메뉴 건너뛰기
Group Decision and Negotiation
Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 315-324
Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game
Author keywords

Evolutionary stability; Fairness; Ultimatum game
Indexed keywords

EID: 0034394546     PISSN: 09262644     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008728906472     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (3)
References (14)
  • 2
    • 0010360675 scopus 로고
    • Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability ?
    • Bomze, I. M., and J. W. Weibull. (1995). "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability ?", Games and Economic Behavior 11: 173-192.
    • (1995) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.11 , pp. 173-192
    • Bomze, I.M.1    Weibull, J.W.2
  • 4
    • 0000489361 scopus 로고
    • On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review
    • Güth, W. (1995). "On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27: 329-344.
    • (1995) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol.27 , pp. 329-344
    • Güth, W.1
  • 5
    • 0002730095 scopus 로고
    • Learning, Mutations, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
    • Kandori, M., G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob. (1993). "Learning, Mutations, and Long Run Equilibria in Games", Econometrica 61: 29-56.
    • (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 29-56
    • Kandori, M.1    Mailath, G.J.2    Rob, R.3
  • 6
    • 34548719708 scopus 로고
    • The Logic of Animal Conflict
    • Maynard Smith, J., and G. R. Price. (1973). "The Logic of Animal Conflict", Nature 246: 15-18.
    • (1973) Nature , vol.246 , pp. 15-18
    • Maynard Smith, J.1    Price, G.R.2
  • 8
    • 0042727863 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary Stability and Cooperation: The Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
    • Sozialökonomisches Seminar der Universität Hamburg
    • Peters, R. (1997a). "Evolutionary Stability and Cooperation: The Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma", Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 94, Sozialökonomisches Seminar der Universität Hamburg.
    • (1997) Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung , vol.94
    • Peters, R.1
  • 9
    • 0041726622 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Stability of Networks: An Evolutionary Approach to Standardization
    • Peters, R. (1997b). "The Stability of Networks: An Evolutionary Approach to Standardization", EURAS Yearbook of Standardization 1: 347-356.
    • (1997) EURAS Yearbook of Standardization , vol.1 , pp. 347-356
    • Peters, R.1
  • 10
    • 58149324992 scopus 로고
    • Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
    • Roth, A. E., and I. Erev. (1995). "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term", Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164-212.
    • (1995) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.8 , pp. 164-212
    • Roth, A.E.1    Erev, I.2
  • 11
    • 0000488786 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games
    • Selten, R. (1983). "Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games", Mathematical Social Sciences 5: 269-363.
    • (1983) Mathematical Social Sciences , vol.5 , pp. 269-363
    • Selten, R.1
  • 12
    • 0000861465 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games - Correction and Further Development
    • Selten, R. (1988). "Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games - Correction and Further Development", Mathematical Social Sciences 16: 223-266.
    • (1988) Mathematical Social Sciences , vol.16 , pp. 223-266
    • Selten, R.1
  • 14
    • 0023589142 scopus 로고
    • On the Definition of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
    • Vickers, G. T., and C. Cannings. (1987). "On the Definition of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy", Journal of Theoretical Biology 129: 349-353.
    • (1987) Journal of Theoretical Biology , vol.129 , pp. 349-353
    • Vickers, G.T.1    Cannings, C.2

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.