation's security was at stake and the scientific problems before them were captivating; see Owens, 559. Rhodes, 464-68, 476-81, writes that Los Alamos scientists tolerated the oppressive working conditions because of the scientific merit of this research as well.
24. In January 1942 Compton decided to centralize much of the atomic research underway at Chicago. While it was agreed that E. O. Lawrence would continue his work at Berkeley because the giant cyclotron magnets would be difficult to move, research groups from Columbia and Princeton joined key scientists from Chicago's physics department to carry out the objectives of the Metallurgical Laboratory. Particularly important was Enrico Fermi's group, from Columbia, which attempted to confirm their ability to create and control a self-sustaining chain reaction. Eugene Wigner and the Princeton group complemented this effort by calculating the theoretical feasibility and implications of the chain reaction. Hewlett and Anderson, 53-56.
25. See Harry Svec, prologue to Handbook on the Physics and Chemistry of Rare Earths, vol. 11, ed. K. A. Gschneidner Jr. and L. Eyring (New York, 1988), 6-8; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr. and J. Capellen, "Dedication of the 17th Rare Earth Research Conference to the Memory of Frank H. Spedding, Sam Legvold and Wallace C. Koehler," Journal of the Less-Common Metals 126 (1986): xvii-xix; and Carolyn Stilts Payne, "The Ames Project: Administering Classified Research as a Part of the Manhattan Project at Iowa State College, 1942-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1992), 39-40.
26. See Harry Svec, prologue to Handbook on the Physics and Chemistry of Rare Earths, vol. 11, ed. K. A. Gschneidner Jr. and L. Eyring (New York, 1988), 6-8; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr. and J. Capellen, "Dedication of the 17th Rare Earth Research Conference to the Memory of Frank H. Spedding, Sam Legvold and Wallace C. Koehler," Journal of the Less-Common Metals 126 (1986): xvii-xix; and Carolyn Stilts Payne, "The Ames Project: Administering Classified Research as a Part of the Manhattan Project at Iowa State College, 1942-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1992), 39-40.
27. See Harry Svec, prologue to Handbook on the Physics and Chemistry of Rare Earths, vol. 11, ed. K. A. Gschneidner Jr. and L. Eyring (New York, 1988), 6-8; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr. and J. Capellen, "Dedication of the 17th Rare Earth Research Conference to the Memory of Frank H. Spedding, Sam Legvold and Wallace C. Koehler," Journal of the Less-Common Metals 126 (1986): xvii-xix; and Carolyn Stilts Payne, "The Ames Project: Administering Classified Research as a Part of the Manhattan Project at Iowa State College, 1942-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1992), 39-40.
28. Rare earths, or lanthanides, include fifteen elements, with atomic numbers 57 through 71. Several interesting properties make them noteworthy. Most lanthanides are nearly indistinguishable chemically, since the outermost electron shells are identical; it is the number of electrons in their 4f-shell that varies. Additionally, pronounced magnetic properties arise from the filling of the 4f-shell, leading to magnetic materials of great technological importance. See F. H. Spedding, "Progress in Rare Earth Chemistry" (n.p., n.d.), in the Spedding Papers at the Iowa State Archives (hereafter Spedding Papers); F. H. Spedding, "The Rare Earths," Scientific American, November 1951, 26-30; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr., Rare Earths, The Fraternal Fifteen (Washington D.C., 1966), 1-8.
29. Rare earths, or lanthanides, include fifteen elements, with atomic numbers 57 through 71. Several interesting properties make them noteworthy. Most lanthanides are nearly indistinguishable chemically, since the outermost electron shells are identical; it is the number of electrons in their 4f-shell that varies. Additionally, pronounced magnetic properties arise from the filling of the 4f-shell, leading to magnetic materials of great technological importance. See F. H. Spedding, "Progress in Rare Earth Chemistry" (n.p., n.d.), in the Spedding Papers at the Iowa State Archives (hereafter Spedding Papers); F. H. Spedding, "The Rare Earths," Scientific American, November 1951, 26-30; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr., Rare Earths, The Fraternal Fifteen (Washington D.C., 1966), 1-8.
30. Rare earths, or lanthanides, include fifteen elements, with atomic numbers 57 through 71. Several interesting properties make them noteworthy. Most lanthanides are nearly indistinguishable chemically, since the outermost electron shells are identical; it is the number of electrons in their 4f-shell that varies. Additionally, pronounced magnetic properties arise from the filling of the 4f-shell, leading to magnetic materials of great technological importance. See F. H. Spedding, "Progress in Rare Earth Chemistry" (n.p., n.d.), in the Spedding Papers at the Iowa State Archives (hereafter Spedding Papers); F. H. Spedding, "The Rare Earths," Scientific American, November 1951, 26-30; Karl A. Gschneidner Jr., Rare Earths, The Fraternal Fifteen (Washington D.C., 1966), 1-8.
31. He served as an instructor at Iowa State in the interim.
32. In the United States, industrial research and development departments were the first to organize their scientific staff in this fashion. Edison's Menlo Park laboratory was one of the earliest industrial laboratories to do so; see Martin V. Melosi, Thomas Edison (Glenview, Ill., 1990). DuPont created a research and development component to its operations early in the twentieth century; see David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy (Cambridge, 1988), 31, 224. In contrast, Payne, 93-95, and Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York, 1979), 283-84, document that individuals rather than groups usually carried out research programs in the American science community of the early twentieth century. Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago, 1991), 15-30, finds that the awarding of research grants to individuals for independent work rather than to groups of scientists for team efforts sustained this pattern of research until about World War I, when project allocations and teamwork became more common. Heilbron and Seidel (n. 2 above), 8-14, discuss the pioneering efforts of George Ellery Hale at the Mount Wilson Observatory and Robert A. Millikan at the California Institute of Technology to promote large-group research early in the twentieth century. In addition, the mobilization of academic scientists for research during World War I boosted the large-research-team model. Though the wartime facilities did not remain intact between the wars, this model was resurrected during World War II. During the 1920s, E. O. Lawrence introduced such work patterns to the physics department at Berkeley as he pursued his cyclotron research program; see Heilbron and Seidel, 34, 111-16, 137-41, 228-35, 240-42, 333-35. European scientists had established this structure earlier; the Cavendish Laboratories of Cambridge University are a particularly noteworthy example. The European tradition of large-group research projects is also discussed in Rhodes (n. 2 above), 123, 124, 138, 154-55, 162, 191.
33. In the United States, industrial research and development departments were the first to organize their scientific staff in this fashion. Edison's Menlo Park laboratory was one of the earliest industrial laboratories to do so; see Martin V. Melosi, Thomas Edison (Glenview, Ill., 1990). DuPont created a research and development component to its operations early in the twentieth century; see David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy (Cambridge, 1988), 31, 224. In contrast, Payne, 93-95, and Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York, 1979), 283-84, document that individuals rather than groups usually carried out research programs in the American science community of the early twentieth century. Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago, 1991), 15-30, finds that the awarding of research grants to individuals for independent work rather than to groups of scientists for team efforts sustained this pattern of research until about World War I, when project allocations and teamwork became more common. Heilbron and Seidel (n. 2 above), 8-14, discuss the pioneering efforts of George Ellery Hale at the Mount Wilson Observatory and Robert A. Millikan at the California Institute of Technology to promote large-group research early in the twentieth century. In addition, the mobilization of academic scientists for research during World War I boosted the large-research-team model. Though the wartime facilities did not remain intact between the wars, this model was resurrected during World War II. During the 1920s, E. O. Lawrence introduced such work patterns to the physics department at Berkeley as he pursued his cyclotron research program; see Heilbron and Seidel, 34, 111-16, 137-41, 228-35, 240-42, 333-35. European scientists had established this structure earlier; the Cavendish Laboratories of Cambridge University are a particularly noteworthy example. The European tradition of large-group research projects is also discussed in Rhodes (n. 2 above), 123, 124, 138, 154-55, 162, 191.
34. In the United States, industrial research and development departments were the first to organize their scientific staff in this fashion. Edison's Menlo Park laboratory was one of the earliest industrial laboratories to do so; see Martin V. Melosi, Thomas Edison (Glenview, Ill., 1990). DuPont created a research and development component to its operations early in the twentieth century; see David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy (Cambridge, 1988), 31, 224. In contrast, Payne, 93-95, and Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York, 1979), 283-84, document that individuals rather than groups usually carried out research programs in the American science community of the early twentieth century. Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago, 1991), 15-30, finds that the awarding of research grants to individuals for independent work rather than to groups of scientists for team efforts sustained this pattern of research until about World War I, when project allocations and teamwork became more common. Heilbron and Seidel (n. 2 above), 8-14, discuss the pioneering efforts of George Ellery Hale at the Mount Wilson Observatory and Robert A. Millikan at the California Institute of Technology to promote large-group research early in the twentieth century. In addition, the mobilization of academic scientists for research during World War I boosted the large-research-team model. Though the wartime facilities did not remain intact between the wars, this model was resurrected during World War II. During the 1920s, E. O. Lawrence introduced such work patterns to the physics department at Berkeley as he pursued his cyclotron research program; see Heilbron and Seidel, 34, 111-16, 137-41, 228-35, 240-42, 333-35. European scientists had established this structure earlier; the Cavendish Laboratories of Cambridge University are a particularly noteworthy example. The European tradition of large-group research projects is also discussed in Rhodes (n. 2 above), 123, 124, 138, 154-55, 162, 191.
35. In the United States, industrial research and development departments were the first to organize their scientific staff in this fashion. Edison's Menlo Park laboratory was one of the earliest industrial laboratories to do so; see Martin V. Melosi, Thomas Edison (Glenview, Ill., 1990). DuPont created a research and development component to its operations early in the twentieth century; see David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy (Cambridge, 1988), 31, 224. In contrast, Payne, 93-95, and Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York, 1979), 283-84, document that individuals rather than groups usually carried out research programs in the American science community of the early twentieth century. Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago, 1991), 15-30, finds that the awarding of research grants to individuals for independent work rather than to groups of scientists for team efforts sustained this pattern of research until about World War I, when project allocations and teamwork became more common. Heilbron and Seidel (n. 2 above), 8-14, discuss the pioneering efforts of George Ellery Hale at the Mount Wilson Observatory and Robert A. Millikan at the California Institute of Technology to promote large-group research early in the twentieth century. In addition, the mobilization of academic scientists for research during World War I boosted the large-research-team model. Though the wartime facilities did not remain intact between the wars, this model was resurrected during World War II. During the 1920s, E. O. Lawrence introduced such work patterns to the physics department at Berkeley as he pursued his cyclotron research program; see Heilbron and Seidel, 34, 111-16, 137-41, 228-35, 240-42, 333-35. European scientists had established this structure earlier; the Cavendish Laboratories of Cambridge University are a particularly noteworthy example. The European tradition of large-group research projects is also discussed in Rhodes (n. 2 above), 123, 124, 138, 154-55, 162, 191.
36. Seidel, "A Home For Big Science" (n. 2 above), 39.
37. Peter Bacon Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Chicago, 1997), 117-19; Hoddeson et al. (n. 2 above), 93-96.
38. Peter Bacon Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Chicago, 1997), 117-19; Hoddeson et al. (n. 2 above), 93-96.
39. Frank Spedding, Harley Wilhelm, and Adrian Daane, interview, May 1967, transcript, Spedding Papers, 7.
40. Svec (n. 6 above), 17.
41. H. A. Wilhelm, "A History of Uranium Metal Production in America," December 1947, Spedding Papers, 7-8. These experiments were modeled on those first attempted in the 1920s. Since then the calcium reduction of uranium tetrafluoride had seemed the most promising technique, but a scarcity of high-quality materials prevented this line of research from advancing. Instead, scientists attempted to reduce uranium oxide to the metal, with little success. During the war, government contracts prompted companies such as Metal Hydride to produce high-quality calcium and spurred the Harshaw and DuPont Corporations to step up production of uranium tetrafluoride from uranium dioxide. The availability of these basic materials allowed the Ames group to return to the abandoned research effort. J. C. Goggins and others at the University of New Hampshire had carried out uranium tetratluoride reduction experiments that showed promise. See Hewlett and Anderson (n. 2 above); Payne (n. 6 above), 69-70.
42. Earle D. Ross, The Land Grant Idea at Iowa State College (Ames, Iowa, 1958), 210-26.
43. Spedding, Wilhelm, and Daane interview, 9. Spedding's own curriculum vitae, for example, does not mention any publications based on research related to the solicited research program until 1947. See "Bibliography of Articles by F. H. Spedding," photocopy, Spedding Papers; Payne, 202-3.
44. Spedding, Wilhelm, and Daane interview, 27.
45. F. H. Spedding, "The Operation and Scope of the Ames Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission," speech, ca. 1960-62, Spedding Papers, 9. The contracts made between 1942 and June 1945, located in the Department of Energy Archives, document a steady decline in the price at which Iowa State was selling the uranium to the U.S. government. In contract no. W-7405 Eng-7, 9 November 1942, the price was eight dollars per pound. In contract no. W-7405 Eng-7, 25 June 1945, "it [was] estimated that the cost of the work [would] not exceed $1.00 per pound." Hoddeson testifies as to the success of the Ames process and notes that "the bulk of material used in full-scale plutonium production plants' utilized this technique"; Hoddeson et al. (n. 2 above), 33 n. 27.
46. E. I. Fulmer, "History of Ames Project," 9 December 1946, Spedding Papers, 7-15. Svec (n. 6 above), 13. See also contract No. W-905-Eng-7, supplement no. 9, date effective 12 January 1945.
47. Spedding recognized their traditionally adverse goals when he referred to the rivalry between industry and the academy in Spedding, Wilhelm, and Daane interview (n. 12 above), 17. Vannevar Bush recognized them as well; see Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C., 1945), 13-14. The long tradition of corporate research and development suggests that in practice their differing objectives, while distinct, are not mutually exclusive. For a history of corporate R&D, see Hounshell and Smith (n. 9 above). Though corporations have supported basic research, academia has seldom strayed into the realm of production. Stanley O. Ikenberry and Renee C. Friedman suggest that institutes, centers, and the like developed to some degree in response to the coupling of postwar objectives of productivity to the traditional commitment of academic departments to basic research; Beyond Academic Departments (San Francisco, 1972), 43-46.
48. Spedding recognized their traditionally adverse goals when he referred to the rivalry between industry and the academy in Spedding, Wilhelm, and Daane interview (n. 12 above), 17. Vannevar Bush recognized them as well; see Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C., 1945), 13-14. The long tradition of corporate research and development suggests that in practice their differing objectives, while distinct, are not mutually exclusive. For a history of corporate R&D, see Hounshell and Smith (n. 9 above). Though corporations have supported basic research, academia has seldom strayed into the realm of production. Stanley O. Ikenberry and Renee C. Friedman suggest that institutes, centers, and the like developed to some degree in response to the coupling of postwar objectives of productivity to the traditional commitment of academic departments to basic research; Beyond Academic Departments (San Francisco, 1972), 43-46.
49. Fulmer, 15-20; Hewlett and Anderson (n. 2 above), 29, 286-87.
50. Harold V. Gaskill (director of the Division of War Research at Iowa State College) to Charles E. Friley (president of the college), 3 October 1945, Friley Papers, ISU Archives; Friley to J. B. Fisk and R. W. Warner (directors of research and engineering, respectively), AEC, 3 February 1948, copy in Spedding Papers.
51. Spedding to Lt. Col. A. V. Peterson, 25 May 1946, references the contract that was in effect in 1946 and testifies to future federal contracts. See also Spedding to James H. Hilton (president of the university), 6 April 1964, copy in Spedding Papers.
52. B. H. Platt (IAR business manager) to Friley, 1 October 1949, copy in Spedding Papers.
53. Spedding to Hilton, 6 April 1964, copy in Spedding Papers.
54. Ibid.
55. Spedding to Friley, 3 February 1947, copy in Spedding Papers.
56. Charles A. Goetz (head of the chemistry department) to Premo Chiotti, 23 August 1950; Wilhelm to Goetz, 15 January 1951, copies in Spedding Papers.
57. Lawrence diverted half of Segré's salary to the physics department, which then gave him a half-time position. The balance came under the research budget at Lawrence's laboratory for services rendered. See Heilbron and Seidel (n. 2 above), 521.
58. Until the professionalization of the disciplines of American science, during the late nineteenth century, scientific research was seldom departmentally oriented. However, as American science professionalized, academic research in chemistry and physics assumed a discipline-specific orientation. See Kevles (n. 9 above), 12, 35. Research could have been organized around particular problems of investigation, as industrial research and development usually was; see Hounshell and Smith (n. 9 above), 221-503. Lawrence's laboratory at Berkeley was one of the earliest labs associated with an academic institution to assume this form; see Robert Seidel, "The Origins of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory," in Galison and Hevly (n. 2 above), 35-36. In addition to academic and industrial models for the IAR, the Agricultural Experiment Station, another contemporary research laboratory, offered another pattern, one that Spedding was probably aware of since it was part of the Iowa State University. See "The Responsibility of the Institute for Atomic Research and Its Relations With the Other Research Institutes on the Campus," internal memorandum, photocopy, n.d., Spedding Papers, 1.
59. Spedding to Hilton, 6 April 1964. The physics department at Stanford presents an interesting counterexample. It refused to support the federally funded linear accelerator with appointments from the department because the faculty feared being subsumed by the federal agenda. See Lowen (n. 2 above), 181-86. Growing concern over Iowa State's dependence on "soft money" forced the university to reconsider this practice. In 1972-73 it was decided that the university would pay 75 percent of the salaries of new faculty. In 1986-87 the policy again changed, and Iowa State began to carry the nine-month salary of faculty jointly appointed at the university and the laboratory; the Ames Laboratory provided two-ninths salary, more akin to conventional summer grants. Bruce Harmon (deputy director of the Ames Laboratory), interview by author, Ames, Iowa, 24 January 1999.
60. Statistics in the following paragraphs are from Iowa State University general catalogs, 1940-70 (hereafter ISU catalogs).
61. It is noteworthy that eleven of the thirty-three new hires between 1948 and 1959 were Iowa State graduates; ISU catalogs, 1948-59.
62. ISU catalogs, 1945-46, 256.
63. ISU catalogs, 1940-70.
64. Gschneidner, Rare Earths: The Fraternal Fifteen (n. 7 above) 6, 10-11; Spedding, "The Rare Earths" (n. 7 above), 26.
65. Gschneidner, Rare Earths: The Fraternal Fifteen (n. 7 above) 6, 10-11; Spedding, "The Rare Earths" (n. 7 above), 26.
66. Fulmer (n. 19 above), 41-42, describes the process that was employed.
67. The unprecedented availability of rare earths stimulated the study of them, which in turn led to the identification of new applications for them. In addition to their importance to the atomic energy program, numerous commercial uses piqued industry's interest. In the mid-1960s the commercial application of rare earths to the color television and electronics industries provided a market for these materials. Spedding, "The Rare Earths," 82-83.
68. Spedding to R. Lindner, Indiana University, 18 November 1955, and Spedding to Lt. Bruce A. Raby, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1 December 1955, appendix, copies in Spedding Papers.
69. Ames Laboratory, Rare-Earth Information Center, brochure (n.p., n.d.), Institute for Physical Research and Technology, Iowa State University.
70. United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No. 107, 13 May 1948, photocopy, Spedding Papers.
71. "General Information" release (n.d.), Hilton Papers, ISU archives; Spedding to Kenneth A. Dunbar (manager, Chicago Operations Office [COO] of the AEC), 29 December 1958, copies in Spedding Papers.
72. Lowen (n. 2 above), 104.
73. Leslie (n. 2 above), 45, credits Terman with using the phrase as he deliberately sought to develop particular areas of strength at Stanford; see also Lowen, 149.
74. Lowen, 158-63; Leslie, 30-31; Bix (n. 2 above), 9.
75. During the 1950s and 1960s, subtle changes in the chemistry department redistributed courses in science and agriculture, but had little effect on the university's larger mission. Courses in practical chemistry, formerly offered by the chemistry department, were subsumed under the curricula of various other departments; the agronomy department and the dairy and food industry department took over the courses aimed at their students, and the department of biophysics and biochemistry, created as a distinct department in 1965, did likewise. It is not apparent, however, that these changes were motivated by any effort to build Termanesque "steeples of excellence." Rather, the transfer of these courses to other departments and colleges reflected the university's continued commitment to serve the "practical education of the land-grant mission" but in a more self-sufficient, departmentally independent manner. It was most likely a consequence of the development of these programs rather than a philosophical shift on the part of the university. See ISU catalogs, 1935-70.
76. Earle D. Ross, A History of the Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts (Ames, Iowa, 1942), 209-11. Governmental opposition to duplication comes through in various statements. See James H. Hilton, "James H. Hilton's Story from 1899 to 1965," photocopy, Hilton papers, ISU archives, 28. See also "Meeting on 1 November 1945 of a group from Iowa State College and the University of Iowa," and Friley to Virgil M. Hancher (president of the University of Iowa), 25 September 1945, copies in Hancher Papers, University of Iowa Archives, Iowa City.
77. Earle D. Ross, The Land Grant Idea (n. 15 above), 206-8, 236-37, 269, 291-92; "Dr. Charles E. Friley Retires July 1 as 9th President of ISC," News of Iowa State, July 1953, 1; Charles E. Friley, "The Place of the Technological College in Higher Education," School and Society, 7 November 1936, 588.
78. Earle D. Ross, The Land Grant Idea (n. 15 above), 206-8, 236-37, 269, 291-92; "Dr. Charles E. Friley Retires July 1 as 9th President of ISC," News of Iowa State, July 1953, 1; Charles E. Friley, "The Place of the Technological College in Higher Education," School and Society, 7 November 1936, 588.
79. Earle D. Ross, The Land Grant Idea (n. 15 above), 206-8, 236-37, 269, 291-92; "Dr. Charles E. Friley Retires July 1 as 9th President of ISC," News of Iowa State, July 1953, 1; Charles E. Friley, "The Place of the Technological College in Higher Education," School and Society, 7 November 1936, 588.
80. Growth in the humanities and social sciences continued through the 1950s and 1960s. The department of history and government had ten professors in 1950, twenty-three in 1967; English and speech had twenty-four in 1950, thirty-nine in 1967. ISU catalogs, 1950-70.
81. Ross, The Land Grant Idea, 269.
82. For example, the Ames Laboratory approved the requests of Fassel, Powell, and Marten to be paid for their consulting work because there was no conflict of interest between it and their government-funded research obligations. Although both Powell's and Fassel's work related to their Ames Laboratory research program, their requests did not "involve holding back information from the AEC or giving preferential treatment to one company. Such work actually is of some benefit to the AEC's research program as [they] obtain good ideas from this work that [they are] free to exploit in the AEC's behalf." Morton Smutz (deputy director, Ames Laboratory) to Fred C. Mattmueller (director of contracts, COO), 3 November 1966, copy in Spedding Papers.
83. Mattmueller to Spedding, 30 November 1961, 13 December 1961; Spedding to Mattmueller, draft of letter not sent, January 1962; Morton Smutz to Chalmer J. Roy, 10 March 1966, copies in Spedding Papers. The glassblowing shop continued to be shared between the Ames Laboratory and the college after the other shops were closed; see Charles V. Banks to Roy, 20 August 1965, copy in Spedding Papers.
84. Spedding to Hilton, 6 April 1964, copy in Spedding Papers.
85. J. H. Jensen to Deans, Directors, and Department Heads, 24 August 1959, copy in Spedding Papers.
86. Morton Smutz to W. Robert Parks, 22 May 1962, Spedding Papers
87. University rules required retirement from administrative duties at age sixty-five, with the possibility of assuming a reduced teaching load until the age of seventy. Spedding retired from the university at sixty-five, Wilhelm took the latter option and did not retire until 1970. Spedding protested this practice to Friley; see Spedding to Friley, 18 December 1950, 16 March 1951; Spedding to Hilton, 6 February 1956, 11 January 1957, 6 April 1964, and 11 May 1964, copies in Spedding Papers. Wilhelm protested the policy by arguing that working for the Ames Laboratory did not afford him the lucrative opportunities that other academics enjoyed, and that special dispensation would only begin to compensate for the excessive and unrewarded burden he had carried in the national interest. None followed. Wilhelm to Robert Hansen, 28 October 1970, copies in Wilhelm Papers, Ames Laboratory Archives.
88. Hilton (n. 47 above), 30-31.