Understanding decisionmaking, U.S. foreign policy, and the Cuban missile crisis: A review essay

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 134-164

  Bernstein, Barton J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034393895     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228800560417     Document Type: Review

References (89)

1. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); henceforth: Essence (1971)
2. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); henceforth: Essence (1971)
3. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
4. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
5. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
6. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
7. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
8. See, for example, Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-490; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 56-129; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-322; and Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 659-684.
9. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); henceforth: Essence (1999).
10. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); henceforth: Essence (1999).
11. See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), pp. 179-260; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950); and William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 1953).
12. See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), pp. 179-260; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950); and William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 1953).
13. See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), pp. 179-260; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950); and William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 1953).
14. Essence (1971), pp. 162-178, at p. 176; see also pp. 179-210.
15. Ibid., pp. 278-279, n. 5, and pp. 162-163.
16. Ibid., pp. 164-173, 185-210. The 1971 Essence might be contrasted with Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, Vol. 24, Special Supplement (1972); and in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79, for elaborations and modifications of the conception of bureaucratic politics. See especially pp. 44 (on hierarchy); 44, 48-49, and 58 (distinguishing internal bureaucratic differences from bureaucratic politics); 48 (on multiple "interests" in bureaucratic politics); 47-48 and 58 (on Congress and domestics politics); and 54 (virtually folding organizational matters into the conception of bureaucratic politics). This 1972 essay was not explicitly presented as sometimes modifying Essence (1971), but that essay can be interpreted that way.
17. Ibid., pp. 164-173, 185-210. The 1971 Essence might be contrasted with Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, Vol. 24, Special Supplement (1972); and in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79, for elaborations and modifications of the conception of bureaucratic politics. See especially pp. 44 (on hierarchy); 44, 48-49, and 58 (distinguishing internal bureaucratic differences from bureaucratic politics); 48 (on multiple "interests" in bureaucratic politics); 47-48 and 58 (on Congress and domestics politics); and 54 (virtually folding organizational matters into the conception of bureaucratic politics). This 1972 essay was not explicitly presented as sometimes modifying Essence (1971), but that essay can be interpreted that way.
18. Ibid., pp. 164-173, 185-210. The 1971 Essence might be contrasted with Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, Vol. 24, Special Supplement (1972); and in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79, for elaborations and modifications of the conception of bureaucratic politics. See especially pp. 44 (on hierarchy); 44, 48-49, and 58 (distinguishing internal bureaucratic differences from bureaucratic politics); 48 (on multiple "interests" in bureaucratic politics); 47-48 and 58 (on Congress and domestics politics); and 54 (virtually folding organizational matters into the conception of bureaucratic politics). This 1972 essay was not explicitly presented as sometimes modifying Essence (1971), but that essay can be interpreted that way.
19. Essence (1971), pp. 149, 158-160, 194, 210-215.
20. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
21. Ibid., at p. 181; see also pp. 186 and viii-ix (on documenting entirely from the public record). Obviously the interviews often determined what was chosen from the public record, and how it was interpreted.
22. Ibid., pp. 141-143 and 225-226 (Jupiters), 128-130 (navy), and 124-126 (air strike). On unraveling the story of the Jupiters, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 56-128; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the navy, see Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 110-114; and Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, October 24, 1962, PREM 11/3690, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. On the air force, see Merritt Olsen to Allison, January 11, 1978, courtesy of Zelikow, Allison, and Olsen. For later revisions, see Essence (1999), pp. 224-235, 252-253, n. 116.
23. Ibid., pp. 141-143 and 225-226 (Jupiters), 128-130 (navy), and 124-126 (air strike). On unraveling the story of the Jupiters, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 56-128; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the navy, see Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 110-114; and Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, October 24, 1962, PREM 11/3690, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. On the air force, see Merritt Olsen to Allison, January 11, 1978, courtesy of Zelikow, Allison, and Olsen. For later revisions, see Essence (1999), pp. 224-235, 252-253, n. 116.
24. Ibid., pp. 141-143 and 225-226 (Jupiters), 128-130 (navy), and 124-126 (air strike). On unraveling the story of the Jupiters, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 56-128; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the navy, see Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 110-114; and Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, October 24, 1962, PREM 11/3690, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. On the air force, see Merritt Olsen to Allison, January 11, 1978, courtesy of Zelikow, Allison, and Olsen. For later revisions, see Essence (1999), pp. 224-235, 252-253, n. 116.
25. Ibid., pp. 141-143 and 225-226 (Jupiters), 128-130 (navy), and 124-126 (air strike). On unraveling the story of the Jupiters, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 56-128; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the navy, see Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 110-114; and Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, October 24, 1962, PREM 11/3690, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. On the air force, see Merritt Olsen to Allison, January 11, 1978, courtesy of Zelikow, Allison, and Olsen. For later revisions, see Essence (1999), pp. 224-235, 252-253, n. 116.
26. Ibid., pp. 141-143 and 225-226 (Jupiters), 128-130 (navy), and 124-126 (air strike). On unraveling the story of the Jupiters, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 56-128; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the navy, see Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 110-114; and Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, October 24, 1962, PREM 11/3690, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. On the air force, see Merritt Olsen to Allison, January 11, 1978, courtesy of Zelikow, Allison, and Olsen. For later revisions, see Essence (1999), pp. 224-235, 252-253, n. 116.
27. See, in particular, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997 ); and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a warning about errors in these transcribed tapes, see Sheldon M. Stern, "What JFK Really Said," Atlantic Monthly, May 2000, pp. 122-128.
28. See, in particular, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997 ); and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a warning about errors in these transcribed tapes, see Sheldon M. Stern, "What JFK Really Said," Atlantic Monthly, May 2000, pp. 122-128.
29. See, in particular, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997 ); and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a warning about errors in these transcribed tapes, see Sheldon M. Stern, "What JFK Really Said," Atlantic Monthly, May 2000, pp. 122-128.
30. Essence (1999), pp. 312-313.
31. Ibid., pp. 26-29; cf. Essence. (1971), pp. 37-38.
32. Ibid., pp. 26-29; cf. Essence. (1971), pp. 37-38.
33. Essence (1971), pp. 33-34; cf. Essence (1999), p. 25.
34. Essence (1971), pp. 33-34; cf. Essence (1999), p. 25.
35. Essence (1999), p. 57, n. 19, on Collingwood's 1993 comments. Cf. Essence (1971), p. 288, n. 95, for a reference to Collingwood but without any endorsement of his thought. For a philosophical dispute about Collingwood, see Leon Goldstein, "Dray on Re-Enactment and Constructuonism," History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (October 1998), pp. 409-421.
36. Essence (1999), p. 57, n. 19, on Collingwood's 1993 comments. Cf. Essence (1971), p. 288, n. 95, for a reference to Collingwood but without any endorsement of his thought. For a philosophical dispute about Collingwood, see Leon Goldstein, "Dray on Re-Enactment and Constructuonism," History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (October 1998), pp. 409-421.
37. Essence (1999), p. 57, n. 19, on Collingwood's 1993 comments. Cf. Essence (1971), p. 288, n. 95, for a reference to Collingwood but without any endorsement of his thought. For a philosophical dispute about Collingwood, see Leon Goldstein, "Dray on Re-Enactment and Constructuonism," History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (October 1998), pp. 409-421.
38. On the covering law and explanation, see Essence (1999), pp. 11-12, n. 1; and cf. ibid., pp. 278-279, n. 5. On James, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 8-21.
39. On the covering law and explanation, see Essence (1999), pp. 11-12, n. 1; and cf. ibid., pp. 278-279, n. 5. On James, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 8-21.
40. On the covering law and explanation, see Essence (1999), pp. 11-12, n. 1; and cf. ibid., pp. 278-279, n. 5. On James, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 8-21.
41. Essence (1971), pp. 49-50. See also the last sentence on this issue of Cuban defense on p. 50, which discussed it as a possible "subsidiary effect" and rejected it as an "overriding objective." That ambiguous phrasing might leave wiggle room for Cuban defense as an additional motive in the book's analysis, but Essence on earlier pages seemed to reject "Cuban defense" as even one of the Soviet motives.
42. James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), pp. 29, 226-296; Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 173; Anatoli Gribkov, in Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 11-14; interviews and discussions with Ball, 1989; Bundy, 1989-93; and McNamara, 1993 and 1999; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 415-419. Obviously, the acceptance by Ex Comm members of such views in later years does not establish the accuracy of those views, but because the endorsement of those views did constitute a critique - variously implicit or explicit - of these men's own thinking during the missile crisis, that later endorsement of a critique seems very often contrary to their interest and should be taken seriously as an important indication of how (admittedly soft) evidence has changed views. There may well be still-unexamined Soviet archives on Khrushchev's 1962 thinking that may help resolve this factual/interpretive dispute.
43. James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), pp. 29, 226-296; Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 173; Anatoli Gribkov, in Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 11-14; interviews and discussions with Ball, 1989; Bundy, 1989-93; and McNamara, 1993 and 1999; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 415-419. Obviously, the acceptance by Ex Comm members of such views in later years does not establish the accuracy of those views, but because the endorsement of those views did constitute a critique - variously implicit or explicit - of these men's own thinking during the missile crisis, that later endorsement of a critique seems very often contrary to their interest and should be taken seriously as an important indication of how (admittedly soft) evidence has changed views. There may well be still-unexamined Soviet archives on Khrushchev's 1962 thinking that may help resolve this factual/interpretive dispute.
44. James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), pp. 29, 226-296; Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 173; Anatoli Gribkov, in Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 11-14; interviews and discussions with Ball, 1989; Bundy, 1989-93; and McNamara, 1993 and 1999; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 415-419. Obviously, the acceptance by Ex Comm members of such views in later years does not establish the accuracy of those views, but because the endorsement of those views did constitute a critique - variously implicit or explicit - of these men's own thinking during the missile crisis, that later endorsement of a critique seems very often contrary to their interest and should be taken seriously as an important indication of how (admittedly soft) evidence has changed views. There may well be still-unexamined Soviet archives on Khrushchev's 1962 thinking that may help resolve this factual/interpretive dispute.
45. James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), pp. 29, 226-296; Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 173; Anatoli Gribkov, in Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 11-14; interviews and discussions with Ball, 1989; Bundy, 1989-93; and McNamara, 1993 and 1999; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 415-419. Obviously, the acceptance by Ex Comm members of such views in later years does not establish the accuracy of those views, but because the endorsement of those views did constitute a critique - variously implicit or explicit - of these men's own thinking during the missile crisis, that later endorsement of a critique seems very often contrary to their interest and should be taken seriously as an important indication of how (admittedly soft) evidence has changed views. There may well be still-unexamined Soviet archives on Khrushchev's 1962 thinking that may help resolve this factual/interpretive dispute.
46. Essence (1999), pp. 99-109.
47. Ibid., pp. 82-88; see also pp. 88-109.
48. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
49. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
50. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
51. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
52. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
53. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
54. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 167-182. Despite the general argument of their " Nuclear Decision" chapter, see also pp. 170-171, for possibly skimpy support for the "Berlin" argument, which is virtually dismissed elsewhere in their book and fully in 1999-2000 discussions by Naftali and in 2000 discussions by Fursenko. Fursenko has recently been in the Soviet archives on Berlin crisis, 1958-63, reports that he found no evidence connecting it to the deployment of Soviet missles in Cuba. Essence (1999) intermittently uses " One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 82-109, but does not seek to rebut it point by point in Soviet motives. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp. 173-174, thought that Khrushchev wanted the missile deployment to defend Cuba and to affect the strategic balance, with the second purpose opening possibilities on Berlin. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 73, offers a similar interpretation, and so does Gribkov in Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 12-14.
55. Essence (1999), p. 108; cf. Essence (1971), p. 50.
56. Essence (1999), p. 108; cf. Essence (1971), p. 50.
57. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 179-182.
58. Essence (1999), pp. 114-115.
59. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
60. Ibid., pp. 110-120.
61. Ibid., pp. 325-347 (on the quarantine), 338-347 (on politics of choice), and 339-340 (on JFK); tor almost identical phrasing of pp. 339-340, see Essence (1971), p. 194.
62. Ibid., pp. 325-347 (on the quarantine), 338-347 (on politics of choice), and 339-340 (on JFK); tor almost identical phrasing of pp. 339-340, see Essence (1971), p. 194.
63. Essence (1999), pp. 207-215, and see p. 201 (on being suggestive); cf. Essence (1971), p. 102, for possibly more hedges about being suggestive in explaining Soviet action.
64. Essence (1999), pp. 207-215, and see p. 201 (on being suggestive); cf. Essence (1971), p. 102, for possibly more hedges about being suggestive in explaining Soviet action.
65. Essence (1971), pp. 110-113.
66. Essence (1999), pp. 210-214; cf. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," p. 192.
67. Essence (1999), pp. 210-214; cf. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," p. 192.
68. Essence (1999), pp. 213-214
69. Ibid., pp. 214-215.
70. Ibid., p. 215.
71. Ibid., p. 287.
72. Essence (1971), p. 176; cf. Essence (1999), p. 307.
73. Essence (1971), p. 176; cf. Essence (1999), p. 307.
74. For a contrary conclusion in one case study on navy budgets, see Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1994), pp. 1-41.
75. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 99-101.
76. Ibid., p. 92.
77. Ibid., pp. 57, 96-97, 112-114.
78. Ibid., p. 403.
79. Interviews and discussions with Bundy.
80. Essence (1971), pp. 193-195; and Essence (1999), pp. 339-340.
81. Essence (1971), pp. 193-195; and Essence (1999), pp. 339-340.
82. Essence (1999), p. 328, 337-347, 354-362, 364-365.
83. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," pp. 83-94.
84. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
85. Ibid., pp. 94-96.
86. Ibid.; and interviews with Bundy and McNamara. Unfortunately, no archival sources on this secret Oval Office meeting have become available, so the interpretation rests substantially on recollections provided well after 1962. But those recollections are fully consistent with the October 27 Ex Comm minutes, which strongly indicate JFK's interests and preferences that day. Were such contemporaneous evidence not available on JFK's thinking that day, there would be good reason JFK look those recollections, especially because - with the ending of the Cold War - they make JFK look good by making him the "chief dove." On problems of sources, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half a Million American Lives' Saved by the Atomic Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 54-95.
87. Ibid.; and interviews with Bundy and McNamara. Unfortunately, no archival sources on this secret Oval Office meeting have become available, so the interpretation rests substantially on recollections provided well after 1962. But those recollections are fully consistent with the October 27 Ex Comm minutes, which strongly indicate JFK's interests and preferences that day. Were such contemporaneous evidence not available on JFK's thinking that day, there would be good reason JFK look those recollections, especially because - with the ending of the Cold War - they make JFK look good by making him the "chief dove." On problems of sources, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half a Million American Lives' Saved by the Atomic Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 54-95.
88. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), especially pp. 4-155.
89. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).